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Chapter 1 
 
 Introduction   
 
1.1. Genesis of Informal Sector: A Historical Perspective 
 
In the aftermath of World War II the global economy underwent significant structural 
changes; particularly, the developing economies, which had by the time started being 
liberated from decades of colonial despotism. Under the dwindling influence of 
colonialisation and in a zest to catch on with the developed world, they, in conformity 
with the Prebisch’s doctrine of post-Keynesian developments, emphasized on appropriate 
macroeconomic policies and institutions for promotion of growth in leading sectors that 
would entail an overall growth of the economy. The trajectory of development was 
essentially through the growth of organized economic activities by rapid industrialization 
that was expected to foster capital formation and expand domestic and export demand.  
 
At this postcolonial juncture the developing countries were characterized by dualistic 
economic structures  with the existence of both a developed urban market economy and 
a backward agriculture oriented subsistence economy. Expansion of industries and the 
resulting economic opportunities in urban areas triggered rural- urban migration and 
massive urbanization. However, industrial development failed to generate adequate 
employment and income opportunities in the urban sector, so that the surplus urban 
labour force was compelled to generate its own means of employment and survival in the 
informal sector. In China, for example, the large number of rural-urban migrants (some 
60 million) has been an important reason for creation of jobs in the informal economy1; 
                                                      
1 It should be noted that although informal sector is predominant in developing countries, it is not 
exclusive to them. The evidence from developed countries shows that cross-border migrants, 
especially those who have recently arrived in the country and do not speak the language, or 
women who are dependants of the primary migrant, tend to concentrate in the informal economy 
since they have few other jobs open to them. (ILO, 2002a). 
 
 Page | 3 
in Colombia migration condition2 has a large impact on the probability of being 
employed in the informal sector (Florez, 2003). A brief summary of the urbanization 
process and emergence of the informal sector has been provided by Sethuraman (1981).  
 
In the 1950s and 60s empirical investigations widely observed a dichotomy in the urban 
economies as well  where besides the organized industrial sector, there exists an 
unorganized, unprotected, traditional sector. It was Hart (1971) who first identified the 
later as ‘informal sector’, introduced it as part of the urban labour force that takes place 
outside the formal labour market and considered it as almost synonymous with the 
category of the small self-employed. Despite the limitation of Hart’s notion of the 
informal sector to the self-employed, the introduction of the concept enabled 
incorporation of activities that were previously ignored in theoretical models of 
development and in national economic accounts (Swaminathan, 1991).  
 
However, the pioneering research on the informal sector is widely considered to be the 
report of the International Labour Office on employment in Kenya (ILO, 1972), which 
was part of a series of large multi-disciplinary ‘employment missions’ to explore the 
persistent widespread unemployment in various developing countries. The Kenya 
employment mission recognised that the traditional sector had not just persisted but 
expanded to include profitable and efficient enterprises as well as marginal activities. 
Initially, ILO considered the main aim of the informal sector to be the provision of 
subsistence to families but later subsequent research studies recognized another aspect of 
the informal sector, that is, dynamism and potential for economic growth and 
employment.  
 
1.2. Towards Defining the Informal Sector 
 
Although the term 'informal sector' has gained wide currency in recent years, even after 
over thirty years of research on informal activities, there is still no consensus on its 
                                                      
2 However, Mazumdar (1976) shows that the informal sector is not the major point of entry for 
fresh migrants from rural areas.  
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definition3. As pointed out by Sethuraman (1981), the main problems confronted are the 
choice of an appropriate economic unit and the determination of the boundary separating 
the two sub-systems, formal and informal. The formal-informal sector dichotomy was 
first used by Hart (1971) in a study of urban Ghana. Weeks (1975) provided the 
distinction between formal and informal sectors on the basis of ‘the organizational 
characteristics of exchange relationships and the position of economic activities vis-à-vis 
the State’. It was also suggested that the activities could be sorted out on the basis of 
mode of production, organization, scale of operation, technology, productivity and labour 
markets (Papola, 1981).  
 
The ILO/UNDP employment mission report on Kenya (1972) suggested the following 
characteristics of the informal sector: (i) Easy entry for the new enterprises; (ii) Reliance 
on indigenous resources; (iii) Family ownership of enterprises; (iv) Small scale of 
operations and low productivity; (v) Labour-intensive and adapted technology; (vi) 
Reliance of workers on informal sources of education and skills; (vii) Unregulated and 
competitive markets and (viii) Lack of governmental support. 
 
As already mentioned, there is a wide heterogeneity in the definitions and characteristics 
of the informal sector forwarded by different authors and the ILO itself 4. In January 1993, 
the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (15th ICLS) adopted an 
international statistical definition of the Informal Sector and characterized enterprises as 
informal on the basis of the following criteria:  
 The enterprises are private unincorporated i.e. owned by individuals or households 
and are not constituted as separate legal entities, and for which no complete accounts are 
                                                      
3 The literature on informal sector is characterized by terminological confusion (Harding and 
Jenkins, 1989). Other synonymous terms found in the literature are ‘urban traditional’ (Todaro, 
1969), ‘lower circuit’ (Santos, 1979), ‘protoproletariat’ (McGee, 1971), ‘firm-centered economy’ 
(Geertz, 1963), ‘underground economy’ (Feige, 1989), ‘urban subsistence sector’ (Cole and 
Sanders, 1985), etc. However, there are important differences so that characteristics included in 
one definition are often ignored in others and none is sufficiently comprehensive.  
 
4 For alternative definitions, see Jhabvala, et al. (2003). 
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available that would permit a financial separation of the production activities of the 
enterprise from the other activities of its owner(s).  
 All or at least some of the goods or services produced are meant for sale or barter, 
with the possible inclusion of households which produce domestic or personal services in 
employing paid domestic employees. 
 Their size in terms of employment is below a certain threshold to be determined 
according to national circumstances, and/or they are not registered under specific forms 
of national legislation.  
 They are engaged in non-agricultural activities, including secondary nonagricultural 
activities of enterprises in the agricultural sector.  
 
However, it was later recognized that with the process of globalisation, enterprises are 
increasingly responding to the impending competitive pressure by resorting to mixed-
mode labour arrangements in which labour regulations coexist with non-standard, 
irregular types of labour and various forms of subcontracting. To accommodate the new 
forms of employment, an alternative conceptual framework for defining informal 
employment was proposed in the ILO report on ‘Decent Work and the Informal 
Economy’ and the 17th ICLS adopted the guideline endorsing it as an international 
statistical standard (ILO 2003). The guideline complements the 15th ICLS Resolution 
concerning statistics of employment in the informal sector. It defined informal 
employment to include the following types of jobs: 
· Own-account workers employed in their own informal sector enterprises; 
· Employers employed in their own informal sector enterprises;  
· Contributing family workers, irrespective of whether they work in formal or informal  
  sector enterprises; 
· Members of informal producers’ cooperatives;  
· Employees holding informal jobs whether employed by formal sector enterprises,  
  informal sector enterprises, or as domestic workers employed by households; and  
· Own-account workers engaged in the production of goods exclusively for own  
  final use by their household. 
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According to the World Bank definition5, the informal sector “covers a wide range of 
labour market activities that combine two groups of different nature. On one hand, the 
informal sector is formed by the coping behaviour of individuals and families in 
economic environment where earning opportunities are scarce. On the other hand, the 
informal sector is a product of rational behaviour of entrepreneurs that desire to escape 
state regulations”. The coping behaviour or survival activities consist of casual jobs, 
temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence agriculture, multiple job holding, while the 
entrepreneural strategies include unofficial activities to evade taxes and avoid 
governmental regulations and illegal underground activities6. 
 
1.3. Theoretical Approaches to Informal Sector 
 
The theoretical literature on informal sector is generally presumed to subscribe to any of 
three broad approaches. These approaches are briefly discussed below.  
 
(i) Dualistic labour market approach  
 
The essence of the dualistic view is that less developed countries are characterized by two 
different sectors, a modern and dynamic sector typified by capitalist mode of production; 
and a marginal or ‘subsistence’ sector dominated by agriculture, characterized by pre-
capitalist modes of production. It hypothesizes that the wage determination process is 
different in the two sectors. It was Lewis (1954) who first developed a theoretical model 
of development in a dualistic economy. Although his model is based on classical school 
foundations containing two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture, with asymmetric 
                                                      
5 Concept of Informal Sector - The World Bank Group. <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org.  
 
6 There is a debate with regard to the inclusion of illegal activities in the periphery of informal 
sector. The 15th ICLS in 1993 asserted, “Activities performed by production units of the informal 
sector are not necessarily performed with the deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes 
or social security contributions, or infringing labour or other legislations or administrative 
provisions. Accordingly, the concept of informal sector activities should be distinguished from 
the concept of activities of the hidden or underground economy”. The majority in the informal 
economy, although they are not registered or regulated, produces goods and services that are legal 
(ILO, 2002a).  
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behaviour postulated for each, he rejected the neoclassical assumptions of full 
employment, market clearance and perfect competition. He analyzed how surplus labour 
from the traditional agricultural sector could be withdrawn and productively used in the 
modern industrial sector to initiate the process of development. His main focus was in 
transition growth from a dualistic to a one-sector economy, i.e. from organizational 
dualism to organizational homogeneity.  Fei and Ranis (1964) extended the Lewis model 
by superimposing product dualism on his organisational dualism. Other important 
extensions of the basic Lewis model can be found in Harris and Todaro (1970) and Fields 
(1975). Harris and Todaro (1970) explained the process of migration in a dualistic 
framework and introduced the notion that intersectoral labour reallocation is affected not 
only by the intersectoral wage gap but also by the probability of obtaining a formal sector 
job. In their model a migrant either gets formal employment or remains unemployed. 
Fields (1975) pointed out that there were three choices for migrants:  a formal sector job, 
open urban unemployment, and a third possibility, a job in the urban informal sector. The 
Harris-Todaro (1970) model proposes that all migrants are intent upon eventual urban 
modern sector employment, but does not explain the movement of those targeting the 
urban subsistence sector employment. But Cole and Sanders (1985) point out that when 
population pressure on fixed agricultural land reduces the rural subsistence wage 
significantly below that of the urban subsistence sector, or when growth of demand for 
urban subsistence sector pushes the wage in that sector significantly above that of the 
rural subsistence sector, the focus for migrants with low endowments is not on the 
modern sector but rather on the subsistence sector with its relative ease of entry.  Banerjee 
(1983) corroborates this view in his empirical study of Delhi, which shows that the 
segmentation model is only partially valid and a substantial proportion of informal sector 
entrants were attracted to Delhi by opportunities in the informal sector 7.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
7 It has also been pointed out by ILO (1972), “it is not only the high-wage formal sector job that 
attracts the potential migrant, but also the income opportunity in the informal sector”.  
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(ii) Neo-liberal approach  
 
In this approach legal instruments are the main influence on the emergence and survival 
of informal sector (De Soto, 1989). Lengthy registration procedures, complex 
administrative steps and the costs involved in legalizing an enterprise deter entrepreneurs 
from operating legally and induce them towards informal activities. Informal sector is 
viewed as the optimal and coherent response of economic units to government-induced 
distortions like minimum wages and excessive taxation policies. Rauch (1991) describes 
in a neoclassical model the emergence of the informal sector as a voluntary phenomenon 
of firms to enjoy legal exemption from a mandated minimum wage policy that distorts 
resources away from first best allocations. Jones (1997), Suryahadi et al. (2003), 
Gindling and Terrell, (2005) and Fortin et al. (1997) have empirically studied the effects 
of minimum wages on informal sector. The importance of tax policy on the size of the 
informal sectors has been considered in a number of papers like Sarte (2000), Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2002), Choi and Thum (2005), Dessy and Pallage (2003), Ihrig and Moe 
(2004), among others. The empirical findings by Loayza (1996), Johnson et al. (1998) 
and Botero et al. (2003) substantiate these theoretical formulations. 
 
(iii) Structural articulation approach  
 
This approach counters the neo-liberal school by emphasizing the lack of association 
between the extent of constraint imposed by the institutional and legal framework, costs 
incurred by the entrepreneurs and the size of the informal sector8. In this approach9 the 
basic distinction between formal and informal activities is supposed to rely on the 
character of production and distribution processes. The different modes and forms of 
production are seen not only to co-exist but also to be inextricably connected and 
interdependent. The traditional sectors are marginalized and impoverished in the process 
                                                      
8 This relates to the fact that the informal sector is proportionally the largest in Bolivia and 
Guatemala, which have completely different legal and administrative framework (Maldonado, 
1995). 
 
9 See Beneria (1989); Castells and Portes (1989); Portes and Schauffler (1993); Roberts (1989) 
and Moser (1978). 
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of expansion of the modern sectors (see, for example, McGee, 1973; Quijano, 1974; 
Mingione, 1984). There is heterogeneity within the informal sector with at least two sub 
sectors: informal activities with direct subsistence goals and dynamic activities with 
decreasing labour costs and capital accumulation goals. The former is a disadvantaged 
sector with a counter-cyclical behaviour, and the latter one is integrated to the formal 
sector showing procyclical behaviour (Flórez, 2002). Ranis and Stewart (1999) 
differentiate among two urban informal sub-sectors, a V-goods sub-sector, which is 
dynamic and tied by subcontract to the urban formal sector, and an informal sponge sub-
sector. Studies indicate that some of the dynamic growth-oriented segments in the 
informal economy require considerable knowledge and skills, for example, information 
and communications technology (ICT) sector in India (See Kumar, 2001). The dependent 
structural linkages between the informal and formal sectors are shaped by the wage and 
labour strategies of capitalist enterprises, which seek to lower costs by maintaining a 
reserve army of surplus labour. 
 
1.4. Informal Sector Employment: Voluntary or Involuntary? 
 
The contention of the dualistic models that the informal sector is the disadvantaged end 
of a segmented labour market and a temporary waiting ground for those awaiting entry 
into formal sector has been empirically refuted in a number of studies. In fact, informal 
employment has been found in many cases to be voluntary10. Fields (1990), recognizing 
the existence of prosperous, voluntary group within the sector, argued that this 
constituted a second tier of the sector that made it more heterogeneous than the original 
Todaro dualistic formulation. Being in the informal sector is often the optimal decision of 
the workers, given their preferences, the constraints they face in terms of their level of 
human capital, and the level of formal sector labour productivity in the country. Fields 
(1990) labeled the two segments as “upper-tier” informal activities and “easy entry” 
                                                      
10 In Mexico, wage rigidity, the main source of labour market segmentation seems to be absent; 
minimum wages have not been binding for the last decade and wages have shown extraordinary 
downward flexibility during crises.  The persistence of a very large informal sector despite 
relatively undistorted and flexible labour market provides a paradox and undermines the role of 
wage distortions in the emergence of informal sector (Capalleja, 1994).  
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ones.11 Unemployed persons in transition countries and even in developed countries are 
often not able to get by on unemployment benefits, if they are available, and people have 
to supplement this income from a variety of informal activities or barter, taking care to 
avoid formal recognition that might lead to a loss of entitlements (Leonard, 2001).  
 
There is a plethora of empirical evidences of the voluntary nature of informal sector. In 
Brazil and Mexico, over 60% of those in the informal self employed sector left their 
previous job and entered the sector voluntarily with greater independence or higher pay 
as the principal motives (Maloney, 2004). In the Brazilian Annual National Domestic 
Survey, over 62% of self-employed men stated that they did not want a formal sector job, 
primarily because they were content with their current job (Cunningham and Maloney, 
2001). In a survey of Argentina it was revealed that 80% of the self-employed had no 
desire to change jobs12. In Greater Buenos Aires, another survey found that while 36% 
would have preferred to work more hours, only 26% were looking for other work 
(SIEMPRO, 1998).  In Paraguay, only 28% of those in the informal sector (both self 
employed and salaried) stated a desire to change occupations13. Arias and Sosa (2004), in 
a study of Bolivia find a premium to being informally self -employed. 
 
The growth of labour force in relation to the economic growth pertinently influences the 
voluntary or involuntary nature of the informal sector. The remarkable economic growth 
of China, coupled with the one-child norm entails rural-urban migration to sustain the 
increasing labour demand. But the political economy ensures protection of the urban 
residents from rural migrants by way of institutions like residence registration, restricting 
the rights of migrants in the cities, and collectivist mentality of many formal sector 
enterprises. The migrants failing to reside permanently in cities are left with the option to 
enter the informal sector. In contrast, in South Africa between 1995 and 2003 the labour 
                                                      
11 See also House (1984), Tokman (1987), Marcouiller et al. (1997) and Ranis and Stewart 
(1999). 
 
12  Consultoria Nordeste ,1998 (as cited in Maloney, 2004). 
 
13 Direccion General de Estadistica, Encuestas y Censos, Republica de Paraguay, “Sector 
Informal,” based on the Encuesta Integrada de Hogares 1997/1998.   
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force increased by a remarkable 4.2% per annum, while, wage employment grew 
relatively slowly over that period, by 1.8% per annum. Those who could not obtain wage 
jobs were forced to enter self-employment or open unemployment (See Kingdon and 
Knight, 2007; Knight and Song, 2005 and Knight, 2007).  
 
 
1.5. Growth of the Informal Sector 
 
The segmented labour market models postulated the informal sector as a temporary 
phenomenon, motivated by the objective of employment generation rather than profit 
maximization and viewed it as a holding ground for workers awaiting entry into the 
modern sector. It was therefore assumed that the informal sector comprising of petty 
traders, small producers and a range of casual workers would eventually be absorbed into 
the formal economy and disappear (Chen et al., 2002). But the evidence of increasing 
proportions of informal activities in developing countries coupled with economic 
progress has led economists to emphasize informal sector as the focal point of 
development. 
 
In the 1980s, the economic crisis in Latin America served to highlight that employment 
in the informal sector tends to grow during periods of  economic crisis (Tokman, 1992). In 
the Asian economic crisis about a decade later, millions of people who lost formal jobs in 
the former East Asian Tiger countries tried to find jobs or create work in the informal 
economy (Lee, 1988). Meanwhile, structural adjustment in Africa and economic 
transition in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe was also 
associated with an expansion of employment in the informal economy. It was realized 
that the phenomenon of informal sector, although pervasive in the developing countries, 
also exists in developed countries in transition. The size of the informal labour market 
varies from the estimated 4-6% in the high-income countries to over 50% in the low-
income countries. Agenor (1996) and Schneider and Enste (2000) list a range of existing 
estimates of the size of the informal sector for a large cross -section of countries. 
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The ILO (2002a) noted that out of the 42 countries studied, 17 had more than half of their 
total employment in the informal sector, and only four countries had less than 10 per cent 
of total employment in the informal sector. Among the regions covered, sub-Saharan 
African countries have the highest proportion of informal to total employment. The South 
Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal (with the exception of Sri 
Lanka) have more than 90% of the workers in the informal economy. In other Asian 
countries, the number of informal workers ranges from 45-85% of non-agricultural 
employment and 40-60% of urban employment. In parts of East Asia, namely Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and China, the informal economy declined as 
manufacturing and industry expanded and created jobs in the formal economy. According 
to Charmes (2000), informal work in Africa accounted for almost 80% of non-
agricultural employment, over 60% of urban employment and over 90% of new jobs over 
the past decade or so. Table 1.1 shows the informal sector employment as a percentage of 
non-agricultural employment in non-OECD countries. 
 
   Table 1.1: Informal sector work in non-OECD countries, 1999-2005 
    
HDI 
Rank 
Country Survey 
Year 
Employment in non-
agricultural informal 
sector, both sexes (% of 
non-agricultural 
employment) 
38 Argentina 2003 401 
40 Chile 1996 361 
46 Uruguay 2000 30 
48 Costa Rica 2000 20 
52 Mexico 2005 33 
62 Panama 2004 33 
65 Mauritius 2004 8 
67 Russian 
Federation 
2004 12 
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70 Brazil 2003 37 
74 Venezuela  2004 46 
75 Colombia 2004 581 
76 Ukraine 2004 4 
78 Thailand 2002 72 
79 Dominican 
Republic 
1997 481 
84 Turkey 2004 35 
87 Peru 2004 561 
89 Ecuador 2004 401 
90 Philippines 1995 721 
91 Tunisia 1994-95 501 
95 Paraguay 1995 661 
103 El Salvador 1997 571 
104 Algeria 1997 431 
107 Indonesia 1998 781 
108 Syrian Arab 
Republic 
2003 22 
110 Nicaragua 2000 551 
111 Moldova 2004 8 
112 Egypt 2003 451 
115 Honduras 1997 581 
116 Kyrgyzstan 2003 43 
117 Bolivia 1997 641 
121 South Africa 2004 16 
126 Morocco 1995 451 
128 India 2000 561 
136 Pakistan 2003-04 70 
148 Kenya 1999 721 
159 Tanzania 2001 43 
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(United 
Republic of) 
160 Guinea 1991 721 
163 Benin 1992 931 
169 Ethiopia 2004 41 
170 Chad 1993 741 
171 Central 
African 
Republic 
2003 211 
172 Mozambique 1999 741 
173 Mali 2004 71 
176 Burkina Faso 2000 771 
 
                 Note 1 - Source: ILO Bureau of Statistics, 2007. 
             Compiled from Human Development Report, 2007-08. 
 
1.6. Globalisation and the Informal Sector 
 
Globalisation and its major driving force, liberalised trade paradigm have often been 
cited in the literature as major reasons for the proliferation of the informal economy. 
Globalisation broadly refers to reductions in trade barriers, liberalised external capital 
flows, diffusion of technology and international migration of labour. Empirical studies 
reveal increasing ‘informalisation’ of the workforce, mainly attributable to the liberalised 
regime. The popular argument is that a growingly competitive and uncertain environment 
due to trade liberalisation leads entrepreneurs to embrace higher capital-intensive 
productions that affects the growth of informal sector in two ways: first, for mostly 
labour abundant developing countries, moving away from labour-intensive production is 
a harbinger of unemployment, which people can ill-afford and subsequently seek 
employment in the informal sector and secondly, in a bid to reduce costs to sustain 
competitive pressure entrepreneurs are keen to subcontract few or all the stages of their 
production process to informal units, whereby they can curtail their costs of training and 
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maintenance of the labour force, and vary their production with demand fluctuations. 
There are also cases where the hitherto protected industries, which get exposed to foreign 
competition, fail to sustain themselves and are compelled to lay off workers or in extreme 
cases, pull down their shutters. These retrenched workers largely prefer informal sector 
employment to remaining unemployed.  
 
Since the major impact of trade liberalisation is typically on the manufacturing and other 
organized sectors of the economy, while the urban informal sector and subsistence 
agriculture are largely the producers of non-tradables, the informal labour market and 
employment are affected indirectly by trade liberalisation through changes in relative 
prices and in the probability of obtaining employment in the organized sector. Moreover, 
there exists substantial heterogeneity in the employment profiles of individuals and 
households within these sectors that vary largely in terms of their skills and endowments 
of assets. This implies that the impact of trade liberalisation on employment also varies 
significantly according to these differences in initial conditions.  
 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) have examined the response of the informal sector to 
liberalisation in Brazil and Colombia, both of which experienced large trade barrier 
reductions in the 1980's and 1990's. While in Brazil, no link between trade policy and 
informality has been found, there did exist such relationship in Colombia, but only for the 
period preceding a major labour market reform that increased the flexibility of the 
Colombian labour market. These results suggest that labour market institutions play an 
important role in determining the extent of reductions in formal employment due to trade 
reforms14. Deregulation of labour market is an important instrument of structural 
adjustment policies that generally accompany liberalised policies. Labour market reforms 
bring in more flexibility in labour markets by lowering the firms’ hiring and firing costs, 
and are likely to affect their incentives to employ informal workers. In a series of papers, 
Kugler (1999) shows that the labour market deregulation in Colombia led to an increase 
in formal employment. On the other hand, doing away with minimum wages, contractual 
agreements ensuring term of service, and social security and benefits implies lower 
                                                      
14 See also Aghion et al. (2002) for a study of India. 
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adjustment costs associated with employment of workers. The firms respond by engaging 
a large pool of workers who are casual and temporary in nature. Despite employed in the 
formal sector they fall within the domain of informal workers. A study by Currie and 
Harrison (1997) on Morocco finds that firms started hiring more temporary workers after 
the completion of a comprehensive trade liberalisation program. 
 
An important policy within structural adjustment programmes aimed at consolidating the 
economy to deal with international debts more effectively consists of devaluation of the 
currency to raise exports. But the constant devaluation results in large-scale inflation, 
pushing the lower income groups to seek additional employment from informal sector. 
More and more children and women from the marginalized section are drawn in this 
sector (Hasan, 2002). 
 
The international trade theory endorses trade liberalisation on the basis of the 
understandings of the Stolper-Samuelson (S-S) theory. Freer trade is unambiguously 
beneficial for a developing country since it not only promotes efficiency and growth, but 
also has gainful effects on the abundant factor in the economy, unskilled labour. 
However, the beneficial growth, employment and distributional implications of trade 
liberalisation hinge on the assumptions of existence of perfectly competitive markets and 
constant returns to scale. However, this is somewhat distant from reality, particularly in 
developing countries, where market imperfection is pervasive, industrial production are 
characterized by economies of scale and market failures are common. It has also been 
assumed in the standard trade theory that resources are fully employed and trade is 
always balanced. But in these countries, characterized by high unemployment levels, 
trade liberalisation can impinge heavy adjustment costs in the form of reduction in output 
and aggravating trade deficits and unemployment. 
 
In these countries, trade liberalisation predominantly fosters import liberalisation that 
mainly involves lowering tariffs in unskilled labour-intensive protected sectors. In 
accordance with the S-S theory this has the immediate effect of decline in factor reward 
to unskilled labour, widening the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour and also 
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loss of jobs for many unskilled workers. For example, in Argentina, economic reforms 
were targeted at reducing import tariffs in labour-intensive manufacturing industries like 
textiles, with the short run effect of an increase in unemployment. Beker (2000) find that 
while “the average job destruction rate in the U.S. is 10.3%… for Argentina it is higher 
than 20% after 1990. About one in five manufacturing jobs disappeared every year. Only 
a little more than half of them were replaced.” 
 
Apart from trade liberalisation, there are other dimensions of globalisation, like foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows and immigration of labour, that have received somewhat 
limited cognizance in the literature, towards analyzing the correlation between 
globalisation and informal sector employment and welfare. Evidently, if FDI concentrates 
on the capital-intensive sector there is a greater possibility of employment reductions, 
stimulating informal employment, while the flow of foreign capital in the labour-
intensive sectors are likely to generate employment potentials and wage hikes. However, 
even in the latter case, in the presence of a wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
labour, if foreign firms tend to locate in skill-intensive sectors there is a relative 
expansion of skill-intensive sectors, improving the relative position of skilled workers 
and accentuating the wage differentials (Feenstra and Hanson, 1995). This makes the 
unskilled workers still worse off and they are embraced in the informal sector requiring 
limited skills. Empirical evidences depict different relations between FDI and wage 
inequality.  While Feenstra and Hanson (1997) find a rise in demand for skilled labour in 
Mexican manufacturing due to FDI, Te Velde and Morrissey (2002) did not find strong 
evidence that FDI reduced wage inequality in five East Asian countries (Korea, 
Singapore, HongKong, Thailand and Philippines). Although FDI had raised wage 
inequality in Thailand, in others wage inequality has shown a decreasing trend, with hike 
in both skilled and unskilled workers. 
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1.7. Child Labour and Informal Sector 
  
Child labour, the worst forms of violation of human rights, is found predominantly in the 
developing countries and is ubiquitous primarily in the informal segment of the labour 
market. Formal enterprises, which are generally subject to government regulation and 
union scrutiny, rarely employ children under the legal minimum age. Of the children 
working in the informal sector, 70% are in agriculture, commercial hunting and fishing or 
forestry, 8% in manufacturing, 8% in wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, 
7% in community, social and personal service, such as domestic work (ILO, 2005). The 
informal manufacturing units in which the children are mostly engaged are shoe, 
garment, embroidery, furniture and handicrafts industries, home based production and 
small-scale mining.  
 
According to the estimates of the ILO (2002b), “246 million child workers aged between 
5 and 17 were involved in child labour, of which 170 million were involved in work that 
by its nature is hazardous to their safety, physical or mental health, and moral 
development.” Of the total number of child labourers, 61% are in Asia, 32% in Africa, 
and 7% in Latin America. 41% of all African children between the ages of 5 and 14 are 
involved in some form of economic activity, compared with 21% in Asia and 17% in 
Latin America. The proportion of child labourers varies a lot among countries and even 
regions inside those countries (See Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable, Geneva, 
1998, p. 7). 
 
The ILO (2002b) lists many causes of child labour, like poverty, economic instability, 
political turmoil, discrimination, migration, traditional cultural practices, inadequate 
social protection, absence of schools, low adult productivity, greed of employees and 
inadequacy of the enforcement machinery. Other empirical studies have identified 
poverty15, lack of education facilities with higher costs of schooling16 and credit market 
                                                      
15 A Child Labour Survey in Zimbabwe, conducted by the ILO in 1999, found that about 88 % of 
economically active children aged 5-17 came from households with incomes below Z$2,000 
(US$36) per month. As family incomes rose above Z$3,000 the participation rate dropped to less 
than 1%. See also Hamid (1994), Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Bhalotra (1999) and Ray (1999).  
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imperfection17 as some of the key perpetrators of child labour. Poverty is the foremost 
compelling force that makes parents send their children to work instead of receiving 
education. The rate of return to primary education is also very low in most of the 
developing countries due to poor quality of schooling. Moreover, the decision of parents 
regarding sending their child to work or school is an intertemporal one, where they make 
a trade-off between the two choices and opt for child education only if the return to 
education is high enough to compensate for the foregone income from child labour. In 
this situation, prevalence of credit market imperfection intensifies the plight of poor 
families where lack of access to credit under reasonable terms dissuades them from 
sacrificing their income from child labour to meet present consumption needs.  
 
In recent years the revolutionary changes in the integrated world economic scenario 
ushering into the neo-liberal paradigm has diverse connotation for the incidence of child 
labour. The profit-motivated employers under increased competitive pressure due to 
globalisation prefer children to adults because child labour is cheaper and are amenable 
to control and exploitation. The informal sector, largely outside the purview of labour 
laws serves as an ideal zone for the persistence of child labour. Such a market-based 
development strategy promoted by globalisation encourages child labour.  
 
In a free market, high supply coupled with low demand for labour (especially unskilled)18 
leads to plunge in wages. The low adult wages entail entry of children into the labour 
market, which in turn, depresses wages paid to adult workers perpetuating the vicious 
circles of poverty and child labour. On the other hand, segmented labour market exists for 
children, that is, the market has a ‘pull’ factor that draws children towards work. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
16 See Ray (2000, 2002) and Grote, et al. (1998). 
 
17 See Jaffrey and Lahiri (2002) and Ranjan (2001). 
 
18 Due to liberalised investment, entailing increased inflow of foreign capital that is usually 
accompanied by skill-biased technology, demand for unskilled labour falls with a corresponding 
surge in demand for their skilled counterparts. 
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low adult wages creates and sustains a segmented market for child labour (See India 
Social Development Report, Council for Social Development, 2006). 
 
Kruger (2007) in a study of Nicaragua finds that labour demand can influence how 
children work. Demand for low skill products from rich countries can enhance the 
economic opportunities available in poor countries, increasing the child's potential 
economic contribution to the family. However, even if the children are getting increased 
prospects of being employed in the export sectors, it can hardly be claimed that the export 
opportunity causes them to work. The ‘push’ factors are equally important - even if the 
children would not have involved in the export sector, they cannot be expected to 
withdraw from work and grow up as educated persons. On the other hand, it is equally 
true that the structural adjustment programmes that accompany globalisation package in 
developing countries have resulted in loss of jobs of adult labour with deleterious effects 
on the prevalence of child labour. The prime force behind availability of children for 
work is abject poverty, compelling them to forego schooling and supplement their 
parents’ meager incomes. Most of the parents of the working children are either engaged 
in informal sector or are unemployed.  
 
Edmonds, et al. (2007) in a recent study on the impact of India's tariff reforms on 
children in rural India, find that despite the growth of the Indian economy, rural areas 
with concentrations of employment in industries that lost protection experienced smaller 
declines in poverty than the rest of the country. Children living in these areas did not 
experience as large of an increase in school attendance or decline in work without school 
as children residing in areas with lower pre-reform employment in heavily protected 
industries. The lower magnitude of child labour declines in these rural areas seems 
attributable to smaller reductions in poverty in these areas than elsewhere in India. They 
find little evidence of other potential causes of these relative declines in schooling and 
increases in work such as declining returns to education or rising unskilled wages.  
 
That reduction in poverty can effectively mitigate the incidence of child labour is also 
evident from the findings from a recent study of Vietnam by Edmonds and Pavcnik 
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(2005). As a result of doing away with export quota and liberalisation of rice trade in 
Vietnam, allowing rice farmers to take advantage of higher international prices, the living 
standards of rice producing households improved, with much lesser children in these 
households going to work, despite increasing employment opportunities.  
 
1.8. Informal Sector: Effects on Environment 
 
The environment is significantly affected by manufacturing activities by way of 
emissions and wastes. Consequent to the recent boost in environmental awareness, large-
scale industries are becoming increasingly concerned about achieving and demonstrating 
sound environmental conservation performance due to compulsions from stringent 
environmental legislation. Also there is now an increased use of innovative and flexible 
incentives to induce them to clean up their act. These are the voluntary initiatives such as 
cleaner production, environment management systems, etc.  
 
However, the informal units that largely use unsophisticated, indigenous technology are 
major sources of air and water pollution. They are also generators of hazardous wastes 
like heavy metal sludges, solvents, waste oils, acidic and alkaline wastes, photo wastes, 
etc. They use unsafe method of disposing the wastes like dumping solvents or heavy 
metal-laden waste water into drains or in a commonplace, which are difficult to monitor. 
Some of the polluting informal activities are tanneries, plastic, metal, chemical units etc. 
Current efforts for global environmental protection are concentrated primarily around 
large and small scale industries within the organized sector. But the large number of 
informal units are left unnoticed inspite of their high resource intensity, inefficiency and 
high level of pollution per unit of production. Although more polluting, they cannot be 
circumscribed by any environmental regulation since they are largely unregistered and 
difficult to identify. However, the environmental implications of these informal units 
cannot be overlooked and policies and steps are immediately required to curb their 
perilous effects on environment. Nonetheless there exists scanty literature on the 
environmental impacts of informal sector.  
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The informal sector also has beneficiary effects on the environment by virtue its 
overwhelming participation in waste management in developing countries. Developing 
country cities often collect only between 50% and 80% of waste generated, with open 
dumping the only disposal method available (Medina & Dows, 2000). Insufficient 
collection, and improper disposal in open dumps allow refuse to be readily available for 
informal waste recycling through scavenging or waste picking. A large number of waste 
pickers contribute in collecting wastes and a comprehensive informal recycling network 
is involved in processing and recycling of wastes. At least four categories of waste 
collection may be identified: itinerant waste buyers who are the door to door waste 
collectors who collect sorted recyclable materials from householders, which they buy or 
barter and then transport to a recycling shop; street waste picking in which recyclable 
wastes are recovered from mixed waste thrown on the streets or from communal bins 
before collection; municipal waste collection crew in which secondary raw materials are 
recovered from vehicles transporting municipal solid waste to disposal sites and waste 
picking from dumps where scavengers sort through wastes prior to being recovered 
(Wilson et al., 2006). 
 
The recycling network takes the form of a hierarchy in which a chain of intermediate 
dealers often exists between the scavengers and end-users. Recycling can effectively 
reduce pollution, lower green house gas emissions, provide environmentally preferable 
sources of raw materials and save energy. Informal recycling provides employment to a 
large pool of low skilled labour and maintains a steady flow of secondary materials for 
local manufacturing units and reduces the costs associated with formal waste 
management systems. The informal waste management is both economically and 
environmentally beneficial in developing countries. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Foundations: A General Equilibrium Approach 
 
The discussions in the subsequent chapters of the book are based mainly on the general 
equilibrium framework as developed by R.W. Jones in his 1965 and 1971 papers.  
Graduates and doctoral students are likely to be familiar with the simple general 
equilibrium theory. However, to have a deeper understanding, they should acquaint 
themselves with the ‘hat calculus’ developed by Jones. While Jones (1965) deals with the 
2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, Jones (1971) is based on the 2×3 
specific-factor full-employment model. In the next section we intend to present the 
essence of these two papers in the simplest possible manner. Later we shall discuss the 
technique of measuring social welfare in a small open economy and its changes resulting 
from changes in policy parameters. 
 
2.1. The 2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model 
 
The 2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model of production assumes that two 
commodities, 1X  and 2X  are produced using two factors, labour ( L ) and capital ( K ). 
The production function exhibits constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal 
returns to each factor. The factors are fully employed and are mobile between the two 
sectors. Commodities can be classified in terms of relative factor intensities and factor 
intensities are irreversible. The wage rate and the return to capital are denoted by W  and 
r  respectively. It is assumed that perfect competition prevails everywhere so that 
commodity prices 1P  and 2P  reflect unit costs of production. Commodity prices and 
factor endowments are given exogenously. 
 
The production functions are given by the following two equations: 
( , )i i i iX F L K  for 1, 2i         (2.1) & (2.2) 
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where iL  and iK  denote employment of labour and use of capital in the i th sector. Since 
the production functions exhibit CRS the equations of unit isoquants are obtained as 
follows. 
1 ( , )i Li Kif a a           (2.3) 
where Lia  and Kia  denote respectively the labour and capital requirement per unit of iX . 
 
Now given the output level, profit maximisation means minimisation of costs. In other 
words, the producers minimize cost along the unit isoquant. At the point of cost 
minimisation, the iso-cost line, with slope ( / )W r , is tangent to the unit isoquant with 
slope ( / )Ki Lida da . Thus cost minimisation with respect to both the commodities implies  
1 1 0L KWda rda           (2.4) 
2 2 0L KWda rda             (2.5) 
The above two equations are called the ‘envelope conditions’. 
 
Rewriting the equations (2.4) and (2.5) in accordance with the ‘^’ notation implying 
proportional change, we get 
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ 0L L K Ka a            (2.4.1) 
2 2 2 2ˆ ˆ 0L L K Ka a            (2.5.1) 
These are the alternative expressions of the ‘envelope conditions’.  
 
The competitive profit conditions (equality between price and unit cost) in each sector are 
represented as 
1 1 1L Ka W a r P   (2.6) 
2 2 2L Ka W a r P   (2.7) 
 
Now, the full employment conditions of labour and capital are given as  
1 1 2 2L La X a X L   (2.8) 
1 1 2 2K Ka X a X K   (2.9) 
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The model consists of four independent equations (2.6) – (2.9). There are four variables, 
1 2, , ,W r X X  and four parameters 1 2, ,P P L  and K . Thus the system is determinate and 
each variable can be uniquely determined. Given the commodity prices, the factor prices 
can be determined from the price system alone consisting of equations (2.6) and (2.7). 
Thus, any changes in factor endowments cannot affect factor prices. This kind of a 
system where factor prices are independent of factor endowments is called a 
decomposable system. 
 
Equations of Change 
 
To examine the comparative static properties of the model, that is, to determine the 
effects of a change in the parameters on the variables of the model, let us transform the 
equations of the system into equations of change. It is convenient to express these 
changes in terms of the rate of change, denoted by ‘^’, for example, ˆ ( / )L dL L .    
 
Totally differentiating the equations (2.6) and (2.7) in the price system and using the ‘^’  
notation, we obtain  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ[ ]L K L L K KW r P a a        (2.10) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ[ ]L K L L K KW r P a a        (2.11) 
where ji is the relative share of the j th input in the total value of the i th commodity, 
1, 2i   and ,j L K , for example, 1 1 1( / )L LWa P .  
 
Using the above ‘envelope conditions’ as given by (2.4.1) and (2.5.1), equations (2.10) 
and (2.11) can be reduced to 
1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ L KW r P                                                                                                           (2.10.1) 
2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ L KW r P                                                                                                         (2.11.1) 
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Equations (2.10.1) and (2.11.1) imply that for each commodity, the distributive-share 
weighted average of proportional factor-price changes equals the proportional commodity 
price change. The above two equations are written in the matrix form as follows.  
1 1 1
2 2 2
ˆˆ  
 
ˆ  ˆ
L K
L K
PW
r P
 
 
        
      
                                                                                             (2.12) 
 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
 
The changes in factor prices can be determined uniquely by solving (2.12) using the 
Cramers’s rule. Thus, 
2 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[ ]K KW P P      (2.13) 
and 
1 2 2 1
ˆ ˆˆ (1/ )[ ]L Lr P P     (2.14) 
where   is the determinant of coefficient matrix in (2.12) and is given by  
 = 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2
  
( )
  
L K
L K K L
L K
 
   
 
 
 (2.15) 
 
By the very definition, 1 1( ) 1L K    and 2 2( ) 1L K   , that is, each row in   add up 
to unity. Therefore,   can also be expressed as 
  1 2L L   2 1K K    (2.16) 
Now, subtracting (2.14) from (2.13) yields  
ˆ ˆ( )W r 1 2ˆ ˆ(1/ )( )P P    
or 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( )W r P P     (2.17)  
It is evident that Wˆ  and rˆ  can be determined if both the commodities are produced and 
0  .  
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Substituting the definition of each distributive share, (for example, 1 1 1( / )L LWa P  ) from 
(2.15) we obtain  
1 2 1 2
1 2
( )L K K L
Wr a a a a
PP
    
Therefore, 0   implies that for uniquely determining the factor prices, the factor 
intensities for production of the commodities must differ. Hence, 0  , if the production 
of 1X  is labour-intensive i.e. 1 2
1 2
L L
K K
a a
a a
 . This also implies from (2.16) that 1 2L L   and 
2 1K K   if 1X  is more labour-intensive vis-à-vis 2X .  
 
From (2.17) it follows that an increase in the price of labour-intensive 1X  raises the 
wage-rental ratio in a magnified amount. If 1ˆP  exceeds 2ˆP  and 1X  is labour-intensive, 
then 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆW P P r    
Analogously if 1X  is capital-intensive, 0  . In this case an increase in 1P  reduces the 
wage rate and raises the return to its intensive factor, capital.  
 
These results are summarized in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem19, which states that a rise 
in the price of a commodity raises the real reward of its intensive factor and lowers the 
real reward of its un-intensive factor. 
 
The Rybczynski theorem 
 
Now let us consider the output system comprising of equations (2.8) and (2.9). Totally 
differentiating the equations and using the ‘^’ notation, we obtain 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )L L L L L LX X L a a        (2.8.1) 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )K K K K K KX X K a a        (2.9.1) 
                                                      
19 See Stolper and Samuelson (1941). 
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where, ji  denotes the proportion of the j th input used in the production of the i th 
commodity, ,j L K  and 1, 2i  , for example, 1 1 1( / )L La X L  . Equations (2.8.1) and 
(2.9.1) describe the relationship between the outputs and the endowments of the factors 
as well as the factor intensities. 
 
Now let us consider the terms in parenthesis in equations (2.8.1) and (2.9.1). One 
relationship between 1ˆLa  and 2ˆLa  follows from the concept of elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital in the production of 1X .  
By definition, the elasticity of substitution in sector 1 is given by  
1 1
1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
K La a
W r
 

  
By using equation (2.4.1) the above expression may be written as  
1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ( )K La W r     
1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ( )L Ka W r     (2.18) 
Similarly, for sector 2, we get 
2 2 2
ˆˆ ˆ( )K La W r    
2 2 2
ˆˆ ˆ( )L Ka W r     (2.19) 
 
Using (2.18) and (2.19) equations (2.8.1) and (2.9.1) can be rewritten as  
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )L L LX X L W r       (2.8.2) 
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )K K KX X K W r       (2.9.2) 
where, 1 1 1 2 2 2L L K L K         
           1 1 1 2 2 2K K L K L         
The changes in output levels can be determined by solving equations (2.8.2) and (2.9.2) 
that may be expressed in matrix notation as 
 
1 2 1
1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  ( )
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ  ˆ( )
L L L
K K K
X L W r
X K W r
  
  
          
              (2.20)
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Solving (2.20) by Cramer’s rule one gets  
1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ(1/ )[ { ( )} { ( )}]K L L KX L W r K W r           (2.21) 
2 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ(1/ )[ { ( )} { ( )}]L K K LX K W r L W r           (2.22) 
where   is the determinant of the coefficient matrix and is given by  
1 2
1 2
L L
K K
 

 

 
Thus, 
1 2 2 1( )L K L K     
 (2.23) 
By definition 1 2( ) 1L L    and 1 2( ) 1K K   .  In this case also each row in   add up 
to unity. Therefore,   can also be expressed as 
1 1 2 2L K K L         (2.24) 
 
Subtracting (2.22) from (2.21) yields  
1 2
ˆ ˆ( )X X  
ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ˆ ˆ( )L KL K W r 
 
    (2.25) 
By definition 1 2 2 1L K L K      . Substituting the definition of input-output ratios for 
each commodity, (for instance, 1 1 1( / )L La X L  ) yields 
1 2
1 2 1 2( )L K K L
X X a a a a
LK
  
 (2.26) 
 
Now, 0  only if the factor intensities in the two sectors differ. If 1X  is labour-
intensive, i.e. 1 2
1 2
L L
K K
a a
a a
 , 0  . Alternatively, this implies from (2.24) that 1 1L K   
and 2 2.K L   
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From equation (2.25) it follows that if 1X  is labour-intensive, an increase in the labour 
endowment raises 1X  by a magnified amount and lowers 2X . If Lˆ  exceeds Kˆ  then 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆX L K X    
But if 1X  is capital-intensive, 0  . In this case, an increase in L  leads to higher 
production of 2X  and a decline in that of 1X . 
 
This result entails the Rybczynski theorem20, which states that a rise in the endowment of 
a factor at constant commodity prices leads to the expansion of the commodity that uses 
the factor intensively and contraction of the other commodity.  
 
Responses of outputs to changes in the commodity prices 
 
Equation (2.25) shows the relationship of changes in outputs with changes in factor 
endowments and factor prices. The output response to changes in factor endowment is 
captured by the Rybczynski theorem. To examine the effects of commodity prices on the 
outputs, let us substitute the link between factor prices and commodity prices depicted in 
equation (2.17) to obtain 
 1 2ˆ ˆ( )X X  1 2
ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ˆ ˆ( )L KL K P P 
  
    (2.25.1) 
 
As already stated, L  and K  are both positive. Now,   and   must have the same 
sign. If 1X  is labour-intensive, both   and   are positive, whereas if 1X  is assumed to 
be capital-intensive, both   and   are negative, so that the product    is always 
positive.  
 
Thus, if 1 2ˆ ˆP P  then 1 2ˆ ˆX X . In particular, from (2.21) and (2.22) it follows that 1ˆ 0X   
and 2ˆ 0X  . If  1 2ˆ ˆ 0P P   then 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0W P P r     so that ˆ ˆ( ) 0W r   and 1 2ˆ ˆ 0X X  . 
                                                      
20 See Rybczynski (1955). 
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Therefore an increase in the price of a commodity leads to rise in production of that 
commodity and fall in that of the other commodity. If both the commodity prices change 
at the same rate, the production of both commodities remains unchanged.  
 
If technologies of production are of fixed-coefficient type i.e. 1 2 0    then L  and 
K are equal to zero. Then from (2.21) and (2.22) it follows that 1 2ˆ ˆ 0.X X   
So any changes in commodity prices have no effect on the composition of outputs.  
 
2.1.1. An alternative presentation 
 
The discussion in the preceding section regarding the effects of changes in factor 
endowments and commodity prices on the outputs can also be expressed in a slightly 
different fashion. We use a few different notations only to obtain the same results as 
described above21.   
 
Given that 1 1( , )L La a W r  and 1 1( , )K Ka a W r , total differentiation and use of ‘^’ 
notation yields respectively 
1 1
1
ˆˆ ˆL LL LKa S W S r   (2.18.1) 
1 1
1
ˆˆ ˆK KL KKa S W S r   
Similarly, from 2 2 ( , )L La a W r  and 2 2 ( , )K Ka a W r , we get 
2 2
2
ˆˆ ˆL LL LKa S W S r   (2.19.1) 
2 2
2
ˆˆ ˆK KL KKa S W S r   
 
Using (2.18.1) and (2.19.1) equation (2.8.1) can be written as  
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )L L LL LK L L LL LKX S W S r X S W S r L          
                                                      
21 Both types of notations have been used in the subsequent chapters of the book. This alternative 
version is particularly useful when three factors are used to produce a commodity so that 
equations of changes involve partial elasticities as well, making the analysis complicated if the 
earlier version is used. 
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or, 1 2 1 21 1 2 2 1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )L L L LL L LL L LK L LKX X L S S W S S r            (2.8.3) 
 
Similarly, equation (2.9.1) can be expressed as 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )K K K KL K KL K KK K KKX X K S S W S S r            (2.9.3) 
Here, ijkS is the degree of substitution between factors j and k  in the i th sector, 
, ,j k L K  and 1, 2i  , for example, in sector 1, 1 1 1( / )( / )LL L LS da dW W a , 
1
1 1( / )( / )LK L LS da dr r a . 0
i
jkS   for j k  and 0
i
jjS  . It should be noted that as the 
production functions are homogeneous of degree one, the factor coefficients, jia s are 
homogeneous of degree zero in the factor prices. Hence the sum of elasticities for any 
factor of production in any sector with respect to factor prices must be zero. For example, 
in sector 1, with respect to labour, we have 1 1( ) 0LL LKS S   while with respect to capital, 
1 1( ) 0KL KKS S  . Similarly, in sector 2, 
2 2( ) 0LL LKS S   and 
2 2( ) 0KL KKS S  . 
 
Equations (2.8.3) and (2.9.3) can be expressed in the form of a matrix  
1 211 2
1 2 3 42
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )
L L
K K
L AW A rX
K A W A rX
 
 
          
        
 
where 1 21 1 2( ) 0L LL L LLA S S     
          1 22 1 2( ) 0L LK L LKA S S     
          1 23 1 2( ) 0K KL K KLA S S     
          1 24 1 2( ) 0K KK K KKA S S     
 
Solving by Cramer’s rule, substituting the expressions for 1 4A A  and simplifying, one 
gets 
1 1 2 2
1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[( ) { ( )}( )]K L L K KL L K LK L K KL LKX L K S S S S W r                
 (2.21.1) 
and 
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2Xˆ
2 2 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[( ) { ( )}( )]L K L K LK L K KL L K LK KLK L S S S S W r                
 (2.22.1) 
Subtracting (2.22.1) from (2.21.1) and using (2.17) one gets  
1 2
ˆ ˆ( )X X  1 2
ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ˆ ˆ( )L KL K P P 
  
    (2.25.2) 
where 1 1 2 22 1 1 2 2 2 ( ) 0L L K KL L K LK L K KL LKS S S S            
           2 2 1 12 1 1 2 1 1( ) 0K L K LK L K KL L K LK KLS S S S            
 
Equation (2.25.2) is analogous to equation (2.25.1). Hence the results pertaining to the 
Rybczynski theorem and output responses to changes in commodity prices obtained in 
the preceding section follow. 
 
2.2. The 2×3 Full-employment Model 
 
Let us now consider a two-sector, specific-factor model of production that produces two 
commodities, 1X  and 2X . Labour and capital of type 1 (say 1K ) are used to produce 1X , 
while labour and capital of type 2 (say 2K ) are combined to produce 2X . Each type of 
capital is used specifically in one sector while labour is mobile between both the sectors. 
The three inputs are fully employed. The wage rate is denoted W , while the returns to 
capitals of type 1 and type 2 are represented by 1r  and 2r , respectively. All the other 
assumptions of the HOS model are retained.  
 
Under competitive conditions, the zero-profit conditions in the two sectors are given by  
1 1 1 1L Ka W a r P   (2.27) 
2 2 2 2L Ka W a r P   (2.28) 
 
The full employment conditions of labour and both types of capital are given by  
1 1 2 2L La X a X L   (2.8) 
1 1 1Ka X K  (2.29) 
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2 2 2Ka X K  (2.30) 
Use of equations (2.29) and (2.30) and substitution in (2.8) yields 
1 1 1 2 2 2( / ) ( / )L K L Ka a K a a K L   (2.31) 
 
This model consists of five independent equations (2.27) – (2.31) and five endogenous 
variables, 1 2 1, , ,W r r X  and 2X . The parameters of the system are 1 2 1, , ,P P L K  and 2K . 
However, this model is indecomposable. The factor prices cannot be solved from the 
price system alone. The values of 1,W r  and 2r  are obtained by solving equations (2.27), 
(2.28) and (2.31). Therefore, any changes in the factor endowments affect factor prices, 
which in turn, affect the per unit input requirements, jia s in each sector.
22  
  
Now, total differentiation of equations (2.27) and (2.28) and use of ‘envelope conditions’ 
in sectors 1 and 2 entail 
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆL KW r P    (2.32) 
2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆL KW r P    (2.33) 
Totally differentiating equation (2.31) gives 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )L L K L L L K La a K a a K L          (2.31.1) 
 
Now, the relationship between jia s and the factor prices as given by (2.18) and (2.19) is 
modified to give the following expressions: 
 
ˆˆ ˆ( )Ki i Li ia W r     (2.34) 
ˆˆ ˆ( )Li i Ki ia W r     
 
Use of (2.34) in equation (2.31.1) yields 
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )      L L L L L LW r r L K K           (2.31.2) 
                                                      
22 It is to be noted that the model loses its consistency if technologies are of the fixed-coefficient 
type, as equation (2.31) does not contain factor prices implicitly.  
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Solving (2.32), (2.33) and (2.31.2) yields 
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[ ]K L K L K K K K L K K LW P P L K K                      (2.35) 
1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1/ )[ { ( )}L L K L L L L L K L K Lr P P L K                         
               1 2 2 2ˆ ]L K L K     (2.36) 
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1/ )[ { ( )}L L L L K L L K L K L Lr P P L K                       
               1 2 2 2ˆ ]K L L K     (2.37) 
where 
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2{ ( )} 0L K L K L L K L L                    
 
From (2.35), (2.36) and (2.37) the following results follow: 
(i) When 1ˆ 0P  , ˆ 0W  ; 1ˆ 0r   and 2ˆ 0r  . 
(ii) When 2ˆ 0P  , ˆ 0W  ; 1ˆ 0r   and 2ˆ 0r  .  
(iii) When ˆ 0L  , ˆ 0W  ; 1ˆ 0r   and 2ˆ 0r  .      (2.38) 
(iv) When 1ˆ 0K  , ˆ 0W  ; 1ˆ 0r   and 2ˆ 0r  . 
(v) When 2ˆ 0K  , ˆ 0W  ; 1ˆ 0r   and 2ˆ 0r  . 
 
At constant overall factor endowments, the relation between the changes in commodity 
prices and factor prices can be established by subtracting (2.33) from (2.32) which gives 
2 2 1 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )K KW r W r P P       
 
The above expression entails that if 1 2ˆ ˆP P  then 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ   r P W P r . Any change in 
commodity price drastically affects the returns to specific factors. The return to the 
mobile factor (labour) rises in terms of one factor and falls in terms of the other. 
 
A crucial difference between the HOS model and the specific factor model is that in the 
former, factor prices remain unaffected by changes in factor endowments, while in the 
latter, changes in factor endowments produce significant changes in factor prices.  
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From the relationships depicted in (2.38 - (iii), (iv) and (v)), it is evident that a rise in the 
endowment of the mobile factor brings about a fall in its return and augments the returns 
to both the specific factors, while an increase in the stock in one of the specific factor 
lowers the returns to both the specific factors  and raises the return to the mobile factor.  
 
Now, let us turn to examine the responses of output due to the changes in commodity 
prices and factor endowments. Total differentiation of (2.29) and (2.30), use of (2.35) – 
(2.37) and simplification yield respectively 
 
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[ ( )L L L L L K K L K K LX P P L K                          
        1 1 2 2 2ˆL L K K     (2.39) 
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[ L L L L L KX P P L               2 2 1 1 1ˆL L K K     
      2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2ˆ( )K L K K L K          (2.40) 
 
From (2.39) and (2.40) the following results follow: 
(i) When 1ˆ 0P  , 1ˆ 0X   and 2ˆ 0X  .                       
(ii) When 2ˆ 0P  , 1ˆ 0X   and 2ˆ 0X  . 
(iii) When ˆ 0L  , 1ˆ 0X   and 2ˆ 0X  .                                                      (2.41)  
(iv) When 1ˆ 0K  , 1ˆ 0X   and 2ˆ 0X  . 
(v) When 2ˆ 0K  , 1ˆ 0X   and 2ˆ 0X  . 
 
Thus, an increase in the price of a commodity expands the production of that commodity 
and reduces that of the other. If the endowment of the mobile factor increases, the outputs 
of both the commodities rise. An expansion in the stock of the specific factor raises the 
production of the commodity that uses the factor and reduces production of the other.  
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2.2.1. The Alternative Version 
 
We now present the above analysis regarding the 2x3 full-employment model using the 
alternative set of notations as discussed in section 2.1.1. In this model, ( , )Li Li ia a W r  
and ( , )Ki Ki ia a W r ; hence ˆLia  and ˆKia  can now be expressed as  
ˆˆ ˆi iLi LL LK ia S W S r   (2.18.2) 
ˆˆ ˆi iKi KL KK ia S W S r   
 
Using (2.18.2) and simplifying from equation (2.31.1) we can derive 
1 2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ L LAW Br Cr K K L        (2.31.2) 
where 1 1 2 21 2[ ( ) ( )] 0L LL KL L LL KLA S S S S       
          1 11( ) 0L LK KKB S S    
          2 22 ( ) 0L LK KKC S S    
 
Solving (2.32), (2.33) and (2.31.2) yields 
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ )[ ( )]      K K K K L LW B P C P L K K       (2.35.1) 
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1/ )[ ( ) ( ) ]L L K L L L Kr C P L K K C A P              (2.36.1) 
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1/ )[( ) ( )]K L L K L L Lr A B P B P L K K              (2.37.1) 
From the above three equations the results obtained in (2.38) follow. 
 
Total differentiation of (2.29) and (2.30) and use of (2.35.1) – (2.37.1) yield respectively  
 
1 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( / )[ { ( ) ] ( / ) ( / )KL L LL KL L KK KL KX P S S S C P CS L S           
     1 1 2 21 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆ( / )[ { ( ) ]L LK L K K L L LL L LL KL K KK S C S S S                
     12 2 2ˆ( / ) KK L KK S     (2.39.1) 
and 
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2 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )[ { ( ) }] ( / )KK KK K L LL KL L KL KX P BS P S S S B L S             
         2 21 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )[ ]KK K L L K K L LK K KK S K B S A               (2.40.1) 
 
From (2.39.1) and (2.40.1) the results obtained in (2.41) follow. 
 
2.3. Measurement of Social Welfare 
 
Let us consider a production structure where two goods, 1X  and 2X  are produced with 
help of labour ( L ) and capital ( K ).  There is international trade and 1X  is the export 
good while 2X  is the import-competing good. Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire. 
The world price of good 2, 2P  is determined in the international market. There is a tariff 
at the ad-valorem rate, t  on the import-competing sector so that the domestic price of 
commodity 2 is 2 (1 )P t . Both the factors are fully employed and are mobile between the 
sectors producing the two goods. The total capital stock in the economy consists of 
domestic capital ( DK ) and foreign capital ( FK ) and these are perfect substitutes. Foreign 
capital income, FrK  is completely repatriated where r  is the return to capital. It is 
assumed that good 1 is more labour-intensive than good 2 so that 1 1 2 2( / ) ( / )L K L Ka a a a . 
 
The competitive profit conditions imply 
1 1 1L Ka W a r   (2.42) 
2 2 2 (1 )L Ka W a r P t    (2.43) 
 
The full employment conditions of labour and capital are depicted by 
1 1 2 2L La X a X L   (2.44) 
1 1 2 2K K D Fa X a X K K K     (2.45) 
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Each individual in the society derives positive utility from consumption of the two goods 
produced in the economy. Assuming that the individuals are homogenous in their 
preferences the strictly quasi-concave social welfare function is given by 
1 2( , )V V D D  (2.46) 
where iD  denotes the demand for the i th commodity for i = 1, 2. 
 
Given that international trade occurs, trade balance requires  
1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) FX D P D X rK     
or, * *1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( ) FD P D X P X tP D X rK       (2.47) 
where 1 1( )X D  is the amount of 1X  exported and 2 2( )D X denotes the amount of 2X  
that is imported. 
 
Differentiating (2.46) yields 
*
1 1 2 2( / )dV V dD P dD   (2.48) 
 
National income at domestic prices is given by 
*
1 2 2 2 FY X P X tP M rK     (2.49) 
where, M denotes the volume of import and is given by 
*
2 2 2( , )M D P Y X   (2.50) 
 
Differentiating (2.47) one gets 
* *
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 FdD P dD dX P dX tP dM rdK      (2.51) 
Using (2.48) and (2.51) we write 
*
1 1 2 2 2( / ) FdV V dX P dX tP dM rdK     (2.48.1) 
 
From differentiation of (2.49) one gets 
* *
1 2 2 2 2 2 2[ ]FdY dX P dX X dP tP dM P Mdt rdK       (2.49.1) 
 
Differentiating (2.50) and use of (2.49.1) yields 
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* * * *
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( / )[ ]FdM D P dP D Y dX P dX X dP tP dM P Mdt rdK dX             
 (2.50.1) 
Here note that 11 1 1( , )X F L K  and 
2
2 2 2( , )X F L K  are the two production functions 
while the full-employment conditions for the two inputs are: 
1 2L L L   and 1 2 D FK K K K K     
 
Therefore, equation (2.49.1) may be expressed as 
1 1 * 2 * 2
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[ L K L KdY F dL F dK P F dL P F dK P X dt tP dM      2 ]FP Mdt rdK   
     1 1 2 2 2 2 2[ ]FWdL rdK WdL rdK rdK P D dt tP dM        
     1 2 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ]FW dL dL r dK dK rdK P D dt tP dM        
or, 2 2( )dY P D dt tdM   (2.52) 
 
Using (2.52), equation (2.50.1) may be expressed as 
* *
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( / ) ( )dM D P dP D Y P D dt tdM dX         
or, *2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[1 ( / )] {( / ) ( / )}dM tP D Y P dt D P D D Y dX           
or, 2 2[ ]dM v HP dt dX   (2.53) 
where *2 2[(1 ) / {1 (1 )}] 0; ( / )v t t m m P D Y         is the marginal propensity to 
consume commodity 2; and, 
*
2 2 2 2[( / ) ( / )] 0H D P D D Y         is the Slutsky’s pure 
substitution term. 
 
Using (2.48.1) and (2.53) one gets 
1 2 2 2( / ) [ ]dV V tP v HP dt dX   (2.54) 
 
From (2.54) we find that 
1 2 2(1/ )( / ) ( / ) 0F FV dV dK tP v dX dK    since 2( / ) 0FdX dK   (2.55) 
1 2 2 2(1/ )( / ) { ( / )} 0V dV dt tP v HP dX dt    (2.56) 
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Now let us assume an imperfection in the labour market. Let sector 2 producing 2X  be 
the formal sector with unionized wage, while sector 1 that produces 1X  be the informal 
sector offering the competitive wage.  
 
Let the unionized wage function in the formal sector be as follows:  
* * * *( , ); ( / ) 0, ( / ) 0W W W U W W W U        
Here U  denotes the bargaining strength of the trade unions. 
* *( / )( / )WE W W W W    is the elasticity of 
*W  with respect to W  and 1 0WE  . 
* *( / )( / )UE W U U W   is the elasticity of *W  with respect to U  and 0UE  . 
 
Now, in the presence of unionized wage in the formal sector, the expressions for change 
in welfare with respect to change in tariff rate and change in the bargaining power are 
given respectively as 
*
1 2 2 2 2(1 / )( / ) {( )( / ) ( ( / )}V dV dt v W W dL dt tP HP dX dt                                   (2.56.1) 
*
1 2 2 2(1 / )( / ) {( )( / ) ( / )}V dV dU v W W dL dU tP dX dU                                          (2.57) 
The signs of ( / )dV dt and ( / )dV dU are ambiguous. Hence in the presence of labour 
market distortion in a two-sector full-employment model a policy of trade liberalisation 
and/ or labour market reform may not be welfare -improving. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Harris-Todaro Migration Model and Introduction of the Informal 
Sector 
 
3.1. Labour Market Segmentation 
 
An important aspect of urban unemployment in developing countries is that it is 
predominantly open. The massive influx of rural migrants in the cities has been 
instrumental in fostering an overwhelmingly faster population growth in urban areas than 
in the rural ones.  Rural workers are lured to migrate by economic incentives as well as 
other attractions of an urbane life. While some of the migrants do manage to secure jobs 
in industries, the less fortunate ones get absorbed only in the urban informal sector and 
the rest wait for their chance to get employment and thus swell the number of open urban 
unemployment. A substantial portion of the urban population in a country like India 
(more than 90%) is engaged in the informal sector.  
 
The urban labour market in the developing economies typically shows evidences of   
labour market segmentation. The labour market can be partitioned into two distinct 
segments: formal and informal. In the formal sector of the market workers are unionized 
and they can wrest a high unionized wage through collective bargaining. On the contrary, 
workers in the informal sector earn a lower and competitive wage than their counterparts 
in the formal sector. In the next section we explain how the unionized wage is determined 
in the organized (formal) sector of the labour market.  
 
3.2.     Determination of Unionized Wage through Collective B argaining 
 
The informal sector wage rate plays a crucial role in determination of the unionized wage 
in the organized labour market. It is like a benchmark (reservation) wage over which the 
wage markup is determined through collective bargaining between the labour union and 
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the firm. To explain how the unionized wage is actually determined we make the 
following assumptions. 
 
We consider a competitive formal sector industry. Production requires two inputs: labour 
( L ) and capital ( K ). The capital market is perfect while the labour market facing the 
industry is unionized. Each firm in the industry has a separate trade union. While 
determining unionized wage, labour is considered as the only variable input of 
production. The unionized wage is determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining game 
between the representative firm and the representative labour union. 
 
The representative firm’s profit function is given by:  
*
2 ( , )P Q L K W L           (3.1) 
where 2P  is the exogenously given price of the formal sector’s product.  
 
The representative labour union maximizes the aggregate wage income of its members 
net of their opportunity wage income i.e. 
*( )W W L            (3.2) 
 
The informal sector wage,W , is the opportunity wage to the workers in the industry. This 
is because any worker failing to get employment in the formal sector will surely be 
getting a job in the informal sector.  
 
We consider a cooperative game between the firm and the labour union that leads to 
determination of the unionized wage, *W  and the employment level, L . If the two 
parties fail to reach an agreement the game will not be played. In that case, no production 
will take place and the workers have to accept jobs in the informal sector. So given the 
objective functions of the two parties, represented by equations (1) and (2), the 
disagreement pay-off is: [0 , 0]  
 
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained from the following optimization exercise.  
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Max * (1 ) *2[ ( , ) ] [( ) ]
U UJ P Q L K W L W W L         (3.3) 
* ,W L  
where U  is  the bargaining strength of the labour unions.  
 
The first-order conditions for maximization are 
* *
2( )[( ) ] [ (.) ]1 U W W L U P Q W L           (3.4) 
and, 
* *
2 2( )( ) [ (.) ]L1 U P Q W L U P Q W L           (3.5) 
 
Using (3.4) and (3.5) one obtains  
2 LP Q W           (3.6) 
Differentiations of (6) lead to 
2 2 2
1( ) 0; ( ) 0L
LL LL
QL L
W P Q P P Q
     
 
      (3.7) 
Simplification from (3.4) yields 
* 2 ( , ) (1 )P Q L KW U U W
L
          (3.8)  
Equation (3.7) is the unionized wage function. In general form it is written as 
* *
2( , , )W W P W U          (3.8.1) 
 
Differentiating (3.8) and using (3.7) we find that 
*
2
1( ) ( )( (.) ) 0W P Q WL
U L
   

 
*
2
2
2
( (.))( ) (1 ) 0
LL
U WL P QW U
W L P Q
    

;         (3.9) 
*
2
2
2 2
(.)( )( ) [ ]LL L L
LL
UP Q Q L Q UWLQW
P P Q L
  

 
From (3.9) it can be checked that 
*
2
( ) 0W
P
 
  
if ( ) 0LL LQ L Q  i.e 1L  ,      (3.10) 
 Page | 45 
where ( )LLL
L
LQ
Q
   is the elasticity of marginal product curve of labour. 23           
      
This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.1: The unionised wage is a positive function of the informal wage and the 
bargaining strength of the labour union. It is also a positive function of the commodity 
price if the marginal product curve of labour is not inelastic. 
 
 
3.3. Two-Sector Mobile Capital Version of the Harris-Todaro Model 
 
Before introducing the informal sector (and hence a dualistic urban industrial sector) let 
us present the essence of the basic 2×2 mobile capital version of the Harris-Todaro 
(1970) (hereafter HT) model which is also known as the Corden and Findlay (1975) 
model. A small open economy with two sectors: rural (sector X ) and urban (sector Y ) is 
considered. Sector X  produces an agricultural commodity using labour and capital while 
sector Y  produces a manufacturing good using the same two inputs. Capital is perfectly 
mobile between the two sectors and its economy-wide return is r . On the contrary, 
labour is imperfectly mobile between the sectors. Workers in the urban sector are 
unionized and receive a higher wage, YW , than their counterparts in the rural sector who 
receive a low competitive wage, XW . So Y XW W  and this intersectoral wage differential 
leads to rural-urban migration of labour. Markets are perfectly competitive except in the 
urban labour market. It is assumed that neoclassical production functions exhibit constant 
returns to scale with positive but diminishing marginal productivities to each factor. 
Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire. 
 
The usual zero-profit conditions for the two sectors are as follows  
                                                      
23 This is only a sufficient condition. There can be another sufficient condition as well for 
which
2
*( ) 0W
P
 

.  
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1X LX KXW a ra           (3.11) 
Y LY KY YW a ra P           (3.12) 
where, jia  is the amount of the j th factor required to produce 1 unit of commodity i , 
where ,j L K and , .i X Y  
 
Capital is fully utilized. The full-employment condition for capital is given by  
KX KYa X a Y K           (3.13) 
 
There is unemployment of labour in the urban sector which is denoted by UL . The labour 
endowment equation is as follows. 
LX LY Ua X a Y L L           (3.14) 
 
Finally, the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition is given by  
( )Y LY X
LY U
W a Y W
a Y L


         (3.15) 
Equation (3.15) states that the expected urban wage must be equal to the rural sector 
wage rate in the migration equilibrium. Using (3.14), equation (3.15) may be rewritten as 
follows. 
( )Y LY LX
X
W a Y a X L
W
                   (3.15.1)  
 
Sectors can be classified in terms of relative factor intensities. It is assumed that 
sector X (sectorY ) is more labour (capital) intensive than the other sector in value sense 
i.e. ( )LX LY
KX KY
Wa Wa
a a
 . This trivially implies that sector X  is more labour-intensive vis-à-
vis sector Y in physical sense. 
 
The general equilibrium structure consists of equations (3.11) – (3.14) and (3.15.1) and 
five endogenous variables; namely, , , ,XW r X Y and UL . This is a decomposable 
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production structure. So factor prices depend on commodity prices but not on factor 
endowments. Given YW , r is obtained from equation (3.12). Inserting the value of r  into 
(3.11), XW  is obtained. Once factor prices are known, factor coefficients, jia s are also 
known. The equilibrium values of X  and Y are determined from equations (3.13) and 
(3.15.1). Finally, UL is obtained from (3.14).  
 
From (3.15.1) one can write 
( )Y LY LX X
W a Y Wa X W
L
                                    (3.15.2) 
(3.15.2) states that the average wage of all workers in an HT economy is always equal to 
the rural sector wage. This is known as the envelope property of the HT structure.  
 
The Harris-Todaro equilibrium is Pareto-suboptimal for two reasons. First, the wages 
across sectors are not equalized so that urban-rural wage differential persists and 
secondly, there exists unemployment in the migration equilibrium. 
 
The basic Harris-Todaro (1970) model has been reexamined and extended by different 
authors in different directions. However, most of the authors have come to the same 
broad conclusion that in the presence of rural-urban wage differential, the urban 
development policies cannot mitigate the problem of rising unemployment in the urban 
sector and therefore indicate to a rural development program as a possible solution to the 
problem. This can be easily seen using the general equilibrium setup we have just 
outlined. 
 
In order to analyse the effects of different development policies on the urban 
unemployment level we rewrite the two zero-profit conditions and the migration 
equilibrium conditions as follows. 
(1 )X LX KX PW a ra S                                     (3.11.1) 
(1 )W Y LY KY YS W a ra P                    (3.12.1) 
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( )
1 ( )
Y
X
U
LY
W WL
a Y


                  (3.15.3) 
where PS  and WS  are the rates of ad-valorem price and wage subsidies given to the rural 
sector and the urban sector, respectively. 
 
First, if the government gives a wage subsidy to the urban employers in order to create 
more jobs in the urban sector, the effective wage paid by the firm, (1 )W YS W , decreases 
although workers are still receiving YW . From (3.12.1) it is clear that the return to 
capital, r , rises to satisfy the zero-profit condition for sector 2. Then from (3.11.1) it 
follows that the rural sector wage, XW , has to fall. The wage-rental ratios in the two 
sectors thus get reduced. So producers will be substituting capital by labour thereby 
increasing the labour-output ratios, 1La  and 2La  and lowering the capital-output ratios, 
1Ka  and 2Ka . There will be an excess supply of capital at the given product-mix. This 
produces a Rybczynski-type effect resulting in an increase in 2X and a decrease in 1X . 
Since the urban sector expands both in terms of output and employment, the expected 
urban wage for a prospective rural migrant rises. On the other hand, the rural sector wage 
rate drops leading to a fresh migration from the rural to the urban sector. The number of 
new migrants exceeds the number of new jobs created in the urban sector. As a result, the 
urban unemployment situation worsens, which is clear from equation (3.15.3). 
 
On the other hand, an increase in the price subsidy to the rural sector cannot affect the 
return to capital, r , as it is determined from equation (3.12.1). But the policy raises the 
rural sector wage, XW . As the ( / )XW r  ratio rises the rural sector producers substitute 
labour by capital. Consequently, 1Ka  rises and 1La  falls. At the given output composition 
adoption of more capital-intensive technology in the rural sector implies a shortage of 
capital. This produces a Rybczynski type effect resulting in a contraction of the capital-
intensive urban sector and an expansion of the labour-intensive rural sector. As the urban 
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sector contracts both in terms of output and employment24 and the wage rate in the rural 
sector increases, the expected urban wage falls short of the rural sector wage resulting in 
a reverse migration of labour from the urban to the rural sector. Accordingly, the urban 
unemployment level falls in the new migration equilibrium which is also clear from 
(3.15.3). So the following proposition is now imminent.  
Proposition 3.2: In the HT model any urban development policy aggravates the problem 
of urban unemployment while rural development program effectively mitigates it.  
 
However, there are two disconcerting features of the Corden and Findlay (1975) model 
which are worth mentioning. An increase in the capital endowment causes sector Y  to 
expand and sector X  to contract following a Rybczynski effect. Factor prices do not 
change. As sector Y expands both in terms of output and employment the expected urban 
wage for a prospective rural migrant increases that causes a fresh migration of labour 
from the rural to the urban sector. The number of new migrants exceeds the number of 
new jobs created in the urban sector. Consequently, the level of urban unemployment 
rises. On the contrary, an increase in the labour endowment causes sector Y to contract 
and the urban unemployment to alleviate. This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.3: In the two-sector mobile capital Harris-Todaro model an increase in the 
labour endowment lowers the problem of urban unemployment while a growth in the 
capital stock accentuates the problem. 
 
These results are surprising because capital scarcity is held responsible for 
unemployment in the capital scarce developing economies. But, an inflow of capital from 
outside or even domestic capital formation raises the level of unemployment. On the 
other hand, population growth lowers urban unemployment. These undesirable properties 
can, however, be avoided in the absence of capital mobility between the sectors i.e. if 
each sector uses capital specific to that sector. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                      
24 As the production techniques in the urban sector do not change a fall in 2X  implies a fall in 
2 2La X . 
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3.4. Three-Sector HT Model, Urban Employment and Trade Liberalisation25   
 
We consider a three-sector dual economy with two urban sectors and a rural sector. 
Sector 1 is the rural sector that produces a final agricultural commodity using labour and 
a non-traded input. One of the two urban sectors (sector m ) produces the non-traded 
input for the rural sector using labour and capital. The other urban sector (sector 2) 
produces a manufacturing commodity with the help of labour and capital. This is the 
import-competing sector of the economy and is protected by an import-tariff. The price of 
the non-traded input, mP , is endogenously determined. As the other two commodities are 
internationally traded their prices are internationally given. In the two urban sectors the 
wage rate is institutionally given at *W  while in the rural sector the wage rate,W , is 
flexible with *W W . The two wage rates are related by the Harris-Todaro migration 
equilibrium condition that states that the expected urban wage for a prospective rural 
migrant is equal to the actual rural wage. Production functions are of fixed-coefficient 
type. Markets, except the urban sector labour market, are perfectly competitive. 
Commodity 1 is assumed to be the numeraire. 
 
Given the competitive product markets the usual zero-profit conditions for the three 
sectors are given by the following three equations. 
1 1 1L m mWa P a                    (3.16) 
*
2 2 2 (1 )L KW a ra P t                    (3.17) 
*
Lm Km mW a ra P                    (3.18) 
 
Capital and the non-traded input are completely utilized. Therefore we have the following 
two equations.  
2 2K Km ma X a X K                    (3.19) 
1 1m ma X X                    (3.20) 
 
                                                      
25 This section is based on Marjit and Beladi (1996). 
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There is unemployment of labour in the urban sector which is denoted by, UL . The labour 
endowment equation of the economy is given by 
1 1 2 2L L Lm m Ua X a X a X L L                     (3.21) 
 
Finally, the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition is as follows. 
*
2 2
2 2
( )( )L Lm m
L Lm m U
W a X a X W
a X a X L
 
 
                 (3.22.1) 
Using (3.21), equation (3.22.1) can be rewritten as follows. 
*
2 2 1 1( / )( )L Lm m LW W a X a X a X L                  (3.22.2) 
 
This production structure satisfies the decomposition properties as there are three 
unknown input prices, ,W r and mP , and the same number of equations; namely, (3.16) – 
(3.18). r  is determined from (3.17) as * 2,W P  and t  are exogenously given. Plugging the 
value of r into (3.18), mP  is obtained. Inserting mP  into (3.16) one can solve for W . 
1 2,X X and mX  are simultaneously solved from (3.19), (3.20) and (3.22.2). Finally, UL is 
determined from (3.21). 
 
Now if the government resorts to trade liberalisation the tariff rate on the import of 
commodity 2 i.e. t  takes a lower value. This lowers the domestic price of commodity 2 
i.e. 2 (1 )P t .   
For finding out the consequence of trade liberalisation on urban unemployment 
differentiating (3.17) one gets  
2
ˆ
ˆ ( )
K
Ttr

                     (3.23) 
where: ( ) 0
1
tT
t
 

. 
 
Differentiation of (3.18) and use of (3.23) yi eld 
2
ˆ ˆ( )Kmm
K
P Tt

                     (3.24) 
 Page | 52 
Using (3.24) and differentiating (3.16) we find  
1
1 2
ˆ ˆ( )m Km
L K
W Tt 
 
                      (3.25) 
 
Differentiating from (3.19) and (3.20) one can derive, respectively  
2 2
ˆ ˆ 0K Km mX X                       (3.26) 
and, 
1
ˆ ˆ
mX X                       (3.27) 
Hence sector 1 and sector m  change in the same direction and in the same proportion. 
 
From (3.22.2) one gets 
*
2 2 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )L Lm m L LW X X X W                         (3.28) 
Using (3.27), equation (3.28) can be rewritten as follows.  
** *
2
2 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )LmL L m L Lm
WW WX X W
W W W
        (3.29)                  
 
Writing (3.26) and (3.29) in a matrix notation we get  
2
2 ***
2
21
                                        0ˆ
ˆˆ ( )( )       ( )
K Km
LmL
L LmL m
X
WWW WX WW W
 
  
                    
               (3.30) 
where: 
* * *
2
2 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )( )Lm L KmK L K Lm L Km L K
W W W
W W W
                  (3.31) 
 
Solving (3.30) by Cramer’s rule one finds  
*
2 2
ˆ ˆ( )Km L Lm
WX W
W
  

                      (3.32) 
*
2
2
ˆ ˆ( )Km L Lm
WX W
W
  

                     (3.33) 
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Differentiating (3.21) one finds: 
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0L L Lm m LU UX X X L                         (3.34) 
 
Using (3.27), (3.32) and (3.33) from (3.34) we can derive:  
*
2
1 2 2
( )ˆ ˆ[( ) ]L LmU L Lm K L Km
LU
WL W
W
      
 
     
With the help of (3.25), the above expression may be rewritten as follows.  
*
2 1
2 2 1 2
1 2
( )ˆ ˆ[( ) ]( )L Lm m KmU K Lm L Km L K
LU L K
WL Tt
W
        
   
       (3.35) 
 
From (3.31) and (3.35) the following results are obtained.  
(1) ˆ 0UL  when ˆ 0t  if 2
2
( ) ( )KmK
L Lm

 
 i.e. the protected sector is capital-intensive. 
(2) ˆ 0UL  when ˆ 0t   only if 0  . This means that a reduction in import-tariff may 
accentuate the problem of urban unemployment only if the protected sector is labour-
intensive. These results may be stated in terms of the following proposition.  
Proposition 3.4: A policy of trade liberalisation lowers the urban unemployment of 
labour if the protected sector is capital-intensive. On the contrary, removal of the 
protectionist policy may accentuate the unemployment problem only if the protected 
sector is labour-intensive. 
 
Proposition 3.4 can be intuitively explained as follows. Trade liberalisation lowers the 
domestic price of commodity 2 that in turn, reduces r (equation (3.17). This leads to a 
decrease in mP  (equation (3.18)). Finally, from the zero-profit condition for sector 1 
(equation (3.16)) it follows that W  rises, which in turn leads to a reverse migration and 
draws more labour in the rural sector. Consequently, the rural sector expands and raises 
the demand for the non-traded input. Sector m expands. If the rural sector expands by 1 
unit, employment and the demand for the non-traded input increase by 1La  and 1ma  units, 
respectively. If sector m  expands by 1ma  units, employment rises by 1Lm ma a  units and the 
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demand for capital rises by 1Km ma a  units. As it is a full-employment model that extra 
capital must come from sector 2. Consequently, sector 2 contracts by 1 2( / )Km m Ka a a units 
and employment falls by 1 2 2( / )Km m L Ka a a a units. So we find that owing to trade 
liberalisation sectors 1 and m  expand while sector 2 contracts. 
 
Employment in the urban sector rises if 1 1 2 2( / )Lm m Km m L Ka a a a a a i.e. if 
2 2( / ) ( / )K L Km Lma a a a . In other words, aggregate employment in the urban sector rises 
if and only if the protected sector is capital-intensive. As the rural sector employment 
also increases, aggregate employment in the economy rises. On the contrary, if the 
protected sector is labour-intensive, aggregate employment in the urban sector falls. But 
the aggregate employment in the economy may still go up if the increase in the rural 
sector employment outweighs the fall in the urban sector employment. Hence that the 
protected sector is labour-intensive is only a necessary condition for the unemployment in 
the economy to increase.  
 
3.5. Introduction of the Informal Sector 
 
The HT model presumes that in the urban sector workers either find employment in the 
formal sector at the high unionized wage or they remain unemployed. However, a worker 
can remain unemployed either if he has not completely cut off his attachment with the 
rural sector or if he has some of his family members employed in the formal sector who 
would help him financially for the time being and keep his hope alive to be able to secure 
a formal sector job in the next period. But the documentation in a series of empirical 
studies26 in several developing economies suggests that people who are unable to find 
employment in the urban formal sector end up working in the urban informal sector at 
low wages.27 In the conventional dual economy models with an urban informal sector, the 
                                                      
26 See, for example, Papola (1981), Romatet (1983), Bose (19 78), Joshi and Joshi (1976).  
 
27 See chapter 1, section 1.5 and Agenor (1996) for the size and growth of the informal sector. 
The percentage of population engaged in the informal sector has increased in the post-reform 
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latter is viewed as a residual sector offering a low competitive wage which is less than 
both the rural and the formal sector wage rates.28 If a worker fails to find a job in the 
formal sector, he is automatically absorbed in the informal sector. The informal sector 
wage rate is assumed to be perfectly flexible so as to clear the labour market in the urban 
sector. Hence, there is no open unemployment in the urban sector in the migration 
equilibrium.29    
 
The informal sector as a residual sector can easily be introduced in a 2×2 mobile capital 
HT model. Consider the following general equilibrium setup. 
1X LX KXW a ra           (3.36) 
m Lm Km mW a ra P           (3.37) 
Y LY KY YW a ra P           (3.38)  
KX Km KYa X a M a Y K           (3.39) 
LX Lm LYa X a M a Y L           (3.40) 
Finally, the HT migration equilibrium condition is given by  
( )Y LY m Lm X
LY Lm
W a Y W a M W
a Y a M
 

        (3.41)  
 
Here sector M  is the urban informal sector that produces an internationally traded 
commodity. So mP  is given internationally. Equations (3.39) – (3.41) are the modified 
                                                                                                                                                              
period. See Marjit (2003) and Dev (2000) in this context. That the informal sector is growing in 
most developing countries has also been pointed out in Djankov (2003). 
 
28 The rural-urban migration of labour in the presence of informal sector ensures that the rural 
sector wage rate settles down somewhere between the urban formal sector and informal sector 
wage rates. This is true in the Harris-Todaro migration framework where migration depends on 
expected wages only. However, there are alternative migrat ion theories, in particular that of Katz 
and Stark (1986), where an individual’s decision to migrate is part of the household’s portfolio 
choice among different income streams. Thus, even if expected income in the rural sector is less, 
some family members may stay there because this allows diversifying the income risks of the 
household. 
 
29 In reality, the informal sector and open unemployment of unskilled labour coexist. This 
happens if the informal sector unskilled wage is also rigid in the downward direct ion. See chapter 
4 for details.  
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capital and labour endowment equations and the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium 
condition, respectively. The Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium is now attained 
when the actual rural wage equals the expected urban wage, which consists of both urban 
formal and informal wages. This model does not have urban unemployment, so that it is 
assumed that those who do not find formal sector employment are absorbed in the 
informal sector.  
 
However, if the informal sector (sector M ) produces a non-traded input for the urban 
formal sector the price of the informal sector’s product i.e. mP  is domestically determined. 
There would be an additional equation in the form of the demand and supply equality 
condition for the informal sector’s product which is as follows.  
mYM a Y           (3.42) 
 
The zero-profit condition for the formal sector (equation (3.38)) has now to be replaced 
by the following equation. 
Y LY KY m mY YW a ra P a P                   (3.38.1) 
 
The modified production structure is an indecomposable one. This is because the price 
system now consists of equations (3.36), (3.37) and (3.38.1) with four unknowns; 
namely, , ,X mW W r  and mP . So factor prices cannot be determined from the price system 
alone. One has to take help of the output system to solve for all the endogenous variables 
including the input prices. Hence apart from the commodity prices, factor prices now 
depend on factor endowments.    
 
Again, if the urban informal sector uses a specific input the production structure would be 
as follows. The price-unit cost equality conditions in perfectly competitive markets of the 
three sectors are given by 
1X LX KX XW a r a P    (3.43) 
2Y LY KY YW a r a P    (3.44) 
1Z LZ KZ ZW a r a P    (3.45) 
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The urban formal and rural sectors use capital of type 1 with interest rate 1r  and the 
informal sector uses capital of type 2 with interest rate 2r . Capital of type 1 is completely 
mobile between the urban formal and rural sectors while capital of type 2 is specific to 
the urban informal sector. Labour is imperfectly mobile among the three sectors of the 
economy. 
 
Full employment of labour and complete utilization of capital of the two types imply that 
LX LY LZa X a Y a Z L     (3.46) 
1KX KZa X a Z K   (3.47) 
2KYa Y K  (3.48) 
 
The Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium condition is now given by  
Y LY Z LZ
X
LY LZ
W a Y W a Z W
a Y a Z
 

 
Use of (3.46) and simplification yield  
X LX Y LY Z LZ XW a X W a Y W a Z W L    (3.49) 
 
There are seven endogenous variables XW , YW , 1r , 2r , X , Y  and Z  that can be solved 
from the above seven independent equations, namely equations (3.43) – (3.49). This is an 
indecomposable system where changes in factor endowments affect the factor prices and 
hence also the factor intensities. 
 
Equations (3.43) and (3.45) form a decomposable subsector since XW  and 1r  can be 
solved from them. Hence, any change in factor endowments does not affect the factor 
prices in rural and formal sectors.  
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3.6. Subcontracting 
 
Most of the studies conducted on the informal sector (see for example, Papola (1981), 
Romatet (1983), Joshi and Joshi (1976), Bose (1978)) have found that the urban informal 
sector consists of many subcontract firms, which produce various parts and semi-
processed components for the parent formal sector firms. Such subcontract firms are 
observed around machine and automobiles makers, garments and shoe industries in 
developing countries. These activities are typically characterized by small scale and 
among others a low wage rate suppressed by the parent firms.  
 
Subcontracting alludes to the practice of farming out a part or whole of the production of 
a commodity by a larger (formal sector) firm to a smaller (informal sector) firm on a 
contractual basis. The terms of the contract i.e. the interest rate on credit and the price at 
which the formal sector firm ( 2F ) purchases the output of the informal sector firm ( 1F ) 
are determined by the former. This is analogous to the concept of credit-product 
interlinkage as observed in backward agriculture. 
 
Formal sector firms have an advantage over the informal sector firms in the capital 
(credit) market while the latter firms enjoy the advantage of cheaper labour supply.  
 
If the different cost advantages of the two sectors are combined, the production cost can 
be minimized. Thus, a possibility of interlinkage between these two sectors arises. 
Subcontracting is such an interlinkage. This system is Pareto-optimal and a principal-
agent framework is adopted to analyse this contract. 
 
Let the equation of the final demand curve facing the formal sector firm for its 
product, X , be  
P = P(X); P  < 0; P   0  ≤         (3.50) 
The total cost function for producing X is as follows. 
C= C(X); C  > 0; C  > 0; C(0) 0.           (3.51) 
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Two alternative contracts 
 
We consider a subcontracting system between the representative formal sector firm and 
the informal sector firm. Two alternative contracts are available to both of these firms.  
 
Contract I: The informal sector firm ( 1F ) sells its product in a competitive market at the 
price 0P  per unit. The large firm ( 2F ) purchases the product from 1F  at 
0P and resells it 
in the final market. 1F  takes credit from an informal source at the parametric interest 
rate g  per period. 
 
The profit function of 1F  is given by 
0 0
1 = P X  - (1+ g)C(X)   (3.52) 
               
The first-order condition of profit maximization is given by  
0P  = (1+ g)C'(.)                      (3.53) 
Solving (3.53) the optimum supply or production of X is obtained as: 
0 0X  = X (P, g)  (3.54) 
              (+)(─) 
The optimum income of 1F  is:  
0 0 0 0
1 = P X - (1+ g)C(X )                      (3.55)            
 
The profit function of firm 2F  is 
0 0 0 = [P(X ) - P ]X  (3.56) 
   
Profit is maximized through a choice of 0X and the first-order condition is                                                              
0 0 0 0 0[P(X ) + P (X )X ] = P  = (1+ g)C (X )                   (3.57) 
i.e. 0 0MR(X ) = MC(X )             
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Contract II:  
 
This is subcontracting. Here 2F  supplies credit to 1F  at the interest rate r  and purchases 
the output of the latter at the price *P per unit. It then sells the product in the final 
commodity market. 
 
The profit function of 1F  under this contract is  
*
1  = P X - (1+r)C(X)                                 (3.58) 
and this is maximized with respect to X . The first-order condition is as follows. 
*P  = (1+r)C'(X)            (3.59) 
(3.59) leads to the following supply function of X .  
 
* * *X  = X (P , r)                      (3.60) 
              (+)(─) 
 
The optimum profit of the informal sector firm ( 1F ) is given by 
* * * *
1  = P X  - (1+r)C(X )                                                       (3.61) 
The profit of the formal sector firm  ( 2F ) under subcontracting system is represented by 
* * * *
2 = [P(X ) - P ]X  + (r - i)C(X )                                           (3.62) 
where i is the opportunity interest rate of 2F .   
 
The problem of 2F  is to maximize 
* * * *
2
*
Max  = [P(X ) - P ]X  + (r - i)C(X )
      P ,i

 
subject to the reservation income constraint of the informal sector firm given by  
* 0
1 1    . 
The Lagrange expression is as follows. 
* * * * * 0
1 1L= [P(X ) - P ]X  + (r - i)C(X ) + ( - )                 (3.63) 
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Assuming interior solutions for *P  and i  the first-order conditions and the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions are given by the following. 
* * * * *( L/ P*) = ( X / P )[MR(X ) - P  + (r-i)C'(.)] - X (1 - ) = 0                 (3.64) 
* * * *( L/ r) = ( X / r)[MR(X ) - P  + (r-i)C'(.)] - C(X )(  - 1) = 0                 (3.65) 
( L/ ) = 0;  and,                   (3.66) 
(  L/ ) = 0, 0                        (3.67) 
 
Multiplying both sides of (3.64) and (3.65) by *C(X ) and *X respectively and adding, one 
gets: 
* * * * * *[MR(X ) - P  + (r-i)C'(.)][C(X )( X / P ) + X ( X/ r)] = 0               (3.68) 
From (3.68) one can easily verify that  
* *[MR(X ) - P  + (r-i)C'(.)]= 0                (3.69) 
(This is because it is easily seen that * * * *[C(X )( X / P ) + X ( X/ r)] 0     )  
 
Using (3.59) from (3.69) it follows that 
* *MR(X ) = (1 + i)C'(.) = MC(X )                    (3.70) 
Using (3.70) from (3.64) or (3.65) one finds  
1 0                             (3.71) 
Using (3.71) from (3.67) it follows that  
* 0
1 1=                                   (3.72) 
This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.5: The informal sector firm does not get more than its reservation income 
in the subcontracting system.  
 
Now using figure 3.1 it is easy to prove that the subcontracting system is optimal for the 
formal sector firm ( 2F ).  
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,MC MR  
 
                                                       0MC [ 0(1+g)C'(X ) ] 
a                                                                                               
                                                                                  *MC [ (1+i)C'(X*) ]   
                                                                                        
 
e                       c  
                             d       
f                               
                                        MR                                             D       
O                   0X *X       b                                                            X  
                               
       Figure 3.1: The optimality of the subcontracting system 
 
In figure 3.1, aD is the market demand curve for the final product ( X ). The 
corresponding marginal revenue curve is ab . 0MC  and *MC are the marginal cost curves 
under the two contracts, respectively. The respective equilibrium points are c  and d . 0X  
and *X  are the corresponding output levels. The profit of the formal sector firm ( 2F ) 
under contract 1 is     
0 0 0
2 ( ) ( ) ( )m OacX m OcX m Oac       
 
The profit of the formal sector firm ( 2F ) under subcontracting is 
* * *
2 ( ) ( ) ( )m OadX m OdX m Oad      
Hence, * 02 2( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) 0m Oad m Oac m Ocd          
Therefore, subcontracting is the optimal policy of the formal sector firm ( 2F ). 
 
It is to be noted that the optimality of the system of subcontracting here has been proved 
in terms of credit market imperfection. In the absence of any credit market imperfections, 
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i g . In that case, * 02 2( ) 0   . So there is no reason for subcontracting system to 
exist. So the following proposition readily follows. 
Proposition 3.6: The subcontracting system is the optimal policy to the formal sector firm 
provided there is imperfection in the credit market. 
 
Now if a credit subsidy is given to the informal sector firm ( 1F ), g  falls and 
OMC curve 
moves to the right and ( )m Ocd  decreases. Although the policy makes 1F  better off, the 
industrial productivity does not increase so long as 1F  is engaged in subcontracting. This 
leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.7: A credit subsidy policy to the informal sector firm does not raise the 
industrial productivity so long as it is engaged in subcontracting arrangement with the 
formal sector firm. 
 
We have used the principal-agent framework to analyse the subcontracting system with 
formal sector firm ( 2F ) as the principal and informal sector firm ( 1F ) as the agent. The 
principal-agent framework is a special case of the Nash-bargaining game between the two 
players where the principal possesses all the bargaining capacity. On the contrary, the 
agent without having any bargaining power accepts the principal’s offer of the interlinked 
contract and does not get more than its reservation income. So subcontracting is actually 
a system of creating economic surplus where the production is done by the agent and an 
instrument of extracting economic surplus on the part of the stronger party.  
 
3.7. Does the Informal Sector Live or Die with the Formal S ector? 
 
It has already been mentioned that the informal sector firms primarily produce 
intermediate inputs for the formal sector through an institutional arrangement which is 
known as subcontracting. As the informal sector depends on the formal sector for 
marketing its output a common contention is that the informal sector lives or dies with 
the formal sector. It is worthwhile to theoretically examine the validity of this 
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conventional wisdom. In the following section we do this exercise using a three-sector 
Harris-Todaro model with an urban informal sector.  
 
We consider a model of rural-urban migration with three sectors: rural, urban informal 
and urban formal sectors. The rural sector produces an agricultural commodity, X , using 
labour and a sector-specific input land, the latter earning a return i . The urban informal 
sector produces an intermediate input, Y  for the formal sector with the help of labour and 
capital. In the rural and the urban informal sectors, labour market is perfectly competitive 
and the wage rates are XW  and YW , respectively. The capital market facing the urban 
informal sector is imperfect. The interest rate on capital, R , is a positive function of the 
amount of capital borrowed and a decreasing function of the policy parameter,  . An 
increase in   implies a credit subsidy to the informal sector that lowers the interest rate. 
Therefore, we have 
( , )KYR R a Y  ,   with ( / ) 0KYR a Y   ; and ( / ) 0R    .    (3.73) 
 
Let us now explain in details the capital market dichotomy which is a salient feature of 
the developing economies. The functional form of (.)R suggests that capital cost in the 
informal sector increases with an increase in the amount of capital borrowed. In the 
absence of any significant provision for organized (formal) credit, the informal sector has 
to mainly rely on informal credit market for financing the costs of capital. 
The (.)R function with ( / ) 0KYR a Y    and ( / ) 0R     is a possible way of 
formalizing the informal sector’s lack of access to the organized credit market. The idea 
is that the economy is endowed with a given amount of capital. Sectors X and Z have 
access to or connections with the owners of capital and they work out a rental rate, r , 
which is the competitive rate. The informal sector lacks this connection. Hence we can 
conceive of a set of middlemen who borrow capital from the capital owners at the 
competitive rate, r  and then lend them out to the workers in the informal sector at a 
higher rate given by (.)R , with ( / ) 0KYR a Y   . This means sector Y can get an 
additional loan at the cost of a higher interest rate. This implies imperfection in the 
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capital market. Similar treatment of credit market imperfection is available in Datta 
Chaudhuri (1989), Gupta (1993) and Chaudhuri (2000) etc.  
 
Lending of credit to the informal sector borrowers is always risky. There is a high 
probability of default of loans. The risk of default may arise due to many reasons. First, 
there is the risk of involuntary default owing to unforeseen circumstances 
(unemployment, disease, death of the borrower etc.). Hence the borrower simply may not 
have sufficient money at the time of repayment of the loan. Secondly, there is possibility 
of voluntary default: the borrower may take the loan, not use the fund for production and 
refuse to repay. In developing countries where the legal machinery is not so strong and 
functions slowly, the risk of default is high. The larger the volume of loan, in order to 
cover risks, the higher the interest rate the informal sector lender would charge. See 
Bottomley (1975), Basu (1998) and Ray (1998) in this context. Nonetheless, in Appendix 
3.1 we have shown mathematically why the informal interest rate, R , is an increasing 
function of the volume of loan and a decreasing function of the government’s credit 
subsidy. 
 
Finally, the urban formal sector faces a perfect capital market but a unionized labour 
market. The unionized wage in this sector,W , is greater than both the rural and the 
informal sector wage rates. In particular, we have X YW W W  . There are two 
production divisions in the formal sector. Division Z  produces a final manufacturing 
commodity using labour, capital and the non-traded input, Y . Another division, M , 
produces at least a part of the requirement for the input in order to avoid complete 
dependence on the informal sector. The price of commodity Y  is determined 
domestically while final commodity prices are given internationally. The technology for 
producing the intermediate good, Y , is identical in both sectors and coefficients of 
production in all the three sectors are fixed so that the jia s are technologically given. 
However, this is only a simplifying assumption. Finally, commodity 1 is chosen as the 
numeraire. 
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The usual zero-profit conditions are given by 
1X LX NXW a ia                     (3.74) 
( , )
                  (+)  (-)
Y LY KY KY YW a R a Y a P                    (3.75) 
LM KM YWa ra P                     (3.76) 
LZ KZ Y YZ ZWa ra P a P                     (3.77) 
 
All inputs are fully utilized. The full-employment conditions for land, capital, labour and 
the non-traded input are given by the following four equations, respectively.  
NXa X N                    (3.78) 
KY KM KZa Y a M a Z K                    (3.79) 
LX LY LM LZa X a Y a M a Z L                    (3.80) 
YZY M a Z                     (3.81) 
Finally, the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition is given by  
( )Y LY LM LZ X
LY LM LZ
W a Y Wa M Wa Z W
a Y a M a Z
  
 
 (3.82) 
           
Here the endogenous variables are: , , , , , , ,X Y YW W i P r X Y M and Z . The policy parameter 
is  . An increase in   implies a credit subsidy policy to the urban informal sector.  
 
W is the exogenously given wage rate in the urban formal sector. Given W  and ZP , the 
equilibrium values of r  and YP  are determined from equations (3.76) and (3.77). The 
values of , , , ,XW i X Y M and Z are determined by solving equations (3.74) and (3.78) – 
(3.82) simultaneously. Once Y  is known R  is also known and hence from (3.74) YW is 
obtained. This is how the values of all endogenous variables are determined.   
 
Now if a credit subsidy is given to the informal sector,   takes a higher value. 
Consequently, R  decreases and YW  increases as YP  and r  are determined from equations 
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(3.76) and (3.77). Sector Y also expands by the process. As the informal sector wage, YW , 
rises the expected urban wage for a prospective rural migrant, given by the left-hand side 
of (3.82), increases leading to a migration of labour from the rural sector to the urban 
sector. There is no reason for sector Z to change. Thus, the demand for the intermediate 
input remains unchanged. The intermediate input-producing division of the formal sector 
must contract as the informal sector now produces more of input Y . Thus, as a whole the 
formal sector (final good plus intermediate input) contracts while the informal sector 
expands. So the following proposition can now be established.  
Proposition 3.8: A credit subsidy policy to the informal sector leads to an overall 
contraction of the formal sector while it expands the informal sector. 
 
Hence, there may be cases where the urban informal sector may expand even if the 
formal sector contracts and the former is dependent on the latter for marketing its output.  
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Appendix 3.1: Derivation of the R function 
 
Suppose an informal sector lender finds that on average, fraction q of his loans is not 
repaid. It is sensible to assume that q should be increasing in the volume of loan, YK , and 
decreasing in the government’s credit subsidy,  . As the volume of credit increases the 
probability of default is expected to increase while a higher provision for subsidized 
formal credit would lower the average cost of borrowing funds for the informal sector 
borrowers and it would be easier for them to repay their loans. So we write 
 
 ( , )Yq q K  with ( / ) 0Yq K   and ( / ) 0q         (3.A.1)   
 
The income of the informal sector lender, denoted Q , is given by 
 
 (1 )(1 ) Y YQ q R K K            (3.A.2) 
 
The effective informal interest rate net of the expected cost of default, denoted d , is as 
follows. 
 ( ) (1 )(1 ) 1
Y
Yd q R
K
                      (3.A.3) 
 
Competition between sectors will ensure that in equilibrium the effective informal 
interest is equal to the competitive interest rate in the organized credit market. So in 
equilibrium we have 
 
 (1 (.))(1 ) 1q R r     
or, 
( )
1
r qR
q


          (3.A.4) 
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It is easy to check that 
 
(1 )( ) ( ) 0
1
q rR r
q
  

if 0.q         (3.A.5) 
 
So if the rate of default of loan, q , is positive there exists positive interest rate differential 
between the informal and the formal credit markets.  
 
From (3.A.4) it is not difficult to check that 
 
2
1( ) [ ]( ) 0;
(1 )Y Y
R r q
K q K
   
  
and, 
                               (+) 
 2
1( ) [ ]( ) 0.
(1 )
R r q
q 
   
  
                                                                (3.A.6) 
                             (–) 
 
Hence R  is an increasing function of the volume of loan and a decreasing function of the 
credit subsidy. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Informal Sector and Open Unemployment 
 
4.1. Existing Literature and Empirical Evidences 
 
In explaining urban unemployment in migration equilibrium, the Harris-Todaro (1970) 
model posits that due to the existence of minimum wages determined by institutional 
forces, a migrant entering the modern sector may not be absorbed at the prevailing urban 
real wage, that is, each migrant has only a ‘probability’ of obtaining modern sector job. 
There remains a time gap between the entry of a migrant in the urban labour force and his 
securing formal sector job. This implies that those not managing to secure modern sector 
employment are left to remain unemployed and search for employment. The job search 
strategy specified in the probabilistic models of Harberger (1971), Mincer (1976), 
Gramlich (1976) and Stiglitz (1982) allow for unemployment and full time search.  
 
The role of informal sector in the urban labour market is latent in Todaro (1969) where he 
suggests that migrants find temporary employment in the urban ‘traditional sector’ before 
their eventual attainment of urban ‘modern sector’ job. Cole and Sanders (1983) 
introduce the informal sector in the Harris-Todaro (1970) model and emphasize that 
much of the migration takes place with the informal sector, not the modern sector as the 
intended destination. Those with adequate human capital migrate to the formal sector 
while others migrate to the informal sector. They argue that all informal sector migrants 
get employed. Therefore, the traditional view postulates that migrants not getting jobs in 
the formal sector are automatically employed in the informal sector, and in migration 
equilibrium, there does not exist any open unemployment in the urban sector 30.  
 
 
                                                      
30 See the models of Datta Chaudhuri (1989) and Grinols (1991). However, the Todaro (1969) 
model earlier had hinted that those who do not find employment in the formal sector accept 
temporary unemployment rather than menial jobs. 
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However, contrary to the traditional wisdom, empirical evidences31 do indicate 
simultaneous existence of open unemployment and informal sector in developing 
countries. This calls for an explanation regarding the nature of unemployment and the 
factors responsible for the inability of the informal sector to sop up the residual labour 
force causing unemployment. Theoretical exposition on unemployment in the presence of 
informal sector depicts it as voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary unemployment is a 
supply side phenomenon where workers prefer remaining unemployed to being employed 
in the informal sector. Involuntary unemployment arises when workers are willing to 
accept informal jobs but are unable to find one. It is the latter type of unemployment that 
is more thought- provoking since it contradicts the conventional wisdom regarding the 
‘free-entry’ nature of the informal sector that disallows open unemployment. 
 
The earliest explanation for the existence of open unemployment in the presence of wage 
flexibility in the informal sector has been provided by Fields (1975).  He posits a trade 
off between informal sector employment and search for formal sector jobs. Those 
aspiring for formal sector employment have two options for job-search: either they can 
get some informal employment with flexible work hours and tenure and search for formal 
sector job in the remaining hours of the day when they are not working or, they can 
remain unemployed and devote their full time for seeking job in the formal sector. The 
greater effectiveness of search from being unemployed than informally employed and 
access to non-earned income may induce workers to choose to be unemployed. 
Unemployment in this case is essentially voluntary in nature.  
 
                                                      
31 In South Africa, the informal sector absorbs only 19% of the workforce, which is a very small 
proportion by developing country standards and open unemployment is more common. During 
the period 1995-2003, the labour force grew by over 5 % per annum, wage employment rose by 
1.8 % per annum, self-employment grew by 5.1 % per annum, and unemployment grew by above 
9 % per annum (Kingdon and Knight, 2001, 2005). In Latin America, according to the ILO, the 
overall average unemployment rates have risen from 9.1 % in 1995 to 11.1 % in 1999, while 
several studies estimate the number of informal workers at between 20 and 35 % of the urban 
economically active population (Portes and Schauffler, 1993). The 2000/2001 Labour Force 
Survey in Tanzania shows that the unemployment rate had increased by 1.5 points from 3.6 % in 
1990/91 to 5.1 points in 2000/2001.   
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However, there are several evidences that indicate that unemployment is neither always 
voluntary nor is the informal sector a free-entry zone as commonly perceived, rather 
conspicuous barriers to entry exist, which deter the unemployed from entering the sector 
(Banerjee, 1986; Gandhi-Kingdon and Knight, 2001). In a study of South Africa, Gandhi-
Kingdon and Knight (2001) find that the unemployed are substantially worse-off than the 
informal sector workers in terms of income, living conditions and happiness. One may 
argue that the unemployed may be prepared to endure temporary penury and unhappiness 
to allow full time search and thus optimize their ‘inter-temporal search strategy’. This 
rationale is also consistent with voluntary unemployment. However, their study shows 
that only 9% of the unemployed searched full-time (35 or more hours) for work in the 
reference week, and 68% spent no more than 10 hours in job-search. This rules out the 
possibility that unemployment is a supply side phenomenon and suggests that limited 
scope for entering the informal sector may have pushed many workers into 
unemployment.  
 
Nonetheless, minimal attention has been devoted in the literature to analyse and explain 
the phenomenon of involuntary unemployment and the deterrents for entry into informal 
sector in developing countries. Whatever studies do exist have mostly been carried out 
with respect to South Africa, typical with remarkably high open unemployment level 
despite the persistence of an informal sector. From those studies, three broad reasons that 
dissuade the unemployed from entering into the informal sector may be envisaged: first, 
lack of resources to enter the upper-tier informal sector, secondly, inhibitions and 
impediments to be engaged in self-employment and thirdly, wage rigidity in the informal 
wage employment. 
 
In Zimbabwe, entry into the productive segment of the informal sector is restricted by 
lack of skills and capital. Voluntary entry is possible mostly for the erstwhile formal 
sector workers who had accumulated experience, knowledge, and skills (Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002). Even for the educated young people it becomes difficult to be successful 
in self-employment, so that they prefer unemployment, in case they could not find formal 
sector jobs.  
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The hindrances to self-employment in South Africa may be classified as profit barriers 
where individuals do not view an informal activity as being able to generate profit, 
capital barriers that restrict an individuals’ access to funds, skill barriers in terms of 
technical or entrepreneurial skills, future-limiting barriers which arise when informal 
work today limits an individual’s opportunity to access formal employment in the future, 
lack of infrastructure, limited role of the government in assisting the unemployed and 
hidden cost barriers that include formal or informal restrictions and criminal activities 
(Skinner, 2005; Cichello, 2005; The Western Cape Provincial Economic Review & 
Outlook, 2007). Moreover, the subjugation of entrepreneurial activities under apartheid 
and the allied inhibition of entrepreneurial skills and social networks, and excessively 
restrictive bye-laws contribute to high entry barriers in South Africa (Chandra et al, 
2002). Cichello et al. (2005) also identify the risk of impending business failure, high 
cost of transport and jealousy within the community as key deterrents in Khayelitsha, 
South Africa.  
 
Wage rigidity in the informal sector can be explained in three ways. First, it is observed 
in many developing countries the informal sector consists of several subcontract firms 
that produce various parts and semi-processed components for the parent formal sector 
firms. These activities are typically characterized by small scale and among others a low-
wage rate suppressed by the parent firms. The informal sectors workers do not get more 
than their reservation wages. Secondly, several authors (e.g. Banerjee, 1986, Gandhi-
Kingdon and Knight, 2001) have noted that many activities in the so-called informal 
sector of developing countries are highly stratified, requiring skills, experience and 
contacts, with identifiable barriers to entry. For example, petty trading often has highly 
structured labour and product markets with considerable costs of entry. Even when skill 
and capital are not required, entry can be difficult because of the presence of cohesive 
networks, which exercise control over location and zone of operation. Finally, 
unemployment of unskilled labour may also arise if the workers are paid their nutritional 
efficiency wage that maximizes the profits of their employers even though the workers 
are willing to work at a lower wage which is equal to their reservation wage.  
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Apart from entry barriers and wage rigidity, the association between informal sector and 
unemployment has been analysed in terms of economic development with the help of the 
theoretical framework developed in the Lewis (1954) model. Following the model, two 
stages of the development process can be identified for an economy with labour mobility 
and market-clearing: first, the labour-surplus stage and second, the labour-scarce stage; 
beyond the turning point, a shortage of labour begins to raise both urban real wages and 
rural real incomes more rapidly. In an economy where the turning point is being 
approached, the proportion of the labour force in free-entry informal activities declines 
while the more productive informal sector remains unchanged. On the other hand, where 
the turning point is receding, the free-entry informal sector and open unemployment 
together have to absorb the growing residual labour force. South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
characterized by fast labour force growth in relation to slow economic growth appear to 
be moving further away from the turning point and therefore show evidences of 
simultaneous existence of informal sector and open unemployment (Ruffer and Knight, 
2007; Knight, 2007). 
 
A common conjecture is that growth can drastically curb unemployment. But 
globalisation-led growth leads to a complex problem. There is a soaring demand for 
skilled workers while a large pool of the unskilled labour remains ‘unemployable’. The 
phenomenon of ‘unsatisfied demand’ coexists alongside ‘an incredible surplus of labour 
power’. In many cases, like for example, Argentina, the revenues brought in through the 
privatisation process and the inflow of foreign investment did not go towards 
strengthening the country’s productive base, instead, priority was put on the financial and 
speculative sector. This led to a gradual contraction of industry and agriculture, 
aggravated by the opening of the economy to more competitive imports. Many people 
who had only informal sector jobs fell into perpetual unemployment.  
 
Trade liberalisation, the most important ingredient of the globalisation process, exposes 
formal enterprises to increased foreign competition, which respond by reducing labour 
costs by cutting worker benefits, replacing permanent workers with part-time labour, or 
subcontracting with establishments in the informal sector, including self-employed 
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micro-entrepreneurs. Alternatively, they may also dismiss workers who subsequently 
seek employment in the informal sector. In many cases, an exceptionally large number of 
retrenched workers create considerable pressure on the already existing informal labour 
market, with the outcome of a pool of unemployed workers.  
 
In the theoretical literature, Gupta (1993) first formalized the simultaneous existence of 
the informal sector and open unemployment in urban areas. Later, Chaudhuri (2000) and 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have also explained open unemployment in the urban sector 
despite the presence of the urban informal sector. It becomes imperative to examine the 
consequences of alternative development policies, particularly on the open 
unemployment in the urban sector within the backdrop of the simultaneous existence of 
the informal sector and open unemployment in the urban sector. In the subsequent 
sections we first present the Gupta (1993) and Chaudhuri (2000) models separately and 
then make a comparative analysis of different development policies on open 
unemployment in the urban area as found in these two models.  
 
 
4.2. Gupta (1993) Model32 
 
The novelty of this model lies in the theoretical formulation of the functioning of 
informal sector in a Harris-Todaro (1970) type of dual economy. It extends the H-T 
framework to explain the simultaneous existence of informal sector and open 
unemployment in migration equilibrium.  
 
The Model 
 
A closed dual economy is considered to consist of an urban sector and a rural sector. The 
urban sector has two subsectors – a formal sector and an informal sector.  
 
                                                      
32 Here we present the Gupta (1993) model in the simplest possible manner. However, some of 
the results get affected due to this simplification. 
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The formal sector 
 
The urban formal sector (Sector 1) produces a manufactured good using labour, capital 
and an intermediate input produced by the informal sector. Capital is assumed to be 
owned by the sector itself. So the cost of capital is not treated as variable cost in the 
process of profit maximization. The production function of this sector is given by  
1 1 1 1( , , )Y F L R K  (4.1) 
where 1Y  is the output level, 1L  and 1K  are the levels of labour and capital and R  is the 
amount of intermediate input used. The production function exhibits the following 
properties: (i) Diminishing returns to scale technology; (ii) positive and diminishing 
productivity of each input; and, (iii) separability in terms of its arguments.  
 
Assuming the price of the formal sector output as a numeraire, the first order conditions 
for profit maximization are given by: 
*
1 1 1 1( / )Y L W S      (4.2) 
1 2( / )Y R P    (4.3) 
where *1W  is the institutionally determined fixed wage rate in the urban formal sector, 1S  
is a policy parameter denoting wage subsidy to Sector 1 and 2P  is the price of the 
intermediate input produced in the informal sector.  
 
Solving (4.2) and (4.3) the input demand functions of Sector 1 are obtained as:  
'
1 1 1 1 1( ); ( ) 0L L S L S   (4.4) 
'
2 2( ); ( ) 0R R P R P   (4.5) 
 
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) represent the employment function in the formal sector and the 
demand function for intermediate input respectively.   
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The informal sector  
 
The urban informal sector (Sector 2) produces an intermediate input for the formal sector 
with the help of capital and labour, the latter being mainly the rural migrants unable to 
find a formal sector job. There is perfect wage flexibility in the labour market, while the 
sector is characterised by capital market imperfection. This implies that capital is 
borrowed from the unorganized capital market at exceptionally high rates of interest. The 
informal sector interest rate r  is given by 
  
 '1 2 2 2 2( ); ( ) 0r r r K r K                                                                                            (4.6)   
where 1r  is a policy parameter. It implies that a credit subsidy policy to the informal 
sector lowers the value of 1r . 2K  is the amount of capital used in the informal sector. The 
assumption that '2 2( ) 0r K   indicates that due to capital market imperfection a higher 
amount of capital can be borrowed only at a higher interest rate.   
 
The production function in sector 2 is given by 
2 2 2 2( , )Y F L K                                                                                                           (4.7) 
where 2Y  and 2L  denote levels of output and employment respectively. It satisfies all the 
properties satisfied by 1 (.)F . 
 
The first-order  conditions for profit maximization in sector 2 are given by:  
2 2 2 2 2( )( / )P S Y L W      (4.8) 
'
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( )( / ) ( ) ( )P S Y K r r K r K K       (4.9) 
 
 Solving (4.8) and (4.9) the demand functions for lab our and capital can be obtained as: 
1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ); 0, 0L L P S W L L      (4.10) 
1 2
2 2 2 2 1 2 2( , ); 0, 0K K P S r K K     (4.11) 
where 2W  is the informal sector wage rate and 2S  is the price subsidy to the informal 
sector. 
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Since the intermediate input produced in the informal sector is entirely used up by the 
formal sector, in equilibrium, the supply of 2Y  must equal its demand R  in the formal 
sector. Thus, using (4.7), (4.10) and (4.1 1) we get 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1( ) ( ( , ), ( , ))R P F L P S W K P S r    (4.12)  
    (-)                      (+)   ( -)           (+)     ( -)  
 
For given values of 2S  and 1r , equation (4.12) gives the alternative combinations of 2W  
and 2P  at which the demand-supply equality of the informal sector output is maintained. 
On plotting the equation graphically on 2W - 2P  plane, it generates the ‘supply-demand 
equality’ (SDE) curve. Since 2 2/ 0Y L    and 
'
2 2( ) 0L W  , an increase in 2W  brings 
about a fall in 2Y  so that to maintain the equilibrium, 2P  must rise. Therefore, the SDE 
curve is positively sloped. 
 
The rural sector 
 
The rural sector produces food using only labour. The production function is given by  
3 3 3( )Y F L   (4.13) 
Assuming that the wage rate is determined in accordance with the marginal productivity 
principle, rural sector wage 3W  is given by  
'
3 3 3 3W P F S    (4.14) 
where 3P  is the procurement price of the crop and 3S denotes the wage subsidy given to 
rural workers. 
 
Marketable surplus 
 
The government procures food from the rural sector and provides subsidized supply of 
food to the urban population. The urban population consists of ( 1 2 UL L L  ) where UL  
represents the urban unemployed workers. The volume of procurement X  is positively 
related to the size of urban population. Thus,  
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'
1 2( ); 0UX X L L L X     (4.15) 
The marketable surplus in the rural sector Z  is assumed to positively depend on the price 
of food and its production level. Thus, the supply function of marketable surplus is given 
by 
 
1 2
3 3( , ); , 0Z Z P Y Z Z    (4.16) 
 
The endowment of labour in the economy is assumed to be equal to unity. Therefore,  
 
1 2 3 1UL L L L      (4.17) 
In equilibrium,  
X Z  .  
 
Using (4.13), (4.15), (4.16), (4.17), the above equilibrium condition can be rewritten as  
3 3 3 3(1 ) ( , ( ))X L Z P F L    (4.18) 
 
An increased subsidization to food grains imply that although the buying price of food for 
the urban population remains the same, the rural producers are able to receive higher 
selling price. Therefore, 3P  is a policy parameter and depends on the foodgrain 
subsidization policy of the government. 3L  remains the only variable which adjusts itself 
to maintain the X Z  condition. The relationship between rural employment level and 
procurement price can be obtained from (4.18) as  
'
3 3 3 3( ); 0L L P L    (4.19) 
 
Rural urban migration 
 
The rural-urban migration considered here is of the Harris-Todaro (1970) type. The 
influx of rural migrants into the urban sector continues as long as the expected urban 
wage exceeds that of the actual rural wage. In migration equilibrium, the expected urban 
wage equals the actual rural wage. In the Harris-Todaro (1970) model, the urban sector 
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employment consists of only formal sector (although implicitly, since it considers the 
sector with institutionally determined wages, which is analogous to the formal sector in 
this model). This model introduces the urban informal sector in the migration equilibrium 
to explain the phenomenon of unemployment. With 1 1 2/( )UL L L L   and 
2 1 2/( )UL L L L   being the probabilities of obtaining formal and informal sector jobs 
respectively the migration equilibrium condition now becomes 
*
1 1 2 2
3
1 2 U
W L W L W
L L L
 
 
 
 
Using (4.4), (4.10), (4.17) and (4.19) the above migration equilibrium condition can be 
written as 
 
*
'1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
3
( ) ( , ) ( )
1
W L S W L P S W P F L S
L
   

 (4.20) 
 
With given values of the policy parameters 1S , 3S  and 3P , the employment levels in 
formal and rural sectors 1L  and 3L  also remain unchanged. An increase in 2P  raises 2L  
and augments the expected urban wage. The migration equilibrium is distorted and to 
restore it back 2W  must change. Now, let 2 2 2 2( / )( / )L W W L      denote the wage 
elasticity of employment in the informal sector. It is assumed that 1  . This implies 
that a fall in 2W  leads to a decline in 2 2W L  and vice versa. So in this case equilibrium is 
restored by a fall in 2W  that lowers 2 2W L . On plotting (4.20) on 2W - 2P  plane the 
‘Migration Equilibrium’ (ME) curve is obtained. It shows the alternative combinations of 
2W  and 2P  at which migration equilibrium is maintained. It is negatively sloped if 1  . 
The two basic endogenous variables in the model are 2P  and 2W , while the policy 
parameters are 1S , 2S , 3S , 1r  and 3P .   
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          Figure 4.1: Determination of equilibrium 2P  and 2W  in Gupta (1993) model  
 
The two basic equations of the model may be rewritten as  
SDE: 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1( ) ( ( , ), ( , ))R P F L P S W K P S r    (4.12) 
ME: *1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3( ) ( , ) (1 )W L S W L P S W W L     (4.21) 
2P  and 2W  are obtained by solving (4.12)and (4.21) simultaneously.  
 
4.2.1. Effects of Policy Changes on Unemployment 
 
In this section the effects on unemployment of wage subsidy, price subsidy and capital 
subsidy to the different sectors are analysed. 
 
 
 Page | 82 
The effect of wage subsidy policy to the formal sector 
 
First, let us consider what happens if there is a hike in 1S .  If 1S  rises 1L  also goes up, 
leading to a surge in the expected formal sector wage. The migration equilibrium is 
disturbed, but can be restored by a fall in expected informal sector wage. Given 2W , 2P  
has to fall so that 2L  shrinks, releasing labour and lowering 2W . Thus the ME curve shifts 
downwards and at the new equilibrium, both 2P  and 2W  decline. On the other hand from 
the SDE equation it follows that the fall in 2P  raises the demand for R  which can be 
satisfied by rising 2L . However, 3L  remains unaffected since 3P  is unchanged. The boost 
in informal sector employment unambiguously lowers unemployment, UL .  
 
The effect of capital subsidy policy to the informal sector 
 
An increase in capital subsidy to the informal sector 1r , ceteris paribus, raises capital 
employment in the sector, 2K . The informal sector output 2 (.)F  also rises. To satisfy the 
SDE condition, given 2W , 2P  must fall. This results in a rightward shift of the SDE. The 
fall in 2P  leads to a contraction of 2L  in ME equation, so that 2W  must rise. Thus in the 
new equilibrium 2P  falls and 2W  rises. As a result, 2L  unequivocally falls. Since 1L  and 
3L  remain unaltered, UL  aggravates. 
 
The effect of  price subsidy policy to the informal sector 
 
As 2S  rises 2L , 2K  and hence 2F  increase. In order to satisfy the SDE condition, given 
2P , 2W  has to rise. The SDE curve shifts outwards. The increase in 2W  augments 2L  in 
the ME condition so that 2P  must fall. As a consequence 2L  falls and since 1L  and 3L are 
unchanged, UL  rises in the new equilibrium.  
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The effect of  wage subsidy policy to the rural sector 
 
If 3S  rises there is a hike in 3W , leading to the rural wage exceeding the expected urban 
wage. To satisfy the ME condition, 2P  must rise, given 2W . The ME equation shifts out. 
Due to the rise in 2P , R  falls whereas 2L , 2K  and hence 2F  increase. The right-hand 
side of the SDE equation increases. To maintain equality, 2W  must also rise. Thus in the 
new equilibrium, both 2P  and 2W  take higher values. 1L  and 3L  do not change and 
therefore UL  falls since 2L  rises. 
 
The effect of price subsidy policy to the rural sector 
 
A hike in the procurement price 3P  lowers 3L , leading to increases in both 3W  and 
3 3(1 )W L . Given 2W , 2P  must increase so as to satisfy the ME equation. As a result, the 
ME curve shifts out. The rise in 2P  lowers 2( )R P but enhances 2F  such that there is 
excess supply in the SDE equation. 2F  can fall only if 2L  falls sufficiently, which is 
possible if 2W  increases. In the new equilibrium, both 2P  and 2W  assume higher values. 
The decrease in both 2L  and 3L  exacerbates unemployment. 
 
The findings of the analysis can be summarized in terms of the following proposition.  
Proposition 4.1: A wage subsidy policy to the urban formal sector or rural sector lowers 
the urban unemployment of labour. On the contrary, a capital or price subsidy to the 
informal sector and/ or a price subsidy policy to the rural sector accentuate the problem 
of unemployment in the urban area.  
 
So a wage subsidy policy to the urban sector or rural sector can be instrumental in 
alleviating unemployment whereas a policy of price subsidy pertaining to the rural sector 
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actually perpetuates unemployment. The two of these results contradict the standard 
Harris-Todaro (1970) result.33  
 
 
4.3. Chaudhuri (2000) Model 
 
The model developed by Chaudhuri (2000) also shows the simultaneous existence of 
open urban unemployment and urban informal sector in migration equilibrium. However, 
the policy conclusions of this model are different from those found in Gupta (1993). This 
is due to the fact34 that in Gupta (1993), the role of aggregate demand in determining the 
level of production and employment has been totally ignored. However, there is good 
evidence in the context of the developing countries that at least the manufacturing output 
is demand determined. This aspect has been taken care of in this model. The aggregate 
demand plays an important role in determining output and employment in all the three 
sectors of the economy. A price and/or a wage subsidy policy to the rural sector raises the 
aggregate income of the workers, which in turn raises the aggregate demand and, 
therefore, the level of employment in all the three sectors of the economy directly or 
indirectly. A demand management policy such as an export promotional scheme in the 
manufacturing sector also raises the aggregate demand in the two urban sectors, thereby 
causing their employment levels to increase. Consequently, the urban unemployment 
level falls. So the Chaudhuri (2000) model directs to a rural development program or a 
demand management policy as a possible solution to the urban unemployment problem 
and the policy prescriptions are akin35 to those generated by the standard Harris–Todaro 
(1970) model.  
 
                                                      
33 The results of a price subsidy policy to the informal sector and a wage subsidy policy to the 
rural sector on the unemployment in the urban sector are different in Gupta (1993) model.  
 
34 This aspect has been more elabourately discussed later. 
35 However, in the standard Harris-Todaro (1970) model, the role of a demand management 
policy such as an export promotion scheme in the manufacturing sector, has not yet been studied.  
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The model 
  
We consider a small open dual economy with three sectors, formal, informal and rural, 
represented by subscripts 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The urban sector consists of two 
segments: formal and informal. The urban sectors are completely dependent on the 
migrant labour force from the rural sector. We also assume that the economy is endowed 
with a given amount of capital stock, DK , and that the domestic capital stock is owned by 
all the workers.36 While the informal sector faces an imperfect capital market the urban 
formal sector faces a perfect market. However, there is no capital constraint in the 
economy. There is free inflow (outflow) of capital into (from) the urban formal sector 
from (into) the foreign countries at the internationally given interest rate, 1r  . 
 
Urban Formal Sector 
  
The urban formal sector (sector 1) produces a manufactured good 1X  using labour, an 
intermediate good and capital as inputs. The production function of this sector is of the 
fixed-coefficient type37. 1Ka  units of capital, 2Xa  units of the intermediate good and 1La  
units of labour together produce one unit of 1X . The formal sector faces a unionised 
labour market. A given fraction z  of the total amount of production of the manufactured 
good 1X  is exported to foreign countries and the remaining amount is sold at the 
domestic market at price 1P , given internationally. The exported amount of the 
manufactures represents the foreign import demand and is a component of aggregate 
demand of that commodity. An export promotional scheme is administered through a 
wage subsidy policy to the urban formal sector. The wage subsidy per unit of 
employment in this sector, 1S  is a positive function of the fraction of the manufactured 
                                                      
36 This assumption has been borrowed from the literature on rural-urban migration. See Gupta 
(1995). This makes the rest of the analysis easier. 
37 This assumption has been made for the sake of analytical simplicity.  
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good exported, z . If the formal sector improves its export performance, it receives more 
assistance from the government in the form of a wage subsidy. Given fixed coefficients 
of production, the price-unit cost equality condition for the formal sector is:  
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1[ ( )]K X LP r a P a W S z a           (4.22) 
where 1W  is the wage rate in the formal sector . 2P  is the price of the intermediate input
38 
which is endogenously determined. 
 
The relationship for the unionized wage rate is specified as:  
1 2 1 fW   =  f (W  , P  , P )           (4.23) 
               (+)   (+)  (+) 
where, 2W  is the wage rate in the informal sector  and  fP  is the issue price
39 of food to 
the consumers. Equation (4.23) states that with an increase in the non-unionized wage 
rate, the unionized wage goes up. Also with an increase in the cost of living, the unions 
bargain for a higher wage.  
 
The level of employment in the formal sector 1L  is given by 
1 L1 1L  = a X                                                                                                                      (4.24) 
where, 1X  is the level of production of sector 1.  
 
Now the demand for the intermediate input (produced in the informal sector) is given by 
D
2 X2 1X   = a X                                                                          (4.25) 
 
 
 
                                                      
38 Most of the theoretical papers in the existing literature on informal sector have made this 
assumption and it has also empirical base. See section 3.6 of chapter 3 for details.  
39 See footnote 42 in this context.  
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Informal Sector 
 
The urban informal sector produces the intermediate input 2X , for the formal sector, by 
means of labour and capital. The production function of the informal sector is given by  
2 2 2 2X   = F  (K , L )                                                                                                        (4.26) 
where 2K  and 2L denote the level of capital used and the level of employment in the 
informal sector, respectively. The production function satisfies all the standard properties 
including a special one that it is separable in terms of its arguments40.  
 
The informal sector faces a perfect labour market and an imperfect capital market. The 
interest rate at which it can borrow capital is 
2 2 2 2 2r  = r (K ); r , r  > 0                 (4.27) 
The effective interest rate on capital that the informal sector faces is 2 2(r  - S  ) , where 2S  
is the rate of capital subsidy given to this sector.  
 
The profit function of the representative informal sector firm is  
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Y  = P F (K , L ) - (r (K ) - S )K   - W L  
Profit is maximized with respect to 2K  and 2L  and the first-order conditions of 
maximization are as follows. 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( ) ( )P F K r K S r K K                     (4.28) 
and 
2 2 2 2P ( F / L ) = W                 (4.29) 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
40 This means that 2 2 2 2( X / L K )= 0   . This assumption has been made for the sake of analytical 
simplicity. 
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Solving equations (4.28) and (4.29) we can obtain the demand function for capital  
2 2 2 2K  = K (P ,S )                                                                                                        (4.28.1) 
               (+)(+) 
and the demand function for labour 
2 2 2 2L  = L  (P ,W )                                                                                                       (4.29.1) 
                (+)(-) 
 
In equilibrium, output of the informal sector must equal the demand for its product. So, 
D
2 2X  = X                                                                                                                     (4.30) 
Using (4.25), (4.26), (4.28.1), (4.29.1) and (4.30) we have  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 X2 1F (K (P ,S ),L (P ,W )) = a X                                                                               (4.31) 
 
Rural Sector 
 
The rural sector produces food using labour only. The production function41 of this sector 
is 
3 3 3X =F (L ) with 3F > 0 and 3F  < 0                                                                      (4.32) 
where 3X and 3L  respectively denote the levels of output and employment in the rural 
sector. 
 
Assuming marginal productivity pricing of labour in the rural sector, we have 
3 3 3 3 3W = P F (L ) + S                                                                                                      (4.33) 
where, 3W  is the rural wage rate, 3P  is the procurement price of food
42 and 3S  is the wage 
subsidy per unit of employment in the rural sector.  
                                                      
41 Land, as a sector specific input, may be included in the production function of the rural sector 
without affecting the qualitative results of the model.  
42 We assume that the government conducts the procurement of the crop - a practice followed, for 
example, in India in the case of food grains and some commercial crops. Government agencies 
like the Food Corporation of India procure food grains from the producers and use it for selling to 
the consumers through the public distribution system at a subsidized price, called the issue price. 
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Equilibrium Conditions for Production of Food and Manufactures 
 
All members (workers) of the economy are assumed to have identical preferences43  
defined over two goods: food and manufactures. We also assume that the aggregate 
demand functions for both food and manufactures exist, that a fraction b  of the aggregate 
income, I , of the workers is spent on food and that 
f 1b = b(P ,P ,I)                                                                                                              (4.34) 
        (+)(+)(-) 
Equation (4.34) states that the proportion of aggregate income of the workers spent on 
food, b  is an increasing function of the food price and the price of manufactures and a 
decreasing function of the aggregate income44 of the labourers. Now (1 )b  fraction of 
their aggregate income is spent on manufactures. 
 
The aggregate income of the workers (wage income plus rental income) with complete 
repatriation of income on foreign capital is  
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 D 2 1 2I = (W L +W L +W L ) + (r K + (r  - r )K )                                                           (4.35) 
 
In equilibrium, the output in each sector must be equal to the demand for its product. So 
we have the following two equilibrium conditions45 in the production of food and 
manufactures, respectively: 
                                                                                                                                                              
A price subsidy to the rural sector implies an increase in the procurement price of food, 3P . On 
the other hand, a reduction in the issue price of food,  fP , implies a subsidy on the consumption of 
food. 
43 Labourers, although engaged in different sectors of the economy and earning different levels of 
wage income, may have identical preferences over two goods - food and manufactures since the 
rural sector is the origin of all the labourers in the economy. 
44 This means that the income elasticity of demand for food for all workers is less than unity. This 
is a direct consequence of the Engel's law. 
45 Here it is assumed that the entire interest income earned from domestic capital is spent on two 
goods - food and manufactures. However, the qualitative results of the model remain unaffected if 
one alternatively assumes that only a fraction of the interest income is spent on the two goods.  
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1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 2 3(.)[( ) ( ( ) )] ( )D fb W L W L W L r K r r K P F L          (4.36)                                          
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 D 2 1 2 1 1(1-b(.))[(W L +W L +W L )+(r K +(r  - r )K )]= P (1-z)X                                        (4.37) 
where z  is the fraction of the amount of production of the manufactured good which is 
exported. So the amount of production of the manufactured good must equal its aggregate 
demand which is the sum of domestic demand and foreign import demand.  
 
Other Equations of the Model 
 
1 2 3 uL +L +L +L =1                                                                                                       (4.38) 
where uL  is the number of unemployed workers in the urban sector. The total number of 
labourers is constant and is normalized to unity. 
 
The rural-urban migration equilibrium condition is given by 
1 1 2 2 1 2 u 3[(W L +W L )/(L +L +L ) ]=W                                                                              (4.39) 
The left-hand side of equation (4.39) is the expected urban wage rate of a prospective 
rural migrant and is equal to the actual rural wage rate 3W , in migration equilibrium. 
 
General Equilibrium 
 
By using (4.38) equation (4.39) can be expressed as 
1 1 2 2 3 3 3W L +W L +W L =W                                                                                          (4.39.1) 
With the help of (4.34), (4.35) and (4.39.1), equations (4.36) and (4.37) are rewritten as  
f 1 3 1 D 2 1 2 3 1 D 2 1 2 f 3b(P ,P ,W +r K +(r - r )K )[W +r K +(r - r )K ]=P F(L )                                   (4.36.1) 
3 1 D 2 1 2 1 1(1-b (.))[W +r K +(r  - r )K ]=P (1-z)X                                                                                     (4.37.1) 
 
In this model, there are thirteen endogenous variables, namely, 
1 2 3 1 2 3 u 1 2X ,X ,X ,L ,L ,L ,L ,W ,W ,  3 2W ,I,P  and 2K . The policy variables of the government 
are 2 3 3 fS ,S ,P ,P and z . 1P  and 1r  are internationally given. If the government adopts an 
export promotional scheme, z  takes a higher value. There are thirteen independent 
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equations (4.22 – 4.24, 4.26, 4.28.1, 4.29.1, 4.31 – 4.33, 4.35, 4.36.1, 4.37.1, and 4.38) to 
solve for the thirteen endogenous variables. From (4.33) and (4.36.1) one can solve  
3 3 2 3 f 2 3L =L (P ,P ,P ,S ,S )                                                                                               (4.40) 
 
Assuming that food is a non-inferior good, from (4.33) and (4.36.1) one can easily show 46 
that 3 f( L / P )< 0  , and 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3( L / P ),( L / P ),( L / S ),( L / S )> 0        . From (4.33) and (4.40) 
we can obtain 
3 3 2 3 2 3( , , , , )fW W P P P S S                                                                                             (4.41) 
                -  +  +  -    + 
Given 3W , the equilibrium value of 1X  is found from (4.37.1) as  
1 1 2 3 f 2 3X =X (P ,P ,P ,S ,S ,z)                                                                                              (4.42) 
              +  +  +  +  +  + 
 
By (4.31) and (4.42) we can write 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 3( ( , ), ( , )) ( , , , , , )X fF K P S L P W a X P P P S S z                 (4.31.1)                                               
             + +            +   -                   +  +   +  +    +  + 
As both the left-hand and the right-hand sides of (4.31.1) are increasing in 2P  and 2S  we 
assume that the responsiveness of the supply of good 2, 2F (.) with respect to 2P  (or 2S ) is 
greater than that of good 1, 1X (.) . So when 2P  (or 2S ) rises, the increase in 2F (.) is greater 
than that of X2 1a X (.) ⁮
47.  
 
An increase in 2W  leads to a fall in 2L , which in turn lowers 2F (.) . In order to keep 
equation (4.31.1) undisturbed, 2P  must rise. So the curve (say, AA ) which represents 
equation (4.31.1) slopes positively in the 2 2W P  space (see figure 4.2). 
                                                      
46 These results have been proved in Appendix 4.1. 
 
47 This assumption causes the AA  curve to be positively sloped which makes the rest of the 
analysis much easier. 
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Now by (4.22) and (4.23) we write 
2 1 1 L1 1 K1 2 1 f L1 x2P =[P +S (z)a - r a - f(W ,P ,P )a ]/a                                                                 (4.43) 
Equation (4.43) is represented by the curve BB  in the 2 2W P  space (see figure 4.2). An 
increase in 2W  raises the unionized wage rate 1W . Consequently, 2P  falls when 2W  rises. 
This implies that the BB  curve in figure 4.2 must slope negatively. 
 
The equilibrium values of 2P  and 2W  are obtained by solving equations (4.31.1) and 
(4.43) simultaneously. In terms of figure 4.2, the determination of the equilibrium values 
of 2P  and 2W  is shown by the point of intersection of the AA  and BB curves.  
 
      2P       
     
                            B                                                                                      A 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 *P  
 
 
 
                 A 
                                                                                                                B 
 
      O                                                       2 *W                                                         2W  
 
      Figure 4.2: Determination of equilibrium 2P  and 2W  in Chaudhuri (2000) model  
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Now given the equilibrium values of 2P  and 2W , the equilibrium values of 1 2W ,K and 2L  
are determined from equations (4.23), (4.28.1) and (4.29.1), respectively. We have 
already determined the equilibrium values of 1 2L ,L and 3L . The equilibrium level of 
urban unemployment, uL , is then obtained from equation (4.38)⁮
48. 
 
Effects of policy changes on unemployment 
 
As 2S  increases given 2P , the net effect will be a rise in 2F (.) . So 2W  has to go up to 
satisfy equation (4.31.1). The AA  curve in figure 4.2 shifts in the rightward direction. 
But the BB curve does not shift. So, in the new equilibrium, 2P  decreases and 2W  
increases, resulting in a fall in 2L . Besides, 1L  rises as 1X  rises. 3L  also increases. But 
the net effect of an increase in 2S  on uL is uncertain. 
 
If fP falls, 3L  rises but 1X  and 1L fall. To satisfy equation (4.31.1), given 2P , 2W has to 
rise. This means that the AA curve shifts to the right. Also the BB curve which represents 
equation (4.43) shifts in the upward direction when fP  decreases. As a result, 2W  rises 
but the effect on 2P  is uncertain. 2L  is likely to fall. However, the effect on uL  is again 
uncertain.  
 
The above results can be summarised in the form of the following propositions.  
Proposition 4.2: The effect of a capital subsidy policy to the urban informal sector and/or 
a price subsidy policy to the consumers on the consumption of food on the open 
unemployment in the urban sector is ambiguous. 
 
                                                      
48 Given the values of 1 2,L L  and 3L , equation (4.38) may not always yield a strictly positive 
equilibrium level of urban unemployment. However, propositions 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of section 4.3 
make sense only when there exists at least some urban unemployment.  
 
 Page | 94 
On the other hand, when 3P  or 3S  goes up, 1X  and 1L  increase. 3L  also increases. To 
satisfy equation (4.31.1), given 2P , 2W has to fall. The AA  curve shifts inwardly. But the 
BB  curve does not shift. Consequently, 2P  increases and 2W  decreases which in turn 
raises 2L .Therefore, uL  decreases. This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.3: If an additional wage or price subsidy is given to the rural sector, the 
employment levels in all the three sectors of the economy increase. The level of urban 
open unemployment falls as a consequence. 
 
Also, a rise in z  raises 1X  and hence 1L . Given 2P , 2W  has to fall. So the AA curve, 
representing equation (4.31.1) shifts in the inward direction. Now consider equation 
(4.43). As z  rises, 1S  also rises. This raises 2P  given 2W . So the BB  curve in figure 4.2 
shifts upward. In the new equilibrium 2P  increases but the effect on 2W  is uncertain. The 
latter depends upon the relative magnitudes of shifts of the AA  and BB curves. An 
increase in z  directly raises 1X . Besides, it also raises 2P  resulting in increases in both 
1X and 2F (.) indirectly. If the total expansionary effect on 1X (direct plus induced) is 
greater than (equal to) the induced expansionary effect on 2F (.) , 2W  decreases (remains 
unchanged)49 as a result. This is of course a reasonable assumption. So 2L  increases since 
2P  increases due to an increase in z . In this case 3L  also rises since 2P  increases. The 
overall effect will be a fall in uL . This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.4: If the government adopts an export promotional scheme in the 
manufacturing sector, the employment levels in all the three sectors of the economy 
expand and the urban unemployment level falls in the new equilibrium. 
 
So a capital subsidy policy to the urban sector may not be able to solve the urban 
unemployment problem. But a wage and/or a price subsidy policy to the rural sector 
and/or a demand management policy like an export promotional scheme in the 
                                                      
49 This is shown in Appendix 4.2. 
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manufacturing sector reduce the level of urban unemployment. These results are different 
from those found in Gupta (1993) model.  
 
Why the results of Chaudhuri (2000) are different from those of Gupta (1993) can be 
explicated as follows. In Gupta (1993), the role of the demand side in determination of 
the level of production has been completely ignored both in the manufacturing and rural 
sectors. The government procures food from the rural sector and distributes it among the 
urban consumers. So the government can effectively control the size of urban labour 
force by controlling the availability of food in that sector. Subsidy policies to the rural 
sector raise the availability of food in the urban sector resulting from an increase in total 
food production. This in turn causes the urban sector labour force to expand. On the other 
hand, a wage or a price policy in the urban sector increases the level of employment in 
the urban sector but does not disturb the rural sector in anyway. Thus the urban 
unemployment level plummets. On the contrary, in Chaudhuri (2000), the demand side 
plays a very crucial role in determining the level of production in all the three sectors. A 
price or a wage subsidy policy to the rural sector raises the aggregate income of the 
workers in the economy, which in turn causes an increase in the level of demand in all the 
three sectors, directly or indirectly. As a result, the employment level in each of the three 
sectors increases, thereby causing a fall in the level of urban unemployment. Also a 
demand management policy, for example an export promotional scheme in the 
manufacturing sector, raises the level of employment in each of the three sectors of the 
economy, directly or indirectly (through an increase in the informal sector's product 
price 2P ). Thus urban unemployment level decreases due to an export promotional 
measure. An export promotional scheme is administered through a wage subsidy policy. 
If the urban formal sector improves its export performance, it receives more assistance 
from the government in the form of a wage subsidy. One may also consider other types of 
methods, for example, the imposition of a tax on the sales of the manufacturing output in 
the domestic market, through which an export promotional scheme can be implemented. 
On the other hand, a hike in the capital subsidy to the urban sector affects aggregate 
income of the workers and leads to an increase in the employment levels in both the rural 
sector and the urban formal sector. But this policy increases the informal sector wage rate 
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and decreases the product price causing the employment level in the sector to fall. Thus 
the net effect of this policy on the urban unemployment level is uncertain. 
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APPPENDIX 4.1:  
 
Interest income of each worker in the economy, denoted by G , is 
1 D 2 2 1 2 2 2G= r K +(r (K ) - r )K  = G (P ,S )                                                                        (4.A.1) 
Since 1r  and DK  are constants, 2r (.)> 0 and 2K  is a positive function of both 2P  and 2S , 
one can easily show that 
2( G/ )> 0P  and 2( G/ S )> 0                                                                                    (4.A.2) 
 
By (4.33), (4.36.1) and (4.A.1) we can write  
f 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 f 3 3b(P ,P ,G + P F +S )(G+P F +S ) = P F (L )                                                            (4.A.3) 
 
Totally differentiating equation (4.A.3) we get  
3 3 3 3 3 f 3 f 3 3 f 2 2dL [I( b/ I)P F +bP F - P F ] = dP  [F (L ) - I( b/ P )]- dP [b+I( b/ I)]( G/ )P           
             2 2 3 3 3 3-dS  [b+I( b/ I)]( G/ S ) - dS [b + I( b/ I)] - dP [b +I( b I)]F (L )              (4.A.4) 
Now 
(b+( b/ I)I)= b [1+(I/b)( b/ I)],     
f 3b= (P X )/I ;
2 2
3 3 f f 3 3 3( b/ I) = [I( X / I)- X ](P /I ) = (P X /I )[(I/X )( X / I) -1].           
Again 
f 3 2 x3 x3[b+( b/ I)I] = b[1+(I/b)(P X /I )(E -1)] = b(.)E > 0,                                           (4.A.5) 
where X3E  is the income elasticity of demand for food and X3E > 0  since food is a non-
inferior good. So using (4.A..5) we can write,     
3 3 f 3P F (b+( b/ I)I) - P F = D <  0                                                                                 (4.A.6) 
    (-)                     (+) 
 
 
 
Now from (4.A.4)  
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3 f 3 3 f( L / P )= [F (L ) - I( b/ P )]/ D < 0                         
                       (+)           (+)       (-)                          
3 2 2( L / ) = - [b+I( b/ I)]( G/ )/ D > 0P P               
                            (+)            (+)       (-)              
3 2 2( L / S ) = - [b+I(b/I)]( G/ S )/ D > 0                                                                  (4.A.7) 
                           (+)          (+)       (-)              
3 3( L / S ) = - [b+I( b/ I)]/ D > 0                                
3 3 3 3( L / P ) = - [b+I( b/ I)]F (L )/ D > 0                   
 
Totally differentiating equation (4.33) we can derive the following results:  
3 2 3 3 3 2( W / ) = P F ( L / P ) < 0P      
                        (-)   (+) 
3 f 3 3 3 f( W / P ) = P F ( L / P ) > 0     
                        (-)     (-) 
3 2 3 3 3 2( W / S ) = P F ( L / S ) < 0     
                         (-)    (+) 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3( W / P ) = P F ( L / P ) + F  > 0      
                        (-)   (+)         (+)  
3 3 3 3 3 3( W / S ) = P F ( L / S ) + 1 > 0     
                              
When 3P (or 3S ) increases 3L  also increases. As a consequence, the right-hand side of 
equation (4.36.1) also increases. 3 3(( b/ W )W +b) > 0   since (I( b/ I)+b) > 0    and G  is 
independent of 3P  and 3S . So W3 has to increase in order to satisfy equation (4.36.1) as 
3P  (or 3S ) increases. So we have 3 3 3 3( W / ),( W / ) > 0P S    . 
 
As 2P (or 3P  or fP or 2S or 3S ) increases 3W  and I  also rise. As a consequence b(.) falls. 
This means that the left-hand side of the equation (4.37.1) rises. An increase in z  lowers 
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the value of the right-hand side of the equation (4.37.1). In all these cases, 1X  has to 
increase in order to satisfy equation (4.37.1). So we 
have 1 2 1 3 1 f 1 2 1 3 1( X / ),( X / P ),( X / P ),( X / S ),( X / S ) and ( X / z) > 0P            . 
 
APPENDIX 4.2: 
 
For the sake of analytical simplicity we take L1 K1 x2a = a = a = 1  
Totally differentiating equations (4.31.1) and (4.43) we respectively get 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2dP [( F / L )( L / ) + ( F / K )( K / ) - ( X / ) ]P P P           
                                       1 2 2 2 2 2= ( X / z)dz - ( F / L )( L / W )dW                                (4.A.8) 
and 
2 1 1 2dP = ( S / z)dz - f (.)dW                                                                                        (4.A.9) 
 
By (4.A.8) and (4.A.9) 
1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2T(( S / z)dz - Tf dW = ( X / z)dz - ( F / L )( L / W )dW         
or, 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1(dW /dz) = [( X / z) - T( S / z)]/[( F / L )( L / W ) - Tf ]                                  (4.A.10) 
where 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2T= [( F / L )( L / ) + ( F / K )( K / ) - ( X / )] > 0P P P           
 
By (4.A.9) and (4.A.10) we can write  
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1(dP /dz) = ( S / z) - f [( X / z) - T( S / z)]/[( F / L )( L / W ) - Tf ]           
After simplification this reduces to 
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 1
[( S / z)( F / L )( L / W ) - f ( X / z)]( )  > 0
[( F / L )( L / W ) - Tf ]
dP
dz
       
   
          (4.A.11) 
 
From (4.A.9) we have 
2 1 1 2(dP /dz) = ( S / z) - f (dW /dz)   
or, 1 2 1 2( S / z) = (dP /dz) + f (dW /dz)                                                                         (4.A.9.1) 
By (4.A.10) and (4.A.9.1) 
2 1 2 2 2 2 2(dW /dz) = [( X / z) - T(dP /dz)]/[( F / L )( L / W )]       
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After inserting the value of T we get 
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
[( X / z) + ( X / )(dP /dz)] - [( F / L )( L / )
                                                    + ( F / K )( K / P )](dP /dz)( ) [ ]
( F / L )( L / W )
P P
dW
dz
       
   
   
 
              <  (=)  0  according to  
1 1 2 2[( X / z) + ( X / )(dP /dz)]  > (=)   P     
                                                           2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[( F / L )( L / ) + ( F / K )( K / )](dP /dz)]P P         
i.e. according to the responsiveness of 1X (.) (direct plus induced) with respect to 
z > (=) the responsiveness of 2F (.) (induced) with respect to z . 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 101 
Chapter 5 
 
Foreign Capital Inflow, Informal Sector and Welfare 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In the first thirty years after the World War II the Development Consensus represented 
the fundamental approach in development strategies throughout the world. It emphasized 
on more stringent trade policies and inward oriented strategies, making use of 
discriminating policies like tariffs, quotas and restricting inflow of foreign capital and 
imports. But the ‘success story’ of the East Asian Tigers brought about a change in the 
thinking about the appropriate road to development.  A new approach known as the 
Washington Consensus started to be accepted widely as an alternative development 
strategy and it gained further momentum after the conclusion of the multilateral 
agreement and the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Uruguay 
round of discussions. The perceptions about development have drastically changed from 
the Development Consensus, and the Washington Consensus has culminated into a 
paradigm shift in shaping the character of the world economy. The new prescription is for 
more openness and less intervention that is likely to entail efficiency and dynamism to 
the growth process. The bottomline is to head towards liberalised economies involving 
freer inflow of foreign capital, curbing down on the much conspicuous protectionist 
policies, structural reforms and integrating the domestic market with the world market.  
 
The importance and desirability of inflow of foreign capital in the context of a  developing 
economy has triggered much debate among trade and development economists. The 
optimism regarding foreign capital inflow tends to vary among different authors. Until 
the early 1980s entry of foreign capital was highly dejected in the developing countries as 
foreign capital was thought to be welfare deteriorating. The much needed theoretical 
foundation was provided by the well-known ‘Brecher-Alejandro (1977) proposition’. The 
skepticism has undergone a diametrical change during the liberalised economic regime 
and many economists have successfully shown that foreign capital might be welfare 
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improving in several cases. In this chapter we discuss both the pessimistic and optimistic 
views on the role of foreign capital in a developing economy using the general 
equilibrium framework.  
 
 
5.2. Pessimistic View 
 
 
Let us begin our discussions on welfare consequence of foreign capital with the 
pessimistic view suggesting that growth with foreign capital in a small open economy is 
immizerising i.e. welfare-worsening. In this section, we first elucidate the ‘Brecher-
Alejandro (1977) proposition’ and then discuss a few extensions made by other 
economists where this result holds. 
 
5.2.1. Immizerising Growth: Brecher and Alejandro (1977) Proposition 
 
 
Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have considered the 2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) 
framework to analyse the welfare consequence of an inflow of foreign capital in a small 
open economy. Two commodities, X and Y  are produced in the economy using two 
factors of production – labour and capital. Factors are fully employed and sector X  is 
assumed to be more labour-intensive than sector Y . There is perfect competition in both 
product and factor markets and the production functions exhibit constant returns to scale 
with positive but diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. The economy exports 
good X and imports good Y and the import-competing sector is protected by a tariff. The 
aggregate capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic and foreign capital and 
these are assumed to be perfect substitutes. All foreign capital income is fully repatriated.  
 
The competitive zero-profit conditions are given as  
LX KX XWa ra P   (5.1) 
*
LY KY YWa ra P   (5.2) 
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where XP  and YP  are the world prices of X and Y ; 
* (1 )Y YP t P  ; t  is the ad-valorem 
rate of tariff so that *YP  represents the domestic or tariff-inclusive price of Y ; wage rate 
and interest rate on capital are denoted by W  and r . 
 
The full employment condition of labour and capital are given respectively by 
LX LYa X a Y L   (5.3) 
KX KY D Fa X a Y K K K     (5.4) 
 
where DK  and FK  denote indigenous capital and foreign capital respectively. L  is the 
total labour endowment in the economy. 
 
In this system there are 4 endogenous variables,W , r , X  and Y , that can be solved from 
(5.1) – (5.4). This is a decomposable system where the factor prices are independent of 
factor endowments. The factor prices W  and r  can be solved from the price equations 
(5.1) and (5.2) while the level of production of X  and Y  is then solved from the output 
equations (5.3) and (5.4). 
  
Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income. The expression for 
national income at world prices, I , is given by 
D YI WL rK tP Y    (5.5) 
WL  is the aggregate wage income while DrK is the income on domestic capital. Foreign 
capital income, FrK  is completely repatriated. Finally, YtP Y measures the distortionary 
cost of tariff of the production side50. 
  
Now, with the endowment of labour remaining unchanged, an increase in the capital 
stock in the economy due to foreign capital inflow is considered.  
                                                      
50 The presence of tariff artificially raises the domestic price of commodity Y and this leads to a 
misallocation of resources, as the producers will be producing more of Y and less of X than their 
free trade levels. Social welfare decreases owing to this commodity market distortion. Both 
producers’ surplus and consumers’ surplus will be lower than the optimum (free trade) levels.  
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Total differentiation of (5.3) yields, 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
lX LYX Y L    (5.3.1) 
 
Similarly, from (5.4) one gets 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
KX KYX Y K    (5.4.1)  
 
Solving (5.3.1) and (5.4.1) by Cramer’s R ule gives 
ˆ ˆ( / )LYX K    and 
ˆ ˆ( / )LXY K   
where ( ) 0LX KY LY KX        since it is assumed that sector X  is more labour-
intensive than sector Y . Hence, ˆ 0X   and ˆ 0Y  , when ˆ 0K  . 
 
Therefore, in accordance with the Rybczynski theorem, with increased capital 
endowment, the production of the capital-intensive import substitution good Y  expands. 
Since the increased production needs more labour as well, the output of X  contracts so 
that the extra labour for production of Y is released in a full-employment situation.  
Differentiating (5.5) with respect to K  gives51, 
( / ) ( / )YdI dK tP dY dK   
 
Now ( / ) ( / )( / ) 0LXdY dK Y K   , which implies that ( / ) 0dI dK  . 
 
The important result that follows is that an inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation 
of its earnings is necessarily immizerizing if the import-competing sector is capital-
intensive and is protected by a tariff. This is called the Brecher-Alejandro proposition, 
also known as the immizerising effect of foreign capital. It is also evident that in the 
absence of tariff, foreign capital does not affect national income.  
 
                                                      
51 Since this is a decomposable system as already mentioned, ˆ ˆ 0W r    as ˆ 0K  , so that 
( / ) 0L dW dK   and ( / ) 0DK dr dK  . 
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In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined in terms of 
three-sector models. The third sector may either be a duty-free zone (DFZ) (sometimes 
called foreign enclave) as in Beladi and Marjit (1992a) or it may be an urban informal 
sector as in Grinols (1991) and Chandra and Khan (1993). The Beladi and Marjit (1992a) 
model is a simple three-sector extension of the HOS framework where the third sector, 
the DFZ, uses sector-specific capital that is foreign owned. They have shown that with 
full-repatriation of foreign capital income, an inflow of foreign capital may lead to 
immiserizing growth in the presence of tariff-distortion even if the foreign capital is 
employed in the export sector. This generalizes the main result in the existing literature, 
which primarily focuses on foreign capital inflow in the protected sector of the economy.  
 
 
5.2.2. Introduction of Rural-Urban Migration 
 
As the developing countries are plagued by labour market distortion, that tend to 
engender wage differentials between rural and urban sectors and consequently induce 
migration, some attempts have been made to analyse the welfare impact of foreign capital 
inflow using a Harris-Todaro (1970) framework. For example, Khan (1982) has 
considered a mobile capital generalized Harris-Todaro model with urban unemployment. 
A third sector, called an urban informal sector, has been introduced in the work of 
Chandra and Khan (1993). Khan (1982) has shown that the ‘Brecher-Alejandro 
proposition’ is valid even in a two-sector mobile capital Harris-Todaro model. The two-
sector Heckscher-Ohlin model considered in the previous section is modified to capture 
the impact of rural-urban migration and the presence of urban unemployment. Total 
labour endowment L  is used to produce X  and Y  and a part remains unemployed 
i.e. X Y UL L L L   . Here XL  and YL  denote total employment in rural and urban 
sectors while UL  is urban unemployment. The model considers inter-sectoral wage 
differential. The rural wage W  is perfectly flexible while there exists distortion in the 
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urban labour market which is institutionally fixed at W  and W W . It is assumed that 
the urban sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the rural sector in value terms.52 
 
The price system depicted in the Brecher-Alejandro (1977) model is slightly modified to 
include the institutionalized wage in the urban sector (sector Y ). The zero-profit condition 
for sector Y is modified as follows. 
*
LY KY YWa ra P           (5.2.1) 
 
The labour endowment equation now includes urban unemployment and is given by  
LX LY Ua X a Y L L           (5.3.1) 
 
The rural urban wage differential induces rural workers to migrate to urban areas. The 
HT migration equilibrium condition is given by Y
Y U
LW W
L L

 .
 Using (5.3.1) this can 
be rewritten as follows.  
( / )LX LYa X W W a Y L          (5.6) 
 
The expression for the national income at world prices remains the same despite the 
introduction of labour market distortion and rural-urban migration. This is because of the 
‘envelope property’ of the Harris-Todaro structure that states that the average wage of all 
workers in a Harris-Todaro economy is equal to the rural sector wage, W . 
 
Now the output system consists of (5.3.1), (5.4) and (5.6). This is again a decomposable 
system with an additional variable UL  and an additional equation (5.6). Differentiating 
(5.4) and (5.6) and considering 0dL   one gets  
 
                                                      
52 This implies that ( / ) ( / )KY LY KX LX    i.e. ( / ) ( / )KY LY KX LXa Wa a Wa . It should be 
mentioned that if sector Y is capital-intensive in value sense it implies that it is more capital-
intensive than sector X  in physical sense as well.   
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ˆ ˆ ˆ
KX KYX Y K    (5.4.1) 
ˆ ˆ( / ) 0LX LYX W W Y    (5.6.1) 
 
 
Solving (5.4.1) and (5.6.1) by Cramer’s Rule the following expressions are obtained.  
ˆ ˆ [{( / ) }/ ]LYX K W W    
ˆ ˆ [ / ]LXY K     
where KX LY Y X KY LXW W       < 0 since the urban sector is more capital-intensive 
than the rural sector in value terms. 
 
Therefore, ˆ 0X   and ˆ 0Y  , when ˆ 0K  . As in the previous case, Rybczynski effect 
leads to expansion of sector Y  and contraction of sector X . 
 
As the expression for national income at world prices remains unchanged  
( / ) ( / )YdI dK tP dY dK   
Since ( / ) 0dY dK  , ( / ) 0dI dK  .  
 
Therefore the immiserizing effect of foreign capital continues to be valid even after the 
introduction of labour market imperfection, rural-urban migration and urban 
unemployment. The presence of labour market imperfection cannot affect the welfare 
consequence of foreign capital as the Harris-Todaro framework satisfies the ‘envelope 
property’, which suggests that the average wage of all workers in a Harris-Todaro 
economy is equal to the rural sector wage and an inflow of foreign capital cannot affect 
the factor prices including the rural wage.  
 
 
5.2.3. Introduction of the Informal Sector: Chandra and Khan (1993) Model 
 
Chandra and Khan (1993) have shown the validity of the immiserizing effect even in the 
presence of an urban informal sector. They have used different concepts of informal 
sector and also distinguished between commodity and sector-specific capital-labour 
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ratios, so that their actual work consists of several models dealing with different 
conceptualizations of the informal sector. However, we present here only the model that 
considers informal sector as producing an internationally traded final commodity and 
there is intersectoral capital mobility so that the rate of interest is the same for all three 
sectors. Chandra and Khan (1993) consider a dual economy with two sectors: urban and 
rural. The urban sector is further subdivided into informal and formal sectors so that in all 
there are three sectors. Let ,X Y and Z denote the rural, urban informal and urban formal 
sectors, respectively. All the three sectors produce internationally traded commodities 
and their prices are given internationally due to the assumption of small open economy. 
Sector Z  is the import-competing sector and is protected by an import tariff.  
 
Given the perfectly competitive markets the usual zero-profit conditions are given by 
X LX KX XW a ra P   (5.7) 
Y LY KY YW a ra P   (5.8) 
(1 )Z LZ KZ ZW a ra P t    (5.9) 
where ,X YW W and ZW denote the rural sector, urban informal sector and formal sector 
wage rates, respectively.  
 
Full employment of labour is depicted by  
LX LY LZa X a Y a Z L    (5.10) 
Complete utilization of capital implies that 
KX KY KZ D Fa X a Y a Z K K K      (5.11) 
 
The migration equilibrium condition is given by 
( )Z LZ Y LY X
LZ LY
W a Z W a Y W
a Z a Y
 

  
Using (5.10) and simplifying, the above condition can be rewritten as follows.  
( / ) ( / )LX Y X LY Z X LZa X W W a Y W W a Z L    (5.12) 
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The national income at world prices is now given by 
X D ZI W L rK tP Z    (5.13) 
 
This is also a decomposable system where input prices are determined from the price 
system alone (equations (5.7) – (5.9)) without use of the output system. 
 
Subtraction of (5.12) from (5.10) yields  
( ) ( ) 0X Y LY X Z LZW W W W      (5.14) 
  
Now the effect of an increase in the inflow of foreign capital on welfare is considered. In 
the decomposable system, an increase in capital has no effect on prices, so that ( / )iW r  
also remains constant. Hence ( / )Li Li ia a W r and ( / )Ki Ki ia a W r  remain constant as 
well. Therefore, differentiating (5.14) one obtains  
ˆ ˆY Z  (5.15) 
 
Differentiating (5.11) and (5.12), using (5.14) and (5.15) and considering 0dL  , we get 
the following two expressions, respectively. 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )KX KY KZX Z K      (5.16.1) 
ˆ ˆ( ) 0LX LY LZX Z      (5.16.2) 
 
Solving (5.16.1) and (5.16.2) by Cramer’s rule one finds  
ˆ ˆ( )( / )LY LZX K    ; and, (5.17.1) 
ˆ ˆ( / )LXZ K    (5.17.2) 
where [ ( ) ( )]KX LY LZ LX KY KZ           (5.17.3) 
 
Now, according to the Chandra-Khan capital intensity condition (CKCIC) the urban 
sector as a whole (consisting of both formal and informal sectors) is capital -intensive if  
[( ) /( )] ( / )KY KZ LY LZ KX LX         (5.17.4) 
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Hence, if CKCIC holds, it implies that 0  . This suggests that ˆ 0X   and ˆ 0Z  , when 
ˆ 0K  .⁮53 
 
It is evident that with increase in capital endowment, the overall urban sector expands 
and the rural sector contracts owing to Rybczynski effect if and only if CKCIC holds. 
The result holds even if the rural and/or informal sector does not use capital, that is, 
1K and/or 2 0K  . 
 
Now differentiating (5.13) with respect to K  we obtain 
( / ) ( / ) 0ZdI dK tP dZ dK    since ( / ) 0dZ dK  .    (5.18) 
Hence an inflow of foreign capital is again immiserizing if the CKCIC holds.  
 
 
5.3. Gainful Effects of Foreign Capital 
 
In spite of the standard welfare deteriorating effects of foreign capital, evidence shows 
that the developing countries have been eager to attract a substantial amount of foreign 
capital in the last two decades by adopting liberalised investment and trade policies. As 
per the World Development Reports 1998-99 and 2006 the amount of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to the low-income countries has increased from 1,502 millions of 
dollars in 1980 to 13,283 millions of dollars in 2003. The corresponding figures for India 
are 162 and 4,289 millions of dollars, respectively. The magnitude of increase of FDI 
flow to China is worth mentioning. It increased from meager 3,487 millions of dollars in 
1990 to 53,505 millions of dollars in 2003. Foreign capital accounts for 11 per cent of 
fixed capital investment (ten times the share in 1980) and almost one-third of that in the 
manufacturing sector.54 This paradox gives rise to a pertinent question that what drives 
the developing countries to yearn for foreign capital given the standard welfare- 
                                                      
53 From (5.15) and (5.17.2) it follows that  ˆ ˆ( / ) 0LXY K      
 
54 See the Oxfam Report, 2002. 
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deteriorating effect of foreign capital. A few plausible explanations may be forwarded as 
follows. First, the immiserizing result has been derived in the context of the standard 
HOS framework, where the decomposition property holds. So factor prices remain 
unchanged despite an inflow of foreign capital and welfare deteriorates as the tariff-
protected import-competing sector expands. However, in an indecomposable production 
structure the result might be different.55 Secondly, if foreign capital enters into the 
import-competing sector, the result should be immiserizing. However, if foreign capital is 
allowed to enter only into an intermediate input (internationally traded or non-traded) 
producing sector, as Marjit and Beladi (1996) and Chaudhuri (2001) have shown, it might 
be welfare improving. Besides, standard trade models do not adequately capture some of 
the essentials characteristics of a typical developing economy. Even in an HT structure, 
with agricultural dualism and non-traded commodities, it is possible to show that an 
inflow of foreign capital might be welfare-improving (Chaudhuri, 2007). Finally, as we 
have seen in any decomposable two-sector or three-sector Harris-Todaro model despite 
the presence of labour market distortion inflows of foreign capital worsen welfare. But,  if 
a full-employment structure is followed, as Chaudhuri (2005) has shown, an inflow of 
foreign capital might be welfare improving even in an otherwise 22 HOS model in the 
presence of tariff and labour market distortions. Let us explain the Chaudhuri (2005) 
model in details. 
 
 
5.3.1. Chaudhuri (2005) Model: Role of Labour Market Distortion 
 
The Chaudhuri (2005) model shows that even in a two commodity–two input full-
employment structure with labour market distortion, an inflow of foreign capital without 
technology transfer may be welfare improving. However, the existence of labour market 
                                                      
55 See for example, Jones and Marjit (1992) and Grinols (1991). Grinols (1991) in terms of a 
three-sector specific factor indecomposable system with an urban informal sector and Harris -
Todaro setting has argued that an inflow of foreign capital in the presence of a capital -intensive 
and tariff-protected import-competing sector is not necessarily immiserizing. This is because of 
an increase in the return to the sector-specific input, which may outweigh the increased cost of 
tariff protection resulting from an expansion of the protected sector. 
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distortion is a necessity to obtain this unconventional result. If an inflow of foreign 
capital takes place concurrently with labour market reform, the possibility of welfare gain 
due to foreign capital diminishes. On the contrary, if the inflow of foreign capital is 
accompanied by a transfer of labour-augmenting technology, welfare may improve even 
in the absence of labour market distortion.  
 
Chaudhuri (2005) considers a small open economy, with two sectors where both the 
sectors operate at close vicinity. There are two inputs of production  labour and capital. 
Sector 1 is the informal sector producing a primary export commodity while the formal 
sector (sector 2) produces a manufacturing commodity. Now it is assumed that labour in 
sector 2 earns a unionized wage, *W , while the wage rate in sector 1, W , is market 
determined. We shall assume that sector 2 is more capital-intensive relative to sector 1 in 
value sense. Besides, sector 2 is the tariff-protected import-competing sector of the 
economy. Two commodity prices are given internationally owing to our small open 
economy assumption. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with positive 
but diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. All markets except the labour 
market facing sector 2 are perfectly competitive. Factors of production are fully utilised. 
 
The general equilibrium is represented by the set of following equations.  
111 PraWa KL                                                          (5.19)        
*
2 2 2 (1 )L Ka W a r P t                                                                    (5.20)     
LXaXa LL  2211                                                                         (5.21) 
KXaXa KK  2211                                                                           (5.22) 
 
Equations (5.19) and (5.20) are the two zero-profit conditions while (5.21) and (5.22) are 
the two full-employment conditions for labour and capital, respectively. iP  and iX  
denote internationally given price and the output level of the i th sector, respectively. L  
and K  are the endowments of labour and capital. The capital stock of the economy 
consists of both domestic and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes.  
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Sector 2 faces a unionized labour market. The relationship for the unionized wage rate is 
specified as56: 
* ( , )W f W U                                                                                                  (5.23) 
where U  denotes the bargaining strength of the labour unions.  
(.)f satisfies the following properties: *W W for *0,U W W  for .0,;0 21  ffU  
 
Equation (5.23) states that *W W when the trade unions exercise at least some power in 
the bargaining over wages. *W  is an increasing function of both W and U . The trade 
union power, denoted by U , is amenable to policy measures. If the government 
undertakes labour market reforms for curbing union power e.g. partial or complete ban on 
resorting to strikes by the trade unions or reformation of employment security laws, U  
takes a lower value. 
 
There are five endogenous variables in the system: * 1, , ,W W r X and .2X  Using (5.23), 
equation (5.20) may be rewritten as follows:  
)1(),( 222 tPraUWfa KL                                                                              (5.20.1) 
W  and  r are determined from equations (5.19) and (5.20.1). Then jia s are determined as 
functions of input price ratios. 1X  and 2X  are obtained from (5.21) and (5.22). Finally, 
*W  is found from (5.23).  
 
We measure welfare of the economy by national income at world prices, I , which is 
given by 
*
1 1 2 2 2 2L L DI Wa X W a X rK tP X                                                                (5.24) 
 
It is assumed that the foreign capital income is fully repatriated. In equation (5.24), 
11 XWaL  and * 2 2LW a X  give the total wage income of the workers employed in sectors 1 
and 2 of the economy, respectively. DrK  is the rental income from domestic capital. 
Finally, 22 XtP  measures the cost of tariff protection
 of the import-competing sector. 
                                                      
56 This function has already been derived in chapter 3.  
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Differentiating equations (5.21) and (5.22) and solving we can derive the following 
expressions 
1Xˆ KL ˆ)/1( 2                                                                                     (5.25) 
2Xˆ KL ˆ)/1( 1                                                                                           (5.26)         
where 0)( 1221  KLKL   as sector 2 is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 1 
in value sense. 
 
Differentiating (5.24) with respect to K  and using (5.25) and (5.26) we get the following 
expression. 
*
1 2 2 2 2 1( / ) ( / )( ) ( / )L L LdI dK a X K W W tP X K                                               (5.27) 
Now since *W W  and ,0  from (5.27) it follows that 0)/( dKdI  iff 
*
2 2( ( )) .La W W tP   However, in the absence of any protectionist policy, i.e. when 
0,t   ( / ) 0,dI dK   irrespective of any condition. This leads to the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 5.1: Welfare of the economy improves owing to an inflow of foreign capital 
in the presence of a tariff iff *2 2( ( )) .La W W tP   In the absence of any tariff, foreign 
capital is unambiguously welfare improving.57 
 
We explain proposition 5.1 intuitively in the following fashion. An inflow of foreign 
capital leads to an expansion of the more capital-intensive sector 2 and a contraction of 
sector 1 following the Rybczynski effect.  As sector 2 is the tariff-protected import-
competing sector, its expansion lowers welfare by increasing the cost of tariff protection. 
This may be called the output effect (of sector 2). On the other hand, as the higher wage-
paying sector 2 expands at the cost of lower wage-paying sector 1, the aggregate wage 
income rises. This we may call the labour reallocation effect, which produces a 
                                                      
57 In the standard 22 Heckscher-Ohlin framework, welfare remains unaffected despite foreign 
capital inflow if there is no tariff protection. But in the present set-up one gets a different result 
because of the presence of labour market distortion. This result, however, cannot be obtained in a 
Harris-Todaro framework despite labour market distortion due to the envelope property implied 
by this structure.  
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favourable effect on welfare. So two opposite forces on welfare are generated. If the latter 
effect, measured by *1 2 2(( / )( )),L La X K W W   dominates over the former ( denoted by 
))/( 122 KXtP L  in (5.27), welfare of the economy improves.   
 
It may be noted that lesser the degree of labour market distortion, the lower will be the 
wage differential between the two sectors and hence lower will be the magnitude of 
labour reallocation effect. If the government undertakes any policy of labour market 
reform, the bargaining power of the trade unions, denoted by U , falls. As U  falls, *W  
decreases directly. Besides, r  rises and W  falls, which causes *W  to fall further. The 
inter-sectoral wage differential *( )W W  goes down, as the decrease in *W  is greater 
than that of W . So a reduction in U  lowers the magnitude of the labour reallocation 
effect and hence weakens the possibility of welfare gain due to foreign capital. So we can 
state the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.2: Any government policy aimed at reducing the labour market distortion 
weakens the possibility of improvement in welfare through foreign capital. 
 
The absence of any bargaining power of the trade unions implies that *W W . Then 
from (5.27) it follows that 
)/()/( 122 KXtPdKdI L  .0                                                                           (5.27.1) 
 
Thus, we find that as labour market distortion vanishes due to labour market reform, it 
boils down to the standard Brecher-Alejandro case and foreign capital inflow is welfare 
deteriorating. It may be mentioned that in the presence of multiple distortions, welfare 
results related to a single distortion could easily change. However, the case cited in this 
paper is an example, which illustrates the tradeoff between labour market reform and 
location of foreign capital. 
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5.3.1.1. An Extension: Inclusion of Technology Transfer and Endogenous 
Determination of Foreign Capital Inflow 
 
In the analysis of section 5.3.1 the possibility of technology transfer from an inflow of 
foreign capital has not been taken into consideration. However, as a result of foreign 
direct investment, residents of the host country come into contact with foreign 
entrepreneurs who possess superior technical skills and know how. These new ideas lead 
to transfer of technology from the foreigners to the residents of the host country and it 
takes place through observation, discussion and training. This transmission can be 
considered as a spillover or external effect on the host country58. It can fairly be 
generalised that technology transfer in developing countries takes place mainly through 
foreign direct investment. Empirical investigations in this area by Mansfield (1961, 1968) 
also support the validity of this hypothesis. 
 
Another shortcoming of the previous analysis is that the inflow of foreign capital has 
been assumed to be completely exogenous. There is no doubt that the major driving force 
behind FDI by the multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the developing countries is the 
higher rate of return on their capital in these countries relative to the international 
market.59 Therefore, it would be more realistic to assume that the supply of foreign 
capital is a positive function of the rate of return to foreign capital in the host country.   
                                                      
58 See Koizumi and Kopecky (1977). Findlay (1978) has also used this “contagion hypothesis” in 
his theoretical analysis of technology transfer and relative backwardness.  
 
59 In many of the recent models of MNEs there is focus on Industrial Organization and oligopoly. 
See for examples, Markusen (1995, 2002), Norback and Persson (2002), Neary (2002, 2003) 
among others. In this literature, MNEs are seen as having firm-specific assets developed from R 
& D, or marketing, which enable these firms to penetrate foreign markets. When an MNE sets up  
a new production plant in a target country, it is in effect implementing an FDI. The MNEs may 
have a number of motives for its FDI decision. One such motive could be the cross -country return 
differential. There are different entry modes into a target production market such as establishment 
of new plants, acquisitions of domestic firms or merger with domestic producers. It may be noted 
that the labour union activity could be a way to extract rents from the foreign MNEs. However, if 
union activity extracts too high wage premiums, the amount of FDI is likely to fall, especially 
when the motive behind an FDI is the cross-country reward differential. On the other hand, the 
host countries may be benefited from transfer of new and improved technologies of producti on by 
the MNEs.  
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The present section is designed to extend the earlier analysis in the two above-mentioned 
directions. It is now considered that the supply of foreign capital to our small open 
economy is a positive function of the net rate of return to capital. However, the 
assumption that foreign and domestic capital are perfect subst itutes is retained.60  
 
In addition to the symbols that we have used in section 5.3.1 of the chapter, we shall here 
use the following symbols as well. 
h efficiency of each worker; 
b   ad-valorem tax rate on foreign capital income; 
FK supply of foreign capital. 
 
The equational structure of the extended model is as follows.  
 
The competitive equilibrium conditions for the two industries are again given by  
111 PraWa KL                                                                                                         (5.19)   
)1(),( 222 tPraaUWf KL                                                                                  (5.20.1) 
 
There is a tax at the rate b on the foreign capital income. The supply function of foreign 
capital is given by 
( (1 )), (.) 0F F FK K r b K                                                                                       (5.28) 
where (1 )r b is the net return to foreign capital. 
 
                                                      
60 An alternative way to deal with the above issues is to introduce a third sector, called a ‘foreign 
enclave’, where foreign capital is a specific input. The assumptions of unionized labour market, 
supply of foreign capital positively related with net return to foreign capital and the efficiency 
enhancing effect of foreign capital are retained. Instead of two, in this case there is only one  
Rybczynski effect. An inflow of foreign capital into the foreign enclave, initiated by a reduction 
in tax on foreign capital income, raises the demand for labour in this sector. On the other hand, 
due to labour-augmenting technology transfer associated with foreign capital, the labour 
endowment of the economy measured in efficiency unit increases. Thus, there are two opposite 
forces working on the availability of labour to the two domestic sectors. This produces a 
Rybczynski effect. The import-competing sector contracts (expands) if the labour availability to 
the domestic sectors rises (falls). One may check that the qualitative results of this section may 
hold under different sufficient conditions. 
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The capital endowment equation of the economy is as follows. 
1 1 2 2 ( (1 ))K K D Fa X a X K K K r b                                                       (5.29) 
 
The efficiency of each worker is considered to be a positive function of the amount of 
foreign capital61 in the economy and is given by 
( ( (1 ))), 0Fh h K r b h                                                               (5.30)   
 
After normalizing the labour endowment in physical unit to unity, we write the labour 
endowment of the economy in efficiency unit as 
 2211 XaXa LL  ( ( (1 )))Fh K r b                                                          (5.31) 
 
Finally, national income at international prices is now given by 
*
2 2 2 2( ( (1 ))) ( ) ( (1 ))F L D FI Wh K r b W W a X rK brK r b tP X                       (5.32) 
where ( (1 ))FbrK r b is the tax revenue from foreign capital income. 
 
Now, totally differentiating equations (5.29), (5.31) and (5.32) and simplifying we can 
derive the following expression. 
 
( / ) [( ) ]F FdI db r Wh br K K      
                         )/)](/()/][()*)[(/( 111222 KhKhtPaWWXKr KKLLF        (5.33) 
 
From (5.33) it is obvious that 
 
                                                      
61 Here the efficiency-enhancing effect of an inflow of foreign capital has been modeled as a 
disembodied increase in labour endowment in efficiency unit. Labour efficiency units are freely 
mobile between the two sectors of the economy so that, in effect, the foreign capital brings to the 
economy additional labour supply. At least in the short run, it may be questionable that labour 
would be more productive in all parts of the economy simply because foreign capital enters into 
one sector (the capital-intensive import-competing sector). It would have been more realistic if 
the labour efficiency gains were tied specifically to labour that works with the foreign capital and 
the same idea would go through. However, this way of treatment of technology transfer keeps the 
analysis simple. Besides, the efficiency-increasing effects of foreign capital are likely to spread 
over more and more workers of the economy with time. 
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( / ) 0dI db  under the sufficient conditions: (i) ;F FbrK K  and,  
(ii) * 2 2 1 1[( ) ][( / ) ( / )] 0L L KW W a tP h K h      . 
 
This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.3: An inflow of foreign capital induced by a reduction in the rate of tax on 
foreign capital income improves welfare in the host country if (i) ;F FbrK K  and, 
(ii) * 2 2 1 1[( ) ][( / ) ( / )] 0L L KW W a tP h K h      . 
 
We explain proposition 5.3 in the following way. A decline in the tax rate on foreign 
capital income raises the net rate of return to foreign capital, which induces a fresh inflow 
of foreign capital. Although the factor prices do not change, this may influence welfare of 
the economy in different ways. First, the aggregate capital stock of the economy swells 
up. This following a Rybczynski effect leads to an expansion (a contraction) of the 
import-competing (export) sector as sector 2 is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 1. 
On the other hand, owing to the labour augmenting nature of technology transfer 
associated with foreign capital, the labour endowment of the economy in efficiency unit 
increases. This produces another Rybczynski effect, which produces an expansion of 
sector 1 and a contraction of sector 2. The net result of the two opposite Rybczynski 
effects would be an expansion (a contraction) of the import-competing sector if the 
former (latter) effect dominates over the latter (former). This happens iff 
1 1( / ) ( )( / )L Kh K h     . As a consequence, the cost of tariff protection of the import-
competing sector rises (falls). This, we call the net output effect (of the formal sector). 
This effect is zero if the magnitudes of the two opposite Rybczynski effects are equal i.e. 
when )/()/( 11 KLhKh  . Secondly, any change in the composition of output affects 
the aggregate income of the workers (at the given labour endowment measured in 
efficiency unit) in the presence of wage differential between the two sectors. This is 
called the labour reallocation effect. If the formal sector expands (contracts) (does not 
change), the aggregate wage income rises (falls) (remains unaffected) due to a labour 
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reallocation effect. The combined effect of the net62 output (of the formal sector) effect 
and the labour reallocation effect is positive (zero) on welfare iff 
*
2 2 1 1[( ) ][( / ) ( / )] ( )0.L L KW W a tP h K h        Third, as the labour endowment in 
efficiency unit rises; this produces another positive effect on welfare. We call it the 
labour endowment effect. Finally, a decrease in the tax rate on the return to foreign 
capital affects the tax revenue of the government. The tax revenue rises (does not change) 
if ( )F FbrK K   . This is called the tax revenue effect. When 
*
2 2 1 1[( ) ][( / ) ( / )] 0L L KW W a tP h K h      ; and, F FbrK K  , the aggregate wage 
income (at given labour endowment) and tax revenue from foreign capital income remain 
unchanged, but welfare may still improve due to the increase in the labour endowment (in 
efficiency unit). 
 
In order to compare proposition 5.1 with proposition 5.3 it should be kept in mind that in 
the basic model the inflow of foreign capital was considered to be exogenous. But in the 
subsequent analysis an inflow of foreign capital was initiated by a reduction of tax on 
foreign capital income, which might affect the welfare result by producing a tax revenue 
effect. To make the results comparable let us ignore this effect. In the basic model we 
have found that a labour market distortion is a necessity for foreign capital to be welfare 
improving. An inflow of foreign capital leads to an expansion of the import-competing 
sector (formal sector) due to a Rybczynski effect. Thus, the output effect (of the formal 
sector) invariably produces a negative impact on welfare by increasing the cost of tariff 
protection. But in the extended model an inflow of foreign capital associated with labour-
augmenting nature of technology transfer leads to an expansion of the effective labour 
endowment measured in efficiency unit. Thus, unlike the basic model two Rybczynski 
effects are generated in the extended model, which work in the two opposite directions to 
                                                      
62 In the analysis of section 5.2.1, there was only one Rybczynski effect resulting from an inflow 
of foreign capital. The output of the import-competing sector expands and it produces a negative 
effect on welfare by increasing the cost of tariff protection. This was called the output effect (of 
sector 2). But here another Rybczynski effect takes place as the labour endowment of the 
economy measured in efficiency unit increases due to efficiency-enhancing effect of foreign 
capital. Therefore, there are now two Rybczynski effects on the output of sector 2 and hence on 
the cost of tariff-protection working in the opposite directions to each other. The combined effect 
is called the net output (of the formal sector) effect. 
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each other. The net result, which we call the net output effect, may not be an expansion of 
the import-competing sector. If it contracts (or remains unaffected) the cost of tariff 
protection falls (or does not change). Even if this sector expands its magnitude (and 
hence the negative impact on welfare) would be lower compared to the earlier case. On 
the contrary, the effect of labour reallocation effect on welfare may be negative (or zero) 
if the import-competing sector contracts (or remains unchanged). Even if it expands, the 
positive effect of the labour reallocation effect on welfare must be less than the original 
case. But it should be noted that for growth with foreign capital to be welfare improving 
the existence of labour market distortion is no longer a necessary condition. There is now 
one additional effect (the labour endowment effect) that works favourably on welfare. 
Therefore, in the absence of wage differential between the two sectors welfare may still 
improve even when the cost of tariff protection rises if the labour endowment effect is 
adequately strong. 
 
It may be noted that in the extended model Proposition 5.2 may hold in a special case 
when )/()/( 11 KLhKh   i.e. the tariff-protected import-competing sector expands due 
to net output effect. This may be explained as follows. Suppose that the tax revenue 
effect and the labour endowment effect on welfare are positive. But the protected sector 
expands due to net output effect. Also there are no labour market distortions so that the 
labour reallocation effect is zero. Then welfare may fall if the increase in the cost of tariff 
protection is sufficiently high. But the presence of labour market distortion and positive 
labour reallocation effect certainly weakens the possibility of welfare loss in this case. If 
the magnitude of wage differential is sufficiently high (which in turn implies an 
adequately strong labour reallocation effect) welfare may still improve. This establishes 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.4: In the extended model proposition 5.2 may be valid when 
)/()/( 11 KLhKh  . 
  
Thus an inflow of foreign capital in a two-sector full-employment model with labour 
market distortion is welfare-improving if the consequent labour reallocation effect 
outweighs the output effect (of the import-competing sector). The existence of labour 
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market distortion is a necessary condition for obtaining gainful effects of foreign capital 
and any attempt to lower the magnitude of labour market distortion lowers the possibility 
of welfare gain. However, if the inflow of foreign capital is accompanied by a transfer of 
technology that raises the technical efficiency of the workers gainful effects of foreign 
can be achieved even without labour market imperfection.  
 
 
5.3.2. Gainful Effects of Foreign Capital in the Presence of an Urban Informal 
Sector and Open Unemployment of Labour63 
 
In the previous chapter, we have stated that in reality the urban informal sector and open 
unemployment of labour coexist in the migration equilibrium. We have also theoretically 
explained their simultaneous existence. Now we proceed to show how inflows of foreign 
capital either into the export sector or into the tariff-protected import-competing sector 
might improve social welfare when the informal sector and open unemployment coexist 
in the urban sector. This framework helps us to examine the consequences of liberalised 
investment policies on the open unemployment in the urban area. 
 
Our small open dual economy is broadly divided into an urban sector and a rural sector. 
The urban sector is further subdivided into two sub-sectors so that there are three sectors 
in the economy. Sector 1 of the economy is the rural sector that is assumed to produce its 
product by means of labour and capital of type 1. The urban informal sector (sector 2) 
produces a non-traded input with the help of labour and capital of type 2. Finally, the 
urban formal sector (sector 3) requires labour, capital of type 2 and a non-traded input to 
produce a final manufacturing product. The per-unit requirement of the intermediate 
input is assumed to be technologically fixed in the formal sector64.  Capital of type 2 is 
                                                      
63 This section is based on Chaudhuri et al. (2006). 
 
64 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded input and other factors of 
production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic.  This 
is partly justified by the fact that four tires are used to produce a car and one Brown tube is used 
for a TV set.  In industries like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out 
their production to the small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the 
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mobile between the two urban sub-sectors and labour is imperfectly mobile between the 
three sectors of the economy. But capital of type 1 is specific to sector 1. Let r and R  
denote the returns to capital of type 1 and type 2, respectively. There is Harris-Todaro 
type of unemployment denoted by UL . The aggregate capital stock of the economy of 
either type consists of both domestic and foreign capital. Incomes earned from foreign 
capital are completely repatriated. Let us now assume that labourers in the urban formal 
and informal sectors earn exogenously given wages65, *3W  and 
*
2W , respectively, while 
the wage rate in the rural sector, 1W , is market determined. The three wage rates are 
related by the Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium condition where the expected 
urban wage rate equals the rural wage rate and * *3 1 2W W W  .
66 Owing to the small open 
economy assumption the prices of the two final commodities are given internationally. 
But the price of the non-traded input produced by the urban informal sector, 2P , is 
determined domestically by demand and supply forces. We assume that the urban formal 
sector is the import-competing sector of the economy and is protected by a tariff. Other 
standard assumptions made in the earlier sections are retained. Commodity 1 is chosen as 
the numeraire. 
 
Some of the new notations used in this section are as follows.  
 
jK  = economy’s aggregate capital stock of the j th type (domestic plus foreign),  
          ( j  = 1,2); 
                                                                                                                                                              
production is done in the informal sector firms while labeling, packaging and marketing are done 
by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in 
quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final commodity. Thus there remains a 
fixed proportion between the use of the intermediate input and the quantity of the final 
commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. It may be noted that Gupta (1994) has 
used this assumption in the context of analyzing different expansionary policies of a duty-free 
zone in a developing economy. Chaudhuri (2003) has also made this assumption.  
 
65 The rigidity of the informal sector wage has been explained in chapter 4.  
66 See footnote 28. 
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DjK = economy’s domestic capital stock of the j th type, j = 1,2; 
V  social utility; 
iD consumption demand for the i th final commodity, i = 1,3; 
Y national income at domestic prices; 
M import demand for commodity 3. 
               
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of equations . 
1 1 1 1L KW a ra            (5.34)                                                                                          
*
2 2 2 2L KW a Ra P           (5.35)                                                                                       
*
3 3 3 2 23 3 (1 )L KW a Ra P a P t    .       (5.36)                                                                  
 
Full-employment conditions for capital of types 1 and 2 are as follows.    
111 KXaK            (5.37)                                                                                                          
23322 KXaXa KK  . (5.38)                                                                                       
    
The demand-supply equality of 2X  implies that 
2323 XXa  .          (5.39)  
                                                                                                          
For the sake of analytical simplicity, the number of workers in the economy, L  has been 
normalised to unity. The labour endowment equation is then given as follows. 
1332211  ULLL LXaXaXa .       (5.40)                                                                                           
 
Introducing the informal sector to the Harris-Todaro framework would modify the labour 
allocation mechanism such that in the labour market equilibrium, the rural wage rate ( 1W ) 
equals the expected wage income in the urban area. Since the probability of finding a job 
in the manufacturing sector is )/( 332233 uLLL LXaXaXa  in the present case, then the 
expected wage in the manufacturing sector is *3 3 3 2 2 3 3/( )L L L uW a X a X a X L  .  Similarly, 
the expected wage in the informal sector is *2 2 2 2 2 3 3/( )L L L uW a X a X a X L  . Thus, the 
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expected wage in the urban area (the manufacturing and informal sectors) is 
* *
2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3( ) /( )L L L L uW a X W a X a X a X L   . Therefore, the labour allocation 
mechanism between rural and urban areas is expressed as  
* *
2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 1( ) /( )L L L L uW a X W a X a X a X L W    , 
 
or equivalently, 
* *
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1L L LW a X W a X W a X W   .                                               (5.41) 
 
Following Beladi and Yabuuchi (2001) we assume that the wage in the informal sector is 
a constant fraction of the formal sector wage67 and is given by 
* *
2 3W nW   (5.42)    
                                                                                                        
where 0 1n  , represents the distortionary wage differential between the two urban 
sectors. It is assumed that the urban informal sector consists of many subcontract firms, 
and as explained in section 3.6, the workers employed do not get more than their 
reservation wages.     
 
There are eight endogenous variables in the system: 1 2 1 2 3, , , , , ,W r R P X X X  and UL  and 
eight independent equations. The policy parameters are: 1K  and 2K .⁮
68 One can 
obtain R  and 2P  by simultaneously solving equations (5.35) and (5.36). Using (5.37), 
(5.39) and (5.42), equations (5.38) and (5.41) may be rewritten as the following, 
respectively. 
233232 )( KXaaa KK   (5.43)                                                                                                   
and 
                                                      
67 This is not an essential assumption in this model. The constancy of the informal sector wage 
serves our purpose, which seems to be reasonable if the informal sector produces a non-traded 
input for the formal sector on a subcontracting basis.  
 
68 One can, of course, consider the tariff rate, t , as another policy parameter and carry out 
comparative statics with respect to that parameter.   
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* *
1 1 1 1 3 2 23 3 3 3 1( / ) ( )L K L LW K a a nW a a W a X W   .                (5.44)             
     
In the present setup, 1W , R  and 3X  are solved from equations (5.34), (5.43) and (5.44). 
Once all the factor prices are known the factor coefficients, jia s are also known. Then 
1X  and 2X  are found from equations (5.37) and (5.39), respectively. Finally, UL  is 
obtained from (5.40). 
 
The demand side of the model is represented by a quasi-concave social utility function. 
Let V denote the social utility that depends on the consumption demand for the two final 
goods denoted by, 1D  and 3D . Thus, it is shown as 
1 3( , )V V D D .         (5.45) 
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that  
)()( 2211331331 DD KKRKKrXPXDPD  , (5.46) 
or equivalently 
*
1 3 3Y D P D   
    *1 3 3 3 1 1 2 2( ) ( )D DX P X tP M r K K R K K       , (5.46.1)  
where Y is national income at domestic prices and 3 3( )M D X   denotes import demand 
for good 3. 
 
5.3.2.1. Effects of Foreign Capital Inflows on W elfare 
 
We are now interested to analyse the consequences of liberalised investment policies on 
national welfare and open unemployment in the urban area. Liberalised investment 
policies imply increases in the stocks of the economy’s two types of capital stock, 1K  
and 2K , which arise due to inflows of foreign capital. According to the conventional 
wisdom an inflow of foreign capital in a developing economy is welfare reducing. This is 
based on the argument that an inflow of foreign capital leads to an expansion of the 
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protected import-competing sector thereby lowering welfare by lowering the volumes of 
trade. 
 
First, it is assumed that foreign capital of type 1 flows in, so that 1Kˆ > 0 with all other 
parameters remaining unchanged. We assume that the endowment of foreign capital is 
initially zero.  
 
Differentiating (5.45) and (5.46), we get (see Appendix 5.3)  
*
1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
ˆ ˆˆ/ [(1 ) ( )]dV V dD P dD v L WW tP tP Ht X X      ,             (5.47) 
where 1 1/V V D   , (1 ) / {1 (1 ) } 0v t m t     , 
*
3 3 3 3[( / ) ( / ) ] 0H D P D Y D        is 
the Slutsky’s pure substitution term, and *3 3( / )m P D Y    is the marginal propensity to 
consume good 3. Thus, welfare depends on the changes in the wage rate in sector 1 and 
the outputs in sector 3 since tariff does not change.  
 
Comparative statics yield69  
1 1 1 3 2 23
ˆ ˆ/ ( ) / 0U L K KW K L         , (5.48)  
and 
0ˆ/ˆ 13 KX , (5.49) 
  
where   is the value of the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the system70. Note 
that 1/ 232323  XXa . Thus, the following proposition follows immediately. 
Proposition 5.5: Welfare improves unambiguously as a result of the inflow of foreign 
capital of type 1. 
 
Now it is assumed that 2Kˆ > 0 i.e., there is an inflow of foreign capital of type 2. 
Similarly to the case of foreign capital of type 1, we have  
 
                                                      
69, 70 See Appendix 5.2. 
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1 2 1 3 2 23 3 2
ˆ ˆ/ ( )( ) / 0U K K K L LW K L             ,  
             0)//()~~( 1
1
123  KKKLLL SD  , (5.50)         
and 
01/)/)((ˆ/ˆ 1
1
12323123  KKKLKKLU SDLKX  ,   (5.51) 
 
where * 1( / )Li i LiW W   )3,2( i  and 0/1 1
1
11  KKKLL SD  . 
 
Substituting (5.50) and (5.51) into (5.47) with all other parameters remaining constant,  
we have 
1
1 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3
ˆ/ [ (1 ) ( ) / ( / ) ]L L L KK KdV V K v L W D S tP X          .   (5.52) 
 
So we can now establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 5.6:  Foreign capital inflow of type 2 is welfare enhancing if and only if  
1
1 1 3 2 1 1(1 ) ( ) /( / )L L L KK KL W D S        > 33 XtP . 
 
Propositions 5.5 and 5.6 can be intuitively explained as follows. An inflow of foreign 
capital of type 1 neither affects the rental to capital of type 2, R , nor the output of the 
formal sector, 3X , as it is specific to sector 1. So the cost of tariff protection 33 XtP does 
not change. But as the supply of this type of capital increases relative to its demand, the 
rental to capital of type 1, r , falls, which in turn raises the rural sector wage rate, 1W  to 
satisfy the zero profitability condition for sector 1 (see equation 5.34). Thus, labour 
moves from urban to rural area. This contributes to increase total wage income and to 
reduce urban unemployment as shown below. Anyway, the hike in total wage income 
outweighs the drop in the rental income to capital of type 1. Hence welfare 
unambiguously improves.  
 
On the other hand, an inflow of capital of type 2 does not affect its rental rate, R , as it is 
determined from the price system alone, independently of the output system. But since 
2K  is used in sectors 2 and 3, there is a boost in 2X  and 3X . As the tariff-protected 
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import-competing sector expands, the cost of tariff protection also rises. Now given 
*
2W (=
*
3nW ) and 
*
3W  and R , the factor coefficients 2La , 3La , 2Ka  and 3Ka  remain 
unchanged. But as 2X  and 3X  rise the aggregate absorption of labour in the two urban 
sectors, )( 3322 XaXa LL   increases. The necessary labour is supplied from the urban 
unemployment pool and the rural area. In this case, the change in unemployment is not 
unambiguous. It depends on the increase in labour demand in the urban sectors relative to 
the inflow of labour from the rural area. But the competitive rural wage rate rises 
unequivocally as the number of workers staying in the rural sector decreases.71 So there 
would be three different effects on welfare. Welfare increases due to an increase in the 
total wage income through the reallocation of labour between the urban and rural areas. 
On the contrary, welfare deteriorates due a decline in total rental income of type 1 capital 
and due to an increase in the cost of tariff protection of the import-competing sector. It 
can be easily checked that the net effect on welfare would be positive under the necessary 
and sufficient condition presented in the proposition. 
 
 
5.3.2.2. Effects of Foreign Capital Inflow on Urban Unemployment 
 
The growing incidence of urban unemployment has been a matter of deep concern to the 
developing economies. The ongoing process of economic liberalisation has probably 
aggravated this problem. We would now like to analyse the effects of liberalised 
investment policies on the level of urban unemployment. 
 
The effect of an inflow of capital of type 1 on unemployment is derived as  
0/))(1(ˆ/ˆ 2323111   KKLLU KL . (5.53)  
 
 
                                                      
71 It is important to mention that owing to the ‘envelope property’ implied by the Harris-Todaro 
framework the aggregate wage income of the workers in the economy increases as the rural sector 
wage, 1W , rises. 
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This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.7: Foreign capital inflow of type 1 unambiguously lowers the urban 
unemployment level. 
 
Similarly, we get the effect of an inflow of capital of type 2 on unemployment as  
 /])/()~~)()[((ˆ/ˆ 21
1
12323232312 KLLULLLLLKKKU SLKL  . (5.54) 
           
This leads to the following proposition (see Appendix 5.4). 
Proposition 5.8:  Foreign capital inflow of type 2 lowers the urban unemployment level if 
and only if )/()~~)(()/( 2323
2
1
1
1 ULLLLKLLL LS   .   
 
We explain propositions 5.7 and 5.8 as follows. An inflow of foreign capital of type 1 
leads to an increase in the rural sector wage rate, 1W , and an expansion of sector 1. As 1W  
increases there would be a reverse migration of labour from the urban sector to rural 
sector. The consequence would be a fall in urban unemployment. On the other hand, if 
capital of type 2 flows into the economy, 1W  rises but both the urban sectors expand. 
Thus, two opposite effects on the urban unemployment level would be generated. If the 
expected urban wage rises relative to the rural sector wage rate, migration of labour from 
the rural to the urban sector rises. On one hand, the level of urban unemployment falls as 
new jobs are created in the urban sector and on the other, it rises if the size of the urban 
labour force swells up following a fresh migration from the rural sector. Our result shows 
that the unemployment level in the urban sector plummets if the expansion effect 
outweighs the migration effect i.e. if the increase in the expected urban wage is greater 
than that in the rural wage rate. This happens subject to the precise condition provided in 
the proposition. 
 
Contrary to the conventional immiserizing result, the theoretical analysis of the previous 
section shows that an inflow of foreign capital in either of the two broad sectors of the 
economy may be welfare improving mainly through the decrease in urban 
unemployment.  Besides, an inflow of foreign capital into the urban sector leads to an 
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expansion of the urban sector of the economy. This policy is likely to ameliorate the 
problem of urban unemployment72. These results are completely opposite to those 
generated by the standard Harris-Todaro model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
72 It has also been noted that new employment opportunities have been created and labour force 
participation rates have increased in several large FDI recipient economies, especially in South, 
East and South-East Asia (ILO 2002a). 
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APPENDIX 5.1: 
 
Differentiating equations (5.12) and (5.14) the following expressions are obtained.  
1 1 2 2
ˆˆ ˆ ( / )L L FX X h K br h b                                                                             (5.A.1)    
1 1 2 2
ˆˆ ˆ ( / )K K FX X K rb K b                                                                             (5.A.2)    
Solving (5.A.1) and (5.A.2)) b y Cramer’s rule one gets the following expression.  
2 1 1
ˆˆ ( / )[( / ) ( / )]F K LX brK h h K b                                                                (5.A.3) 
 
Now differentiating (5.32) with respect to m we get 
* 2
2 2 2 2( / ) ( ) ( / ) (.) ( / )F L F FdY db Wh K r W W a dX db rK br K tP dX db          
Using (5.A.3) and simplifying we get 
( / ) [( ) ]F FdY db r Wh br K K      
                )/)](/()/][()*)[(/( 111222 KhKhtPaWWXKr KKLLF        (5.A.4) 
                                                         
From (5.A.4) it is evident that 
( / ) 0dY db  if (i) ;F FbrK K  and, (ii) 
*
2 2 1 1[( ) ][( / ) ( / )] 0L L KW W a tP h K h      .  
 
 
APPENDIX 5.2: 
 
Differentiating  (5.34) to (5.41) and arranging terms, we obtain 
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                                                 
 
   (5.A.5) 
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where * 1( / )Li i LiW W   ),3,2( i )1/( ttT  . 
3
3
2
2 KKKKKK SSA   ,               3322 LKLLKL SSC   ,        
3
3
2
2
~~* LKLLKL SSC   ; and,      0/1 1111  KLLLL SD  ,               
    
Solving (5.A.5) for 1ˆW  with respect to 1Kˆ  and considering 132  KK  , we have 
equation (5.48) in the main text.   
 
1 1 1 3 2 23
ˆ ˆ/ ( ) / 0U L K KW K L         ,      (5.48) 
where   is the value of the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the system, and it is 
shown as 
0)/)(( 1
1
123231  KKKLKKKU SDL  . 
Other comparative static results are obtained similarly. 
 
 
APPENDIX 5.3: 
 
Differentiating (5.45) and (5.46) with keeping initial holdings of foreign capital zero, we 
have 
 
*
1 1 3 3/dV V dD P dD    
*
1 3 3 3 1 2dX P dX tP dM rdK RdK     ,      (5.A.6) 
where 1 1/V V D    and 
*
3 3 3( , )M D P Y X  . 
 
Differentiating M and arranging terms with keeping initial holdings of foreign capital 
zero, we obtain 
 
* * * *
3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3( / ) ( / )[dM D P dP D Y dX P dX X dP tP dM          
3213 ] dXRdKrdKdtMP  , 
 
* * *
3 3 1 3 3 1 2 3[ ( / )( ) ]dM v HdP m P dX P dX rdK RdK dX        (5.A.7) 
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Differentiating production functions and considering (4.38) and (4.41), we have  
 
*
1 3 3 1 2
1 1 * 3 3 3
1 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 2( ) ( )L K L K
dX P dX rdK RdK
F dL F dK P F dL F dK F dX rdK RdK
  
      
* *
1 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )W dL rdK W dL RdK W dL RdK rdK RdK       
* *
1 1 2 2 3 3W dL W dL W dL    
1 1(1 )L dW  ,         (5.A.8) 
 
where kjF  is the value of marginal product of the j th factor in the k th sector, which is 
equal to the factor price. 
 
Substituting (5.A.3) and (5.A.4) into (5.A.2) yields  
*
1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
ˆ ˆˆ/ [(1 ) ( )]dV V dD P dD v L WW tP tP Ht X X      .  (5.47) 
 
 
APPENDIX 5.4: 
 
Solving (5.A.5) for ULˆ  with respect to 2Kˆ , and considering 1
1
1
1 / KLLLKK SS  , 
)~~()1( 231 LLL   , 
and 
 )()~~()()1( 2323231 LLLLLLLUL   , 
we have equation (5.54) in the main text.  Since  < 0, therefore, 0ˆ/ˆ 2 KLU  from (5.54) 
iff 
0])/()~~)(([ 21
1
12323  KLLULLLLL SL  .    (5.A.9) 
 
Thus, (5.A.9) can be rewritten as  
)/()~~)(()/( 2323
2
1
1
1 ULLLLKLLL LS   .   
This leads to the proposition. 
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Chapter 6 
 
How and How Far to Liberalise a Developing Economy 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Many of the developing countries have chosen free trade as their development strategy 
and been vigorously implementing liberalised trade and investment policies for the last 
two decades or so. Liberalisation involves both inflow of foreign capital as well as 
reduction of protection of domestic industries, structural reforms like deregulating the 
labour market and integrating the domestic market with the world market.  
 
The developing countries are plagued by many distortions. Commodity market distortion 
in the form of tariff protection in the import-competing sector and labour market 
distortion in the form of unionized formal sector labour market are the two most common 
types of distortion prevalent in these countries. Removal of distortions, according to the 
conventional wisdom, is likely to be welfare improving since this would lead to more 
efficient distribution of economics resources. The developing countries, therefore, have 
been advised by the WTO to include tariff and structural reform policies, like making the 
labour market more competitive by curbing the trade union power in determining the 
unionized wage in their globalisation program packages.  
 
However, it has been observed that some of the developing economies, notably the non-
OECD countries, have not implemented tariff reforms to any significant extent, even after 
formally choosing free trade as their development strategy. The explanation to this 
seemingly puzzling situation has been provided by the existing tariff-jumping theory.73  
The tariff-jumping theory suggests a positive correlation between the amount of FDI in a 
                                                      
73 The major driving force behind FDI by the MNEs in the developing countries is the higher rate 
of return on their capital in these countries vis-à-vis the international market. Countries with 
protected domestic markets are likely to attract foreign investment, but only for the purpose of 
jumping the tariff walls and reaping a good harvest by serving their markets directly. See for 
example, Motta (1992) and Yanagawa (1990) for details.  
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country and tariff rates imposed by it. So, the countries in quest of foreign capital may be 
reluctant in implementing tariff reform seriously. But, this theory fails to explain as to 
how many other countries have been able to attract a substantial amount of foreign 
investment even after lowering their tariff rates considerably.  
 
As many of the developing economies have chosen free trade as their development 
strategy, thoughtfully or not, they are bound to open up their economies to the world and 
make domestic markets increasingly competitive. But how and how far to liberalize an 
economy is the vital questions of the hour. In other words, the crucial question is whether 
a developing economy should follow all the WTO-prescribed liberalizing policies and to 
what extent. This is extremely important because available empirical evidences reveal 
that developing countries have been facing substantial adjustment costs in their 
endeavour in implementing different WTO-prescribed policies and opening up their 
economies to external competition at a brisk pace. Although, many of the Sub-Saharan 
African countries have been subjected to IMF-imposed reforms for a decade or more, the 
overall performance of these economies yet remains remarkably poor, despite 
considerable progress on liberalisation and deregulation. The average annual growth of 
real GDP in these countries fell from 2.5 per cent between 1985-89 to 1.9 per cent 
between 1990-97.⁮74 During the 1990s, per capita income has also declined in most of 
Africa’s less developed countries (UNCTAD, 2000). In South Africa and in many of the 
Latin American countries, trade liberalisation during 1990s was associated with falling 
employment and hence economic insecurity for the formal sector labour force. Most 
seriously, as noted by Kaplinsky (2001), trade reform measures have made the 
developing economies increasingly reliant on external economic events. In recent 
decades, this external environment has become increasingly volatile. The volatility of 
both capital flows and GDP growth was much greater in developing countries than in the 
industrial countries (Hausmann and Gavin, 1996). Besides, the costs of this volatility 
were greater for developing than industrialized countries. More developing countries 
experienced currency crises than industrial ones, and with a greater negative impact on 
                                                      
74 However, it has increased to 3.9 %during 2000-04 (World Development Report, 2006). The 
GDP per capita grew at 2.4 %during 2003-04. 
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output (IMF, 1998). According to Stiglitz (2002) the results of IMF sponsored economic 
reforms have been intensifying poverty for many people and instigating social and 
political chaos for many countries. Mistakes in sequencing and pacing of economic 
reforms have led to rising unemployment and increased poverty in many countries. 
Markets were opened up for competition too rapidly, which resulted in sharp increases in 
unemployment levels due to lack of strong financial institutions. After the 1997 Asian 
crisis, IMF policies exacerbated the crises in Indonesia and Thailand. Even those 
countries that have experienced some limited growth have seen the benefits accrue to the 
very well off leading to sharp increases in income inequalities.  
 
In these circumstances, an effort has been made in this chapter to provide answers to the 
questions mentioned above in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with 
informal sectors, reasonable for a developing economy. Welfare effects of different trade 
and investment liberalisation policies have been first studied in a full-employment set-up. 
The study has then been extended into a HT framework with an urban informal sector 
and capital market distortion.  
 
6.2. The Analysis and Results75 
 
A small open economy with three sectors has been considered. There are one formal and 
two informal sectors. One of the two informal sectors (sector 1) produces an agricultural 
commodity using capital and labour. The other informal sector (sector 2) produces a non-
traded input76 for the formal sector using capital and labour. The formal sector produces a 
manufacturing commodity with the help of capital, labour and the intermediate input 
produced in sector 2. The per-unit requirement of the intermediate input is assumed to be 
                                                      
75 This chapter draws upon Chaudhuri (2003). 
 
76 It may be pointed out that in the models of Grinols (1991) and Gupta (1997) it is assumed that 
the informal sector produces an internationally traded final commodity, which may seem hardly 
realistic, given the definition of informality. On the other hand, there is enough empirical 
evidence (see section 3.6) in support of the fact that the informal sector units mostly produce non-
traded intermediaries for the formal manufacturing industries.  
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technologically fixed in sector 3.⁮77 Let us now assume that labour in the formal sector 
earns a contractual wage, *W , while the wage rate in the two informal sectors, W , is 
market determined. Capital and labour78 are perfectly mobile among all the three sectors 
of the economy. Owing to our small open economy assumption we consider the prices of 
the commodities of sectors 1 and 3 to be given internationally. On the other hand, the 
price of the non-traded input produced in sector 2 is endogenously determined. We 
assume that the formal sector is the import-competing sector of the economy and is 
protected by a tariff. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with 
diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. All inputs are fully employed.79 The 
endowment of labour is normalized to unity. 
 
The general equilibrium is represented by the set of following equations.  
L1 K1 1a W + a r = P                                                                                                      (6.1)  
L2 K2 2a W + a r = P                                                                                                         (6.2) 
*
L2 K3 23 2 3a W  + a r + a P = P (1+t)                                                                                    (6.3)     
                                                      
77 See footnote 64.  
 
78 Perfect labour mobility is compatible with the type of wage differential considered in this 
paper. See chapter 10 in Batra (1973), for an interesting exposition of this issue. 
 
79 The assumption of full-employment of labour in the context of a developing economy may 
seem to be awkward at the first sight. But in the presence of informal sectors where wages are 
completely flexible, this assumption may be justified. Datta Chaudhuri (1989), Grinols (1991), 
Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) consider that in the migration equilibrium in the 
presence of an informal sector, there does not remain any involuntary unemployment and the 
informal sector wage rate lies below that of the rural sector. There are also a few variants of the 
HOS framework with informal sector where full employment is ensured relying on the complete 
flexibility of the informal sector wage rate. Marjit and Beladi (1996) Chaudhuri and Mukherjee 
(2002) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002) are three of the few papers based on the HOS 
framework. The difference between the two types of frameworks is that in the models where an 
HT framework has been followed, wage rates differ between the rural and urban informal sectors 
while in the HOS type of papers all the sectors operate at close vicinity and perfect labour 
mobility between the informal sectors ensures equalization of the informal sector wage rates. 
However, in all these papers, there does not exist any involuntary unemployment of labour in 
equilibrium. Section 6.4 of this chapter has considers the HT case.   
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where r  and 2P  denote the return to capital and the price of the non-traded input 
produced by sector 2, respectively. 1 3,P P  and t  are the world prices of commodities 1 and 
3 and the ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 3.  
 
Equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) are the three competitive industry equilibrium conditions 
in the two informal and the formal sectors, respectively.  
 
Complete utilization of capital ( K ) in the economy implies that 
K1 1 K2 2 K3 3a X + a X + a X = K                                                                                          (6.4) 
 
Full employment of labour is implied by the following equation.  
L1 1 L2 2 L3 3a X + a X  + a X = 1                                                                                           (6.5) 
 
The demand for the non-traded input must equal its supply. So we have 
23 3 2a X = X                                                                                                                   (6.6) 
 
The formal sector faces a unionized labour market. The relationship for the unionized 
wage rate is specified as80: 
* *W  = W (W,U)                                                                                                         (6.7) 
where U  is the bargaining strength of the labour unions.  
 
*W (.) satisfies the following properties81: 
*W  = W for *U = 0, W  > W for * *U > 0; ( W / W), ( W / U) > 0     
 
Using (6.7), equation (6.3) may be rewritten as follows.  
                                                      
80 It may be noted that in a simple fixed wage differential model also, many of the qualitative 
results remain unaltered. Also one may include 3 (1 )P t in the 
*(.)W function. The welfare 
effects of trade liberalisation remain unaffected if the net effect on *W of a decrease in t remains 
the same.    
 
81 See section 5.3.1 for explanation. 
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*
L3 K3 23 2 3a W (W,U) + a r + a P  = P (1+t)                                                                       (6.3.1) 
 
There are seven endogenous variables in the system: * 2 1 2W, W , r, P , X , X  and 3X . The 
parameters of the system are: 1 3 23P ,P ,a ,t,U,L and K , which are exogenously given. 
Equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3.1) form the price system of the model. We note that given 
the values of the parameters, the three unknown factor prices, 2W,P and r can be solved 
from the price system alone, independently of the factor endowments. Thus the 
production structure shows the decomposition property. Once the informal wage rate, W , 
is known, the unionized wage rate, *W  , is obtained from (6.7). If factor prices are known 
the factor coefficients, jia s, are also known. Equations (6.4), (6.5) and (6.6) then can be 
solved for 1 2X , X and 3X . 
 
The measure of welfare in this small open economy is national income measured at world 
prices, Y , which is expressed as follows. 
*
L1 1 L2 2 L3 3 D 3 3Y= W(a X + a X ) + W a X + rK  - tP X                                                         (6.8) 
In equation (6.8), L1 1 L2 2W(a X + a X ) and 
*
L3 3W a X  give the total wage income of the 
workers employed in the two informal and the formal sectors of the economy, 
respectively. Rental income from domestic capital is DrK  where DK  is the domestic 
capital stock. Finally, 3 3tP X  measures the cost of tariff protection
82 of the import-
competing sector. 
 
According to the conventional wisdom, an inflow of foreign capital83 in a developing 
economy leads to deterioration in its welfare while a reduction in tariff protection is 
                                                      
82 The imposition of a tariff on the import-competing sector artificially raises the domestic price 
of the formal sector’s product from its world price, which would lead to a misallocation of 
resources between the two traded sectors. Producers would produce more (less) of the importable 
(exportable) commodity vis-à-vis their free trade levels. 3 3tP X  measures the deadweight loss to 
the economy’s welfare resulting from this inefficiency in production.  
 
83 Our assumption is that domestic capital and foreign capital are perfect substitutes. This 
simplified assumption has been made in Brecher and Alejandro (1977), Khan (1982), Grinols 
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welfare improving. However, in this section we reanalyse the impact of foreign capital 
inflow and / or a reduction in import tariff on welfare of a small open economy. It is 
equally interesting in the present set-up to study the welfare consequences of any attempt 
of formal sector reforms, like deregulating the labour market. Although, different 
liberalised policies in trade and investment are undertaken concurrently in a developing 
economy, to fix our ideas we may consider their effects one by one. We shall, however, 
discuss intuitively the net outcome of these policies on welfare, if carried out 
simultaneously.  
 
Total differentials of (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3.1) and use of envelope conditions yield  
L1 K1
ˆ ˆW + r = 0                                                                                         (6.1.1) 
L2 K2 2
ˆ ˆˆW + r - P = 0                                                      (6.2.1) 
L3 W K3 23 2 L3 U
ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆE W + r + P = Tt - E U                    (6.3.1.1) 
where T = (t/1+t) > 0 , * *WE = (( W / W)(W/W )) > 0  ; and,
* *
UE = (( W / U)(U/W )) > 0  . 
WE  and UE  are the elasticities of the unionized wage rate,
*W  , with respect to the 
informal sector wage rate, W , and the trade union bargaining power, U , respectively.  
 
Solving (6.1.1), (6.2.1) and (6.3.1.1) by Cramer’s rule one gets the following expressions.  
K1 L3 U
ˆ ˆˆW= - ( / )(Tt - E U)                    (6.9.1) 
L1 L3 U
ˆˆrˆ= ( / )(Tt - E U)                                                                                (6.9.2) 
2 L1 2 1 2 L3 U
ˆ ˆˆP = {( ) / )(Tt - E U)K K L                     (6.9.3) 
L3 U
ˆ ˆˆˆ(W- r) = - {(Tt - E U)/ }                  (6.9.4) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1991), Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1997), etc. However, in the papers of Beladi and Marjit 
(1992a, 1992b), Marjit and Beladi (1996) foreign capital has been treated differently from 
domestic capital and these two types of capital are not engaged in the same sector of the 
economy. 
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where L1 K2 23 K3 K1 L2 23 L3 W= ( + ) - ( + E ) > 0         as the vertically integrated formal 
sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the agricultural informal sector; and, 
W0 < E 1 
84. 
 
Also total differentiation of (6.7) and use of (6.9.1) and (6.9.2) yield,  
*
L1 U L1 W K1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ(W - r) = ( E U/ ) - (Tt / )( + E )                  (6.9.5) 
 
Now total differentiation of equations (6.4) and (6.5) and use of (6.6) yield, respectively,  
K1 1 K2 K3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆX + ( + )X =  K + At - BU                  (6.10.1) 
L1 1 L2 L3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆX + ( + )X = CU - Dt                 (6.10.2) 
where: K1 K1 1 K2 L2 2 K3 L3 3 L1 W K1A = [(T/ ){ + + ( + E )}] > 0            ; 
L3 U K1 L1 1 K2 L2 2 K3 3 L3 L1 W K1B = ( E / )[ + + { + ( + E )}] > 0              ; 
U L1 K1 1 L2 K2 2 L3 L3 3 3 L3 L1 W K1C = (E / )[( + ) + { + ( + E )}] > 0K               ; 
and, 
L1 K1 1 L2 K2 2 L3 K3 3 L1 W K1D = [(T/ ){ + + ( + E )}] > 0             
and i  is the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the i th sector. 
 
Solving (6.10.1) and (6.10.2) by Cramer’s rule one obtains 
3 L1 K1 L1 K1 L1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆX  = (1/ )[- K + U(C + B)} - t(D + A )]                     (6.11) 
where K1 L2 L3 L1 K2 K3= [ ( + ) - ( + )] < 0       as the vertically integrated import-
competing sector is more capital-intensive than the export sector (sector 1).  
 
Now using (6.5) we rewrite the welfare function given by equation (6.8) as 
                                                      
84 This means that *W and W move in the same direction. But the proportionate change in *W  is 
not greater than that in W . This is only a sufficient condition to make 0  , which means that 
the vertically integrated import-competing sector is more capital-intensive than the export sector 
in value terms. 
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*
L3 3 D 3 3Y = W + (W - W)a X + rK  - tP X                          (6.8.1) 
 
Totally differentiating (6.8.1) the following expression can be obtained. 85 
*
L1 L3 3 3
ˆ ˆYY = - K( / )[(W  - W)  - tP X ]    
                       (─) 
               *U L1 L3 F L3 K3 3 L3 L1 W K1ˆ+ UE [(r K / ) - {(W  - W) / }{  + ( + E )}            
                      (+)                   (+)                                    (+)    (+)                 (+)       
                           *K1 L1 U L3 3 3+ {(C + B )/E }{(W  - W)  - tP X }]     
                                            (+)      (+) (─)            
                        *L1 F L3 K3 3 L1 W K1ˆ- tT[( rK / ) - {(W  - W) ( + E )/ }         
                                              (+)                                        (+)            (+) 
                               *K1 L1 L3 3 3+ {(D + A )/T }{(W  - W)  - tP X }]                      (6.12) 
                                                 (+)         (─) 
              
From equation (6.12) it follows that 
*
L1 L3 3 3(dY/dK) = - ( /K )[(W  - W)  - tP X ]              (6.12.1) 
                              (─) 
 
From equation (6.12.1) the following proposition can be established.  
Proposition 6.1: An inflow of foreign capital in the presence of tariff is welfare 
improving iff * L3 3 3(W  - W) > tP X . In the absence of any tariff protection, welfare 
unequivocally improves due to foreign capital inflow.  
 
Equation (6.12.1) can be interpreted in terms of the labour-reallocation effect and the 
output (of the formal sector) effect. Since the system possesses the decomposition 
property, factor prices and hence factor coefficients remain unaltered owing to foreign 
capital inflow, with only a change in the output composition of the economy. As the 
                                                      
85 See Appendix 6.1 for detailed derivation of this expression. 
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vertically integrated formal sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the agricultural 
informal sector, the former (latter) sector expands (contracts) due to Rybczynski effect. 
The informal manufacturing sector that produces a non-traded input for the formal sector 
expands too. As the import-competing formal sector is protected by a tariff, its expansion 
raises the distortionary cost of protection and hence lowers welfare. We call it the output 
(of the formal sector) effect. Owing to changes in the output composition, labour 
reallocation between the sectors of the economy takes place, thereby affecting the 
aggregate wage income of the workers. As the higher wage-paying formal sector expands 
at the cost of the lower wage-paying agricultural informal sector, the aggregate wage 
income increases, and as a consequence the welfare of the economy measured by the 
national income at world prices also goes up. This may be called the labour-reallocation 
effect. The necessary and sufficient condition under which (dY/dK) > 0 is 
that * L3 3 3(W - W) > tP X . This in turn implies that 
*
L1 L3[- ( /K )(W  - W)  >   3 3 L1 tP X ( /K )]  . The left-hand side of the inequality is the 
magnitude of labour-reallocation effect arising from an inflow of foreign capital while the 
right-hand side measures the output effect (of the formal sector). Thus under the 
necessary and sufficient condition that the labour-reallocation effect is stronger than the 
output effect of the formal sector, an inflow of foreign capital is welfare improving.  
 
It may be noted that in the absence of any labour market distortions, the labour 
reallocation effect will be completely absent. There would not exist any gainful effect on 
welfare due to labour reallocation between the three sectors resulting from foreign capital 
inflow. Aggregate income of the workers would remain unaffected even though the 
formal sector expands. From (6.12.1) it then foll ows that 
L1 3 3(dY/dK) = - ( / K)tP X  < 0  . 
 
Thus when the labour markets are perfect, welfare unambiguously falls owing to an 
expansion of the tariff-protected formal sector in consequence of foreign capital inflow. 
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The presence of any labour market imperfection is a necessary condition86 for welfare 
improvement in the existing setup. 
 
We now analyse the welfare consequences of tariff reduction87 and / or formal sector 
reforms. Owing to tariff reform, the domestic price of the formal sector’s product falls 
leading to a contraction of the tariff-protected formal sector. Welfare increases due to an 
increase in the efficiency of production. But, a tariff reduction also affects domestic 
factor incomes, which may have a bearing on the economy’s welfare in the opposite 
direction. On the contrary, if the government as a part of its structural adjustment 
programs intervenes in the formal sector labour market by weakening the unions’ ability 
to mark-up wages, the unionized wage rate decreases. The tariff-protected formal sector 
expands, which will affect the economy’s welfare negatively by reducing the efficiency 
in production. However, factor incomes will also be affected. These two forces may not 
work on welfare in the same direction. Thus no definite conclusion can be drawn 
regarding the welfare effects of tariff or formal sector labour market reforms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
86 It should be mentioned that if there are more than one distortion (one of which being tariff 
protection), an inflow of foreign capital might alleviate some distortion at the expense of 
aggravating others. So the conditions derived in the paper may be specific to this model and to 
distortions chosen. The results may change if another distortion is added or substituted for 
another one. If for example we relax the assumption of perfectly competitive product market for 
commodity 3 and consider increasing returns to scale, embedded in a monopolistically 
competitive market, an inflow of foreign capital in the formal sector may increase welfare even 
with a perfect labour market. A labour market distortion would no longer be necessary to derive 
the result. 
 
87 In order to analyse the welfare consequence of a tariff reform one should ideally measure 
welfare in terms of a strictly quasi-concave social welfare function as apart from the usual income 
effect there is also a price effect resulting from the change in relative prices of commodities to the 
consumers. See section 2.3 in this context. 
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However, from (6.12) it follows that  
L1 F(dY/dt) = - {1/(1+t)}[( rK / )   
                                                 (+) 
                    * L3 K3 3 L1 W K1 K1 L1- (W  - W) {( ( + E )/ ) - ((D + A )/T )}          
                             (+)                                            (+)                                (─)        
                                                                         3 3 K1 L1- tP X {(D + A )/T }]            (6.12.2) 
                                                                                                (+)           (─) 
                                                              
A reduction in tariff affects welfare of the economy by affecting both the aggregate factor 
income and the cost of tariff protection of the import-competing sector. As t  is lowered, 
the domestic price of the formal sector’s product falls. The rate of return on capital, r , 
falls too, which in turn raises the informal sector wage rate, W . As W  rises the 
unionized wage rate, *W , also rises. The wage-rental ratios in all the three sectors of the 
economy rise forcing the producers to adopt more capital-intensive techniques of 
production. Given the output composition, adoption of more capital-intensive techniques 
means a shortage of capital leading to a contraction of both sectors 2 and 3 and an 
expansion of sector 1 as the vertically integrated import-competing sector is more capital-
intensive vis-à-vis sector 1 in value terms. This produces a favourable effect on welfare 
since the cost of tariff protection now falls. However, there are other effects on welfare 
too. As t  decreases the rental income from capital unequivocally falls. On the contrary, 
the effect on the aggregate wage income is somewhat uncertain. The aggregate wage 
income of the workers is affected due to: (i) direct positive effects on W  and *W  
following a reduction in t ; and, due to (ii) labour reallocation effect as the higher (lower) 
wage-paying formal (informal agricultural) sector contracts (expands). To sum up, a tariff 
reduction produces three different effects on welfare (national income at world prices): 
(a) factor income effect at given iX s, (i.e. changes in aggregate factor income excluding 
the labour reallocation effect), which is encapsulated by the term, L1 F{1/(1+t)}{ rK / }  ,  
(ii) effect on wage income resulting from reallocation of labour, captured by the 
expression, * L3 K3 3 L1 W K1 K1 L1- {1/(1+t)}.(W  - W) {( ( + E )/ ) - ((D + A )/T )}          and, 
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(iii) outcome on cost of tariff protection resulting from output effect of the formal sector, 
given by the term, 3 3 K1 L1- {1/(1+t)}tP X {(D + A )/T }   . When the stock of foreign 
capital, FK , is zero the aggregate factor income at given iX s would not change. Then, 
welfare decreases owing to tariff reform if and only if the labour reallocation effect on 
aggregate wage income is stronger than the output effect of the formal sector. On the 
contrary, if the size of foreign capital stock of the economy is positive, aggregate factor 
income at the given product-mix would increase and welfare improves under the 
sufficient condition that the labour reallocation effect on wage income is not greater than 
the output effect of the formal sector. Even if the former effect outweighs the latter, 
welfare may still improve if the foreign capital stock is sufficiently large. This establishes 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 6.2: A tariff reform in the absence of any foreign capital in the economy is 
welfare deteriorating if and only if * L3 K3 3 L1 W K1[(W  - W) {( ( + E )/ )       
- K1 L1((D + A )/T )}]    >  -  3 3 K1 L1[tP X {(D + A )/T }]   . However, in the presence of 
foreign capital, welfare improves due to tariff reform if L1 F( rK / )     
*
L3 K3 3 L1 W K1[(W  - W) {( ( + E )/ )       K1- ((D   +  L1A )/T )}]  . 
 
Now to study the welfare impact of any labour market reform, from (6.12) it is easy to 
derive the following expression. 
 
U L1 L3 F(dY/dU) = (E /U)[(r K / )    
                                                 (+)                       
*
L3 K3 3 L3 L1 W K1 K1 L1 U- (W  - W) {( / )( + ( + E )) - ((C + B )/E )}                             
         (+)                       (+)   (+)               (+)                       (+)             (─)                            
                                                                        3 3 K1 L1 U- tP X {(C + B )/E }]           (6.12.3) 
                                                                                                (+)            (─)  
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Owing to government’s measures to curb trade union power, the bargaining power of the 
trade unions, denoted by U , falls, which results in a lowering of *W , the formal sector 
wage rate. To satisfy the zero-profit condition in sector 3, the rental on capital, r , must 
rise. This lowers the informal sector wage rate, W , too. Production techniques in all the 
three sectors become more labour-intensive as the wage-rental ratio in each sector falls. 
Given the product-mix this must imply an excess of capital resulting in an expansion of 
the formal sector and a contraction of the informal agricultural sector as the vertically 
integrated formal sector is more capital-intensive than the agricultural sector. Unless U  
becomes zero, *W  exceeds W . Thus an expansion (a contraction) of the higher (lower) 
wage-paying sector implies an increase in the total labour-income unless the wage rates 
fall. But as the wage rates have fallen the net effect on the income of the workers is 
ambiguous. Aggregate rental income on capital unambiguously rises as rate of return on 
capital rises. On the contrary, as the formal sector expands, the cost of tariff protection 
rises and works unfavourably on welfare. Here the positive effect on welfare due to 
labour reallocation effect is given by  
*
U L3 K3 3[(E /U)(W  - W) {( / )(     L3 L1 W K1 K1+ ( + E )) - ((C +     L1 UB )/E )}]  . On 
the other hand, the negative impact on welfare arising from output effect (of the formal 
sector) is expressed as U 3 3 K1 L1 U[(E /U)tP X {(C + B )/E }]   . Finally, the net effect on 
aggregate factor income, excluding the labour reallocation effect i.e. at given iX s is 
given by the term U L1 L3 F[(E /U)(r K / )]   . We now note that in the absence of any 
foreign capital, aggregate factor income at given iX s does not change. So, welfare 
improves if and only if the labour reallocation effect on wage income is stronger than the 
formal sector output effect on cost of tariff protection. But, in the presence of foreign 
capital the outcome of labour market reform is likely to get reversed. This leads to the 
following proposition. 
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Proposition 6.3: Labour market reform is welfare improving in the absence of any 
foreign capital if and only if * L3 K3 3[(W  - W) {( / )(      
L3 L1 W K1+ ( + E ))   K1 L1 U- ((C + B )/E )}] >   3 3 K1 L1 U- [tP X {(C + B )/E }]   . 
However, in the presence of foreign capital welfare deteriorates owing to any labour 
market reform if L1 L3 F[(r K / )]    * L3 K3 3[(W  - W) {( / )( +      
L3 L1 W K1 K1 L1 U( + E )) - ((C + B )/E )}]      . 
 
6.3. Implications of the Derived Results 
 
From propositions 6.2 and 6.3 we note that the presence and magnitude of foreign capital 
in the small open economy plays a very crucial role in determining the outcome of tariff 
and labour market reform policies. On the other hand, the relative magnitude of the 
labour reallocation effect and output effect of the formal sector also affect the welfare 
consequences of the policies. So, what liberalisation policies are to be undertaken and to 
what extent hinges on three factors: (i) extent of labour reallocation effect between 
different sectors; (ii) magnitude of the output effect of the tariff-protected formal sector; 
and, (iii) the size of foreign capital stock of the economy.  
 
Now depending on different relative magnitude of the labour reallocation and formal 
sector output effects we may come across two alternative situations in the given set-up. 
First, one may think about the case where the labour reallocation effect is weaker than the 
formal sector output effect. Let us start from a situation where FK = 0 . Then allow an 
inflow of foreign capital. In this case (dY/dK) will be clearly negative. So an inflow of 
foreign capital will be immiserizing. Besides, in such a scenario, labour market reform 
will also be counterproductive while only a tariff reform does improve welfare. Now if 
all these three liberalisation policies are undertaken concurrently, the net outcome is 
likely to be a sharp decline in welfare as the investment and labour market reforms work 
unfavourably on welfare while only a tariff reduction produces a favourable effect. Thus, 
in this case the policymakers of the economy should think twice before going in for 
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liberalisation programs. Secondly, there may be another case where the labour 
reallocation effect is stronger than the output effect of the formal sector. We again start 
with a situation where FK = 0 . An inflow of foreign capital now works favourably on 
welfare. When FK  is low, (dY/dt) > 0and (dY/dU) < 0 . This implies that tariff reform 
lowers welfare but labour market reform is welfare improving. However, as FK  rises 
with foreign capital inflow, the negative (positive) effect of tariff (labour market) reform 
measure on welfare decreases. Once FK  reaches a particular value, say 
*
FK , 
(dY/dt) becomes zero and for any *F FK > K , (dY/dt) < 0 . This implies that for all 
*
F FK  > K , tariff reform will be welfare improving. On the other hand, at another specific 
value of FK , say 
**
FK , (dY/dU)  becomes zero and any further inflow of foreign capital 
makes labour market reform counterproductive. So, the economy must stop undertaking 
labour market liberalisation policies at that point i.e. when **F FK  = K . But the country 
can continue with tariff and investment liberalisation measures as both of these produce 
favourable effects on welfare. Thus, it follows that a country ought not carry on with 
labour market reform measures beyond a certain point. This is also necessary88 in the 
present system, because the gainful effects of foreign capital are obtained only in the 
presence of labour market distortion. In other words, in the absence of any labour market 
distortion, there would be no positive effect on welfare due to reallocation of labour 
between different sectors. Hence, the liberalizing country in question must implement 
labour market reform very cautiously. It must be kept in mind that if labour market 
distortion is removed beyond a certain limit, gainful effects of investment and trade 
liberalisation policies may not be achieved and in the extreme these may even be 
counterproductive. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
88 This aspect has been discussed in details in footnote 86.  
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6.4. An Extension: A Harris-Todaro Framework with Imperfect Labour and 
Capital Markets 
 
In this section of the chapter we study the welfare consequences of the different trade and 
investment liberalisation policies in HT framework with an urban informal sector and in 
the presence of capital market distortion. We consider an HT economy where there are 
two broad sectors: rural and urban. The urban sector is further divided into two sub-
sectors: urban formal sector and informal sector. Each of the three sectors of the economy 
produces an internationally traded final commodity89 using labour and capital. The urban 
formal sector faces a unionized labour market but a perfect capital market. On the other 
hand, the urban informal sector and the rural sector have competitive labour markets but 
imperfect capital market. The urban formal sector is the tariff protected import -competing 
sector while the other two sectors produce two exportable commodities.  
 
In addition to the symbols that we have used in the full-employment version of the 
analysis, we shall here use the following symbols as well. 
1W =  rural sector wage rate; 
2W = urban informal sector wage rate; 
*
3W  = unionized wage rate in the urban formal sector; 
R = rate of return on capital in the informal capital market;  
r =  rate of return on capital in the formal capital market;  
 = parameter denoting the degree of imperfection in the informal capital market, and  
> 1; 
IK = supply of capital to the informal capital market; 
 
The general equilibrium is represented by the following set of equations.  
  
                                                      
89 The assumption that the urban informal sector produces a traded final commodity is a 
simplifying one. Grinols (1991), Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) have used  this 
assumption. This helps us to make the production structure a decomposable one.  
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1 L1 K1 1W a + Ra = P                                                                                                         (6.13) 
2 L2 K1 2W a + Ra = P                                                                                                        (6.14) 
*
3 2 L3 K3 3W (W , U)a + ra = P (1+t)                                                                                   (6.15) 
 
Equations (6.13) – (6.15) are the price-unit cost equality conditions for the rural, urban 
informal and formal sectors, respectively. The unionized wage rate of the formal sector, 
*
3W , is a positive function of both the informal sector wage rate, 2W , and the bargaining 
power of the trade unions, U . We assume the following functional relationship between 
R and r , the informal and formal sector interest rates respectively. 
 
R = r;  > 1                                                                                                                (6.16) 
Here   denotes the degree of isolation of the informal credit market. 1   implies that 
R > r . Thus the informal rate of interest, R , increases as the degree of capital market 
imperfection,  , and/or the formal sector interest rate, r, increases. The informal sector 
lenders generally borrow funds from the formal capital market for re-lending. 
Alternatively, r  could simply be the opportunity cost of lending funds. Hence, the 
informal interest rate, R , depends positively on the formal sector interest rate, r . On the 
other hand, informal credit markets are modeled either as monopolies (see e.g. Bhaduri 
(1977), Rudra (1982) and Basu (1984, 1998)) or as fragmented oligopolies (Basu and 
Bell (1991) and Mishra (1994)). According to both lines of thinking, lenders in the 
informal credit markets have sufficient control over most of the borrowers,  especially the 
smaller group of borrowers. A borrower cannot get credit from any lender according to 
his desire. The lower the number of alternative sources of credit to the borrowers, the 
greater is the degree of isolation that exists in the informal credit market and greater is the 
power of the informal sector lenders to mark up interest rate over that prevailing in the 
formal credit market.  
 
We assume that the amount of capital supplied to the informal capital market, IK , is a 
positive function of the interest rate differential between the two capital markets. So we 
have 
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I IK = K (R-r) ; and, IK  > (=) 0 when I(R- r) > (=) 0; K '(.) > 0                                    (6.17) 
 
We introduce a dichotomy between the two capital markets in this way90. Equation (6.17) 
implies that the informal capital market exists only in the presence of an interest rate 
differential between the two capital markets. However, it should be noted that so long as 
imperfection in the informal capital market exists i.e. 1  , the interest rate differential 
exists and ensures the existence of the informal capital market. This assumption is 
consistent with the lender’s risk hypothesis, as explained by Bottomley (1975). 
According to this theory, an informal sector lender always suffers from the risk of default 
of loans advanced by him and the risk of default rises with loan volume. So it is rational 
for him to advance credit to informal sector borrowers only if the interest rate differential 
exists. The larger the interest rate differential between the two credit markets, the higher 
would be the amount of credit supplied to the informal capital market.  
 
Informal credit is used by the rural and the urban informal sectors. So the complete 
utilization of informal credit implies that 
K1 1 K2 2 Ia X + a X = K                                                                                                      (6.18) 
The urban formal sector uses formal credit. Formal credit market equilibrium is given by  
K3 3 Ia X = K - K             (6.19) 
The labour endowment equation is as follows. 
L1 1 L2 2 L3 3a X  + a X  + a X  = 1    (6.20) 
Finally, the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition is given by 
*
3 1 L3 3 2 1 L2 2 L1 1(W /W )a X  + (W /W )a X  + a X  = 1          (6.21) 
 
This extended model also possesses the decomposition property. So, factor prices are 
determined from the price system alone, namely from equations (6.13) – (6.15). Equation 
(6.18) is not an independent equation. Equation (6.16) determines R once r  is known. 
                                                      
90 Another way of introducing capital market dichotomy has been discussed in section 3.7.  
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IK  is found from (6.17). Given IK , 3X  is obtained from (6.19). Once 3X  is known, 1X  
and 2X  are found from (6.20) and (6.21).    
 
The expression for national income at world prices is given by the following.  
1 D I 3 3Y = W + rK + (R-r)K  - tP X                                                                                    (6.22) 
where 1W  is the aggregate wage income of the workers as the labour endowment has 
been normalized to unity. Besides, DrK  and I(R- r)K  denote rental incomes from 
domestic capital stock employed in the formal and informal capital markets, respectively. 
The deadweight loss to the society due to tariff is once again given by 3 3tP X . 
  
To derive comparative static results, totally differentiating equations (6.13) – (6.15) and 
using (6.16) the following expressions are obtained. 
L2 U L3 2 K2 U L3
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆrˆ = (1/ ) (Tt - E U); W  = - ( / )(Tt  - E U)     ; 
                                                                                                                                   (6.23) 
*
3 U L2 K3 W K2 1 K1 L2 L1 U L3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆW = (E / )U - (E T/ )t ; W  = - ( / )(Tt  - E U)          
 
where L2 K3 W K2 L3=  - E  > 0    as the urban formal sector is more capital-intensive than 
the informal sector in value terms and T = (T/(1+t)) > 0 .                    
 
Again totally differentiating (6.19) and using (6.16), (6.17) and (6.23) it is easy to derive 
the following. 
3 K3 L3 3 L2 W K2 I L2 K3
ˆ ˆ ˆX = (K/ ) + (T/ )t[ ( + E ) - {K '(.)r( -1) / K}]         
                                           L3 U L2 3 I L2 K3ˆ- ( E / )U[  - {K '(.)r( -1) / K}]                    (6.24) 
 
Differentiating (6.22) with respect to K , t and U and using (6.24) the following 
expressions are obtained, respectively. 
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3 3 K3(dY/dK) = - tP (X /K ) < 0 ; 
2
L2 D I I K1 L1(dY/dt) = ( Tr/t )[{(K + ( -1)K (.) + r( -1) K '(.))} - (a /a )]    
                         3 3 L3 3 L2 W K2 I L2 K3- P X [1 + (T/ ){ ( + E )} - {K '(.)r( -1) /K }]           (6.25)  
2
L2 U L3 K1 L1 D I I(dY/dU) = ( E r / U)[(a /a ) - {(K + ( -1)K (.) + r( -1) K '(.))}]     
                                   3 3 L3 U L2 3 I K3+ tP (X E / U)[ - {K '(.)r( -1)/K }]      
 
In (6.25) we find that the sign of the term, 
2
D I I K1 L1[{(K + ( -1)K (.) + r( -1) K '(.))} - (a /a )]  , is likely to be positive unless the stock 
of foreign capital in the initial aggregate capital endowment of the economy is 
sufficiently large. This is because of the following reasons. In an HT framework with 
informal sector, the rural sector is less (more) capital-intensive than the urban formal 
(informal) sector as *2 1 3W  < W  < W  and R > r . Therefore, it follows that 
K3 L3 K1 L1 K2 L2(a /a ) > (a /a ) > (a /a ) . According to the capital-intensity condition of Chandra 
and Khan (1993), (aK1/aL1) is less than the aggregate capital-labour ratio of the urban 
sector (formal plus informal). Also the capital intensity of the rural sector is less than 
while that of the urban sector is greater than the overall capital-labour ratio of the 
economy, ( K ).91 But the overall capital-labour ratio is measured with respect to the 
aggregate capital stock of the economy that includes foreign capital apart from domestic 
capital, DK . Hence, 
2
D I I K1 L1{(K + ( -1)K (.) + r( -1) K '(.))} > (a /a )  , unless the country 
has sufficiently large amount of foreign capital at the initial equilibrium. If this is the 
case, from (6.25) we find that (dY/dt) > 0  under the sufficient condition that 
L3 3 L2 W K2 I L2 K3[1 + (T/ ){ ( + E )} - {K '(.)r( -1) /K }]  0        . Besides, (dY/dU) < 0 if 
3 I K3[   {K '(.)r( -1)/K }]   . On the other hand, (dY/dK) < 0  irrespective of any 
condition. This establishes the following proposition. 
 
 
                                                      
91 Note that the labour endowment has been normalized to unity. So K  gives the capital-labour 
ratio of the economy. 
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Proposition 6.4: An inflow of foreign with full repatriation of income on foreign capital 
is always immiserizing in the existing setup. Also a tariff reform lowers welfare of the 
economy if L3 3 L2 W K2 I L2 K3[1 + (T/ ){ ( + E )} - {K '(.)r( -1) /K }]  0        . On the 
contrary, a labour market reform is welfare improving if 3 I K3[   {K '(.)r( -1)/K }]   . 
 
We explain proposition 6.4 as follows. A major difference between the full-employment 
and the HT cases is that in the former case any policy change has a labour reallocation 
effect on welfare while in the latter there is no such effect owing to the envelope property 
of the HT framework. An inflow of foreign capital cannot affect the factor prices but 
leads to an expansion of the tariff protected urban formal sector. As the protected sector 
expands, the deadweight loss to the society due to a tariff protection rises and as a 
consequence welfare decreases. On the other hand, a reduction in tariff lowers the return 
to capital and raises the wage rates in the different sectors of the economy. Aggregate 
factor income of the economy falls unless the magnitude of foreign capital in the 
aggregate capital stock of the economy is sufficiently large at the initial equilibrium. 
Besides, producers in the different sectors of the economy adopt more capital-intensive 
techniques of production including the urban formal sector leading to increases in the 
Kia s. But as r falls (R- r) falls too, resulting in a decrease (an increase) in the supply of 
capital to the informal (formal) capital market. So two opposite effects on 3X  are 
generated. An increase in aK3 lowers X3 given the supply of capital to the formal capital 
market, I(K - K (.)) , while an increase in the latter raises 3X , given K3a .  If the sufficient 
condition, L3 3 L2 W K2[1+ (T/ ){ (  + E )}     I- {K '(.)r(  L2 K31) /K }]  0   , is satisfied, 
3X  and hence the cost of tariff protection does not fall.  The consequence would be a 
deterioration in welfare of the economy. On the contrary, any labour market reform that 
lowers the bargaining strength of the trade unions lowers the wage rates and raises the 
return to capital. Aggregate factor income in this case rises if the magnitude of foreign 
capital in the economy is not sufficiently high. Also Kia s fall and the supply of capital to 
the informal (formal) capital market rises (falls). Again there would be two opposite 
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effects on 3X . Both 3X  and the cost of tariff protection, 3 3tP X  do not rise under the 
sufficient condition that 3 I K3[   {K '(.)r( -1)/K }]   .  
 
 
6.5. Policy Implications of Results of the Extended Model 
 
We now try to explain the welfare consequences of different liberalisation policies, if 
undertaken concurrently. Let us start from a situation where the stock of foreign capital, 
denoted by FK , is zero. Then we have 
2
D I I K1 L1[{(K + ( -1)K (.) + r( -1) K '(.))} > (a /a )]  . 
The magnitude of K3K  would be relatively low and it is quite probable that the two 
sufficient conditions required to make (dY/dt) > 0 ; and (dY/dU) < 0 are satisfied. In such 
a case, any tariff reform is welfare deteriorating while a labour market reform is welfare 
improving. Now allow inflow of foreign capital. Welfare deteriorates due to growth with 
foreign capital. Also as the magnitude of foreign capital increases due to capital inflow 
the possibility of the above capital intensity condition and the two sufficient conditions to 
hold diminishes. Along with this, the absolute magnitudes of (dY/dt) and (dY/dU)  fall. 
There exist two critical levels of foreign capital for which (dY/dt) and (dY/dU)  would be 
zero, respectively. If FK  exceeds those critical values a tariff reform would be welfare 
improving while a labour market deregulation policy would be counterproductive. So in 
the HT framework too, welfare outcomes of tariff and labour market reforms crucially 
depend on the presence and magnitude of the foreign capital in the liberalizing country. 
But we should note that unlike the full employment case, there is no labour reallocation 
effect in the H-T case and that an inflow of foreign capital is always immiserizing in the 
presence of a tariff.  
  
Empirical evidence points out that trade and investment liberalisation has so far failed to 
provide any substantial welfare gains to the liberalizing countries. Why liberalised trade 
and investment policies have not so far been successful in taking the developing countries 
into higher growth orbits is quite puzzling. One possible explanation may be that the 
liberalizing countries have tried to free their economy in every possible way and at a very 
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brisk pace, without pre-calculating their possible outcomes. Whether a country should 
follow every aspect of the WTO-prescribed policy-package is an important question. We 
have found that an inflow of foreign capital is desirable only if there exists a certain 
degree of labour market distortion. So, the labour market reform, which aims at reduction 
of labour market distortion, a common characteristic of the developing countries, must be 
undertaken very cautiously. If labour market distortion is removed beyond a certain limit, 
gainful effects of investment and trade liberalisation policies cannot be achieved and in 
the extreme cases these may even be counterproductive. On the other hand, a tariff 
reform measure has been found to be relatively safe in the existing setup. In the Harris-
Todaro setting an inflow of foreign capital has been found to be immiserizing. The 
welfare consequences of tariff and labour market reforms have been found to depend 
crucially on the presence and magnitude of foreign capital in the economy. If the 
magnitude of foreign capital is relatively small, deregulation of the labour market is 
likely to produce a favourable effect on national welfare while a tariff reform will be 
counterproductive. But these results are likely to get reversed in the presence of 
substantial amount of foreign capital in the economy. We, therefore, conclude that there 
may not be any need for a liberalizing country to follow all the recommendations of the 
WTO, without taking into consideration the net outcome of these policies on national 
welfare. What policies to be followed and up to which limit, will depend crucially on the 
institutional and technological characteristics and the trade pattern of the relevant 
country. Unless, a proper choice among different prescribed policies is made 
implementation of reform measures may produce counterproductive result on welfare of 
a developing country.  
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APPENDIX 6.1: Derivation of equation (6.12) 
 
Totally differentiating (6.8.1) the following expression can be obtained. 
* * *
L3 3 L3 3 3 L3 D 3 3dY = dW + (dW  - dW)a X + (W  - W)a dX + (W  - W)X da  + K dr - P X dt  
                                                                                                                         3 3- tP dX  
or, * * *L3 L3 L3 3 D 3 3 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆYY = [WW + (W W  - WW) ] + (W  - W) (a + X ) + rK r - tP X (t + X )     
 
Using (6.9.1), (6.9.2), (6.9.4), (6.9.5) and (6.11) the above expression becomes  
* *
K1 L3 U L3 L3 W L3 U
ˆ ˆ ˆˆYY = - ( / )(Tt - E U){W(1 - ) +  W E } + E W U        
             * L3 K3 3 U L3 L1 W K1 L1 W K1ˆ ˆ+ (W  - W) [- {E U(1 + ( + E )/ ) - (T/ )( + E )t}             
                                           L1 K1 L1 K1 L1ˆ ˆ ˆ+ (1/ ){- K + U(C + B ) - t(D + A )}]       
                                     D L3 U L1 3 3ˆˆ ˆ+ (rK / )(Tt - E U)  - tP X t       
                             3 3 L1 K1 L1 K1 L1ˆ ˆ ˆ- (tP X / ){ - K + U(C + B ) - t(D + A )}             
      
*
L1 L3 3 3
ˆ= - ( / )K[(W  - W)  - tP X ]       
              * *U K1 L3 L3 L3 W L3ˆ+ E U[( / ){W(1 - ) + W E } + W                           
* *
L3 K3 3 L3 L1 W K1 L3 U K1 L1- (W  - W) {1 + ( + E )/ } + {(W  - W) /E }(C + B )            
                       D L3 L1 3 3 U K1 L1- (rK / ) - (tP X /E )(C + B )]       
            * *K1 L3 L3 W L3 K3 3 L1 W K1ˆ- Tt[ ( / ){W(1 - ) + W E } - {(W  - W) ( + E )/ }                                   
                   * L3 K1 L1 D L1 3 3+ {(W  - W) /T }(D  + A ) - (rK / ) + (tP X /T)       
                             3 3 K1 L1- (tP X /T )(D + A )]              (6.A.1) 
                                      
Now * *K1 L3 L3 L3 W L3 D L3 L1[( / ){W(1 - ) +  W E } + W  - (rK / )]          
*
K1 L3 L3 L3 L1 K2 K1 L2 23 L1 K3 D L3 L1= (1/ )[ W(1 - ) + W {(  - )  + } - rK ]               
       *K1 L3 L3 L3 L1 L2 23 L1 K3 D L3 L1= (1/ )[ W(1 - ) + W .{(  - )  + } - rK ]             
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* * * *
K1 1 L3 3 L1 1 L2 2 L3 3 L1 1 2 23 3= (1/ )[(ra /P )(W a /P )W(a X + a X ) + W a X {(Wa /P )(P a /P )        
* * *
L2 2 2 23 3 L1 1 K3 3 D L3 3 L1 1  (Wa /P )(P a /P *) + (Wa /P )(ra /P )} - rK (W a /P )(Wa /P )]  
     * *L3 1 3 K1 L1 1 L2 2 3 L1 2 2 3 L2 2 3 1 L1 K3= (WW a /P P )[ra (a X + a X ) + X {a P (X /X ) - a (X /X )P + ra a }              
                                                                                                                          D L1- rK a ]  
* *
L3 1 3 K1 L1 1 L2 2 L1 2 2 L2 2 1 L1 K3 3 D L1= (WW a /P P )[ra (a X + a X ) + a P X  - a X P + ra a X  - rK a ]  
* *
L3 1 3 L2 2 K1 1 L1 K1 1 K3 3 L1 2 2 D L1= (WW a /P P )[a X (ra  - P ) + ra (a X + a X ) + a P X  - rK a ]  
* *
L3 1 3 L1 2 2 L2 L1 K1 1 K3 3 D L1= (WW a /P P )[a X (P  - Wa ) + ra (a X + a X ) - rK a ]  
* *
L1 L3 1 3 K1 1 K2 2 K3 3 D= (WW ra a /P P )[(a X + a X + a X ) - K ]  
L3 L1 F= ( r/ )K                                                                                                             (6.A.2) 
 
Again, *K1 L3 L3 W D L1 3 3[ ( / ){W(1 - ) +  W E } - (rK / ) + (tP X /T)]       
         *K1 L3 L3 W 3 3 D L1=  [( / ){W(1 - ) +  W E } + (1+t)P X  - (rK / )]       
        * *K1 L3 L3 W 3 3 L1 K2 23 K3= (1/ )[ {W(1 - ) + W E } + P X ( + )         
                                                                    *3 3 K1 L2 23 L3 W D L1- P X (  + E ) - rK ]                         
* * *
K1 1 L3 L3 W 3 3 L1 1 K2 2 2 23 3= (1/ )[(ra /P ){W(1 - ) + W E } + P X (Wa /P ){(ra /P )(P a /P )    
               * * * * *K3 3 3 3 K1 1 L2 2 2 23 3 L3 W 3+ (ra /P )} - P X (ra /P ){(Wa /P )(P a /P ) + (W a E /P )}  
                    D L1 1 - rK (a W/P )]                                                                                                   
*
1 K1 L1 1 L2 2 L3 3 W L1 K2 2 K3 3= (r /P )[a {W(a X + a X ) + a X W E } + Wa (a X + a X )  
                                                              *K1 L2 2 L3 3 W L1 D- a (Wa X + W a X E ) - a WK ]  
    L1 1 K1 1 K2 2 K3 3 D= (Wra /P )[a X + a X + a X  - K ]                   
     L1 F= ( rK / )                            (6.A.3)                                                                                           
                                                                                         
 
Now by (6.A.1), (6.A.2) and (6.A.3) we can write  
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*
L1 L3 3 3
ˆ ˆYY = - ( / )K[(W  - W)  - tP X ]    
              *U L3 L1 F L3 K3 3 L3 L1 W K1ˆ+ E U[ ( r/ )K  - {(W  - W) / }{ + ( + E )}                
        *K1 L1 U L3 3 3+{(C + B )/E }{(W  - W)  - tP X }]     
                *L1 F L3 K3 3 L1 W K1ˆ- Tt[( rK / ) - {(W  - W) ( + E )/ }                               
                K1 L1 L3 3 3+ {(D + A )/T }{(W* - W)  - tP X }]             (6.12) 
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Chapter 7 
 
Economic Liberalisation, Informal Wage and Skilled-unskilled Wage 
Inequality 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Informal labour market characterized by competitive wage formation rather than 
unionized process of negotiations has emerged as an important institution in the entire 
developing world. The ongoing process of economic reforms has boosted significantly 
the role played by informal sectors in determining the pattern of employment in the 
developing countries. Many of the developing countries have been facing substantial 
adjustment costs in implementing economic liberalisation programs, particularly in the 
employment front. Empirical evidence suggests that in South Africa and in many of the 
Latin American and other developing countries, trade liberalisation during the 1990s was 
associated with falling employment and hence economic insecurity for the formal sector 
labour force (ILO, 2006). Reformatory policies leads to contraction of the formal 
manufacturing sector and drive labour out into the informal segment of the labour market. 
Empirical studies92 have reported that the size of the informal sector in the developing 
countries has increased considerably in the post-reform period. But the expanding 
informal sector has not been able to absorb the huge number of retrenched workers from 
the formal sector. The consequence has been a steep rise in the level of open 
unemployment in many of the developing economies. 
 
When the size of the informal sector in the developing countries is increasing at a brisk 
pace, it is important to know how the liberalised economic policies have affected the 
working conditions and welfare of the informal sector workforce. As economic wellbeing 
of the workers and wage earnings are strongly correlated, the issue boils down to the 
study of the consequences of economic reforms on the informal sector wage. There are 
not enough direct empirical evidences as yet in understanding clearly the direction of 
                                                      
92 See, for example, Bhalotra (2002), Dev (2000), ILO (2006) and Leite et al. (2006). 
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movement of the informal sector wages in response to economic reforms. While Bhalotra 
(2002) reports that the real wage in the informal manufacturing sector has increased in 
the period of reforms, empirical studies of Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) have 
found that the incidence of poverty has increased in India in the post-reform period. As 
informal sector workers belong to the poorer section of the population, an increase in 
poverty implies deterioration in their wage earnings. Besides, Leite et al. (2006) have 
reported a significant decrease in average real wage for informal workers in South Africa 
during 2000-2004. 
 
The enormous theoretical literature on the informal sector93 has not adequately addressed 
this aspect. An important exception in this context is Marjit (2003) who has examined the 
outcome of trade liberalisation on the informal wage using a three-sector general 
equilibrium model with two informal sectors. In his model one of the two informal 
sectors produces a non-traded input for the formal sector and capital is mobile only 
between the two informal sectors of the economy. Marjit (2003) has found that trade 
liberalisation may increase the informal sector wage under certain conditions. He argues 
that the positive effect on the informal wage would be strengthened if capital mobility 
between the informal and the formal sectors is allowed.  
 
It should be pointed out that economic reforms involve not only removal of the 
protectionist policy but also liberalised investment policy resulting in inflows of foreign 
capital and structural reforms like deregulating the labour market. But, liberalisation of 
labour laws is a politically sensitive issue. It is apprehended by the trade unions that any 
relaxation of labour laws will lead to general wage reductions94 of the poorer group of the 
                                                      
93 This includes works of Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1993, 1997), Beladi and Yabuuchi 
(2001), Kar and Marjit (2001), Chaudhuri (2000, 2003), Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (2002), 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006), etc. But, none of these papers has exclusively examined the 
consequences of economic reforms on the wage rate and the wellbeing of the informal sector 
labour force and the role of the capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors in 
this context.  
 
94 The firms in the urban (manufacturing) sector have well-organized trade unions. One of the 
most important roles of the labour unions is to bargain with the respective employers in r espect of 
the betterment of the working conditions. Through offer of negotiation, threat of strike, actual 
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working population engaged in the informal sector of the economy95. Two other 
important aspects in this context are the empirical findings that the informal sector firms 
mainly produce intermediate inputs for the formal sector firms under the system of 
subcontracting and that capital is mobile between these two types of firms96. Three 
pertinent questions, therefore, are as follows: (i) Do different liberalised policies produce 
disparate effects on the informal wage? (ii) How far is the general apprehension that 
labour market reforms depress the informal wage valid? (iii) Do the consequences of 
economic reform really hinge on the nature of capital mobility between the formal and 
the informal sectors of the economy?  
 
 In the next section we attempt to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a 
three-sector general equilibrium model with two informal sectors.  
 
7.2. Economic liberalisation, Capital Mobility and Informal W age97  
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors: two traded sectors and one non-
traded sector. Sector 1 produces a primary agricultural commodity, 1X , using labour and 
land. Sector 2 produces a non-traded input for sector 3 using labour and one of the two 
inputs: land and capital. Finally, sector 3 (formal sector) may be either an agro-based 
                                                                                                                                                              
strike etc. they exert pressure on the employers (firms) in order to secure higher wages, reduced 
hours of work, share in profits and other benefits. Bhalotra (2002) has noted that in India before 
the initiation of economic reforms organized workers in large firms were been able to reap wages 
higher than the supply price of labour due to the job security and minimum wage legislations. The 
higher the bargaining strength of the unions the higher is expected to be the extent of benefits that 
can be wrested through collective-bargaining. Now if the government undertakes measures e.g. 
partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by the trade unions, reformation of employment 
security laws to curb union power, the unions' power to mark up wages over the supply of labour 
decreases. The consequence would, therefore, be a fall in the unionized wage.  
 
95 Many of the developing countries, including India, are now seriously thinking in terms of 
implementing labour market reforms. But, not much progress has been made so far toward 
implementation of such a highly politically sensitive measure and hence the outcome of this on 
the unionized wage cannot be statistically established a priori.  
 
96 See Papola (1981), Romatet (1983), Sethuraman (1984), Sethuraman and Maldonado (1992) 
etc. in this context. 
 
97 This section is based on Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2007). 
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industry or a manufacturing industry that uses labour, capital and the product of sector 2 
to produce a final industrial commodity. So, we consider two cases depending on the 
nature of good produced by sector 3. In the former case, sector 2 produces a commercial 
agricultural crop for the formal sector using only labour and land while in the latter it 
produces a manufacturing intermediate input with the help of labour and capital. 
However, for constructing a general model from which the two cases arise as sub-cases, 
we assume that sector 2 uses both land and capital in its production. Sector 1 is the export 
sector while sector 3 is the import-competing sector protected by an import-tariff.  
 
The per-unit requirement of the intermediate input is assumed to be technologically fixed 
in sector 3.98 Let us now assume that labour in the formal sector earns a contractual wage, 
*W , while the wage rate in the two informal sectors, W , is market determined. So, 
labour is perfectly mobile between the two informal sectors but is imperfectly mobile 
between sector 3 and the rest of the economy. Land (capital) is perfectly mobile between 
sector 1 (sector 3) and sector 2 if sector 2 uses land (capital) while it is specific to sector 
1 (sector 3) in the case where sector 2 produces a manufacturing (an agricultural) input 
for sector 3. The capital stock of the economy includes both domestic and foreign capital 
and these are perfect substitutes. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale 
with diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. All inputs are fully employed. 
Owing to our small open economy assumption we consider the prices of the commodities 
of sectors 1 and 3 to be given internationally while the price of the non-traded input 
produced in sector 2 is endogenously determined. Finally, commodity 1 is chosen as the 
numeraire.  
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three 
equations, respectively. 
 
 
                                                      
98 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded input and other factors of 
production in sector 3. The rationale of this assumption has been discussed in earlier chapters.  
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111  NL RaWa                                        (7.1)                                       
2222 PraRaWa KNL                                                                                          (7.2) 
)1(323233
* tPaPraaW KL                                                                               (7.3) 
where *, , ,W W R r  and 2P  denote informal wage, unionized wage in the formal sector, 
return to land, return to capital and the price of the non-traded input produced by the 
informal sector, respectively.  
 
Full utilization of labour, land and capital imply the following three equations, 
respectively.           
 
LXaXaXa LLL  332211                                                                                 (7.4)           
NXaXa NN  2211      (7.5)           
;3322 KXaXa KK                  (7.6) 
where ,L N  and K  are the endowments of labour, land and capital (domestic plus 
foreign) of the economy. iX  is the output of the i th sector and t  is the ad-valorem rate of 
tariff on the import of commodity 3. 
 
The output of the informal sector, 2X , is used entirely for producing 3X , so that the 
supply of 2X  is circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand – supply 
equality condition is given by 
32322 XaXX
D                                                                                                 (7.7) 
 
There are seven endogenous variables in the system: rRW ,, , 212 ,, XXP and .3X The 
policy parameters are: *,t W  and K . There are seven independent equations (7.1) – (7.7). 
The price system consists of equations (7.1) – (7.3). The model does not satisfy the 
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decomposition property. The working of the model is as follows. RW ,  and r are 
obtained from equations (7.1) – (7.3) as functions of 2P  as * 3,W P  and t  are given 
exogenously. Once factor prices are determined factor-coefficients, jia s are also 
determined as functions of 2P . Then from (7.4) – (7.6), 21 , XX  and 3X are obtained. 
Finally, 2P  is found from (7.7). Once 2P  is obtained the equilibrium values of all the 
endogenous variables are now found in terms of the parameters of the model.  
 
Differentiating equations (7.1) – (7.7), solving and using the stability condition in the 
market for the non-traded commodity the final expression for Wˆ  is derived.99 Depending 
on the nature of the non-traded good produced by sector 2 and the nature of capital 
mobility between the formal and the informal sectors two cases are possible.  
 
Sub-case I: Sector 2 produces an agricultural input for the formal sector and hence uses 
land and does not use capital. In this case there is complete mobility of land between the 
two informal sectors while capital is a specific input in sector 3.  These imply that 
,, 22 KKa  ;1;0 32  KK  and, 2KLS , ,2KNS ,2LKS 2 ,NKS 02 KKS  where 
i
jkS  is the partial 
elasticity of substitution between factors j and k  in the i th sector. ji  and ji have been 
defined in earlier chapters. It should be noted that sectors 1 and 2 together form a 
Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS).  
 
We assume that sector 2 is more labour-intensive than sector 1. The rationale behind this 
assumption becomes quite clear if one considers rice and cotton (or jute) as the two 
agricultural commodities. The production of rice involves less labour per unit of land vis-
à-vis the processing of raw cotton/jute for delivery to the textile industry (formal sector). 
Even at the cultivation stage both products require the same labour/land ratio, cotton/jute 
must go through another process of conversion before it can be sent to the textile firms. 
                                                      
99 See Appendices 7.1 and 7.2 for detailed derivation of this expression.  
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This additional phase of production is likely to make the output of sector 2 labour-
intensive.100  
Using the above specifications the final expression for Wˆ is the following.101 
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where:  
3 1 2 1 2( ) 0K L N N L        ;                                                                              (7.9) 
0)( 1221  NLNL  ; and,                                                                        (7.10) 
( ) 0
1
tT
t
 

.                                                                                                     (7.11) 
       
0   in this case and its expression has been presented in Appendix 7.3.             
 
From (7.8) one can easily establish the following proposition.102 
 
 
                                                      
100 See Marjit (1991) for details. 
 
101 This has been proved in Appendix 7.3. 
 
102 Proofs of this are available in Appendix 7.3. 
 
 Page | 169 
Proposition 7.1: When the informal sector produces an agricultural input for the formal 
manufacturing sector the informal wage (i) increases owing to an inflow of foreign 
capital; (ii) decreases due to removal of the protectionist policy; and, (iii) rises following 
labour market reform. 
  
Proposition 7.1 can intuitively be explained as follows. We note that sectors 1 and 2 
together form a HOSS. Now, an inflow of foreign capital lowers the rate of return to 
capital as the supply of capital rises given its demand. Sector 3 expands and demands 
more non-traded input which in turn raises the price of the input, 2P . This produces a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect in the HOSS leading to an increase in the competitive informal 
wage and a fall in the return to land as sector 2 is more labour-intensive relative to sector 
1. On the other hand, a reduction in import tariff reduces the domestic price of 
commodity 3 and leads to a contraction of this sector. The demand for the non-traded 
input falls given its supply resulting in a decrease in its price. The informal sector wage, 
W , now falls following a Stolper-Samuelson effect in the HOSS. Finally, a policy of 
labour market reform that takes the form of a reduction in the unionized wage, *W , helps 
the formal manufacturing sector (sector 3) to save on labour input and enables it to 
expand, which in turn increases its demand for the non-traded input. This raises the price 
of the non-traded input which in turn pulls up the informal wage once again following a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect in the HOSS. 
 
We may consider a special case where sector 2 is land-intensive relative to sector 1 and 
the proportion of the workforce employed in the formal sector is significantly low. All 
these suggest that: ;0;0,   and, .03 L  Using these specifications from the 
final expression for Wˆ (as presented in Appendix 7.1) the following proposition can be 
easily proved.103 
 
 
                                                      
103 This has been proved in Appendix 7.3.  
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Proposition 7.2: In the case where the non-traded sector produces an agricultural input 
the informal wage (i) rises following a reduction in import tariff; (ii) falls due to labour 
market reform; and, (iii) rises owing to an inflow of foreign capital if and only if 
;0,   and, .03 L     
Under the necessary and sufficient condition that ;0,  and, 03 L , the policy 
changes produce exactly the opposite effects on the informal wage to what we had 
derived in proposition 1. Policy consequences on the price of the non-traded good remain 
unaltered. But, the price change and the consequent Stolper-Samuelson effect would 
make the informal wage to move in the opposite direction, as the informal sector (sector 
2) is now land-intensive. It is worthwhile to mention that Marjit (2003) has considered 
this case and obtained the counterintuitive effect of a reduction in import tariff on the 
informal sector wage. 
  
Let us now turn to analyse the other sub-case. 
Sub-case II: Sector 2 produces a non-traded manufacturing input for the formal sector. 
So it uses capital but not land. Land is now specific to sector 1 while capital is perfectly 
mobile between sectors 2 and 3. All these imply that ;1;0,, 1222  NNNNa   and, 
2
NLS , ,
2
NNS ,
2
LNS
2
,NKS 02 KNS . It is sensible to assume that the formal sector is more 
capital-intensive vis-à-vis the non-traded sector (sector 2) in both physical and value 
terms. 
 
Using these stipulations from the final expression for Wˆ (as presented in Appendix 7.3) 
the following proposition can now be established. 
Proposition 7.3: In the case where the non-traded informal sector produces a 
manufacturing input for the formal sector the informal wage (i) decreases due to removal 
of the protectionist policy; and, (ii) increases owing to an inflow of foreign capital. On 
the other hand, a policy of labour market reform raises the competitive informal wage if: 
).)(( 33232322 LKKKLL      
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We explain proposition 7.3 in the following fashion. A policy of trade liberalisation 
lowers the domestic price of commodity 3 and leads to a contraction of this sector. Sector 
3 now demands less capital which in turn lowers the return to capital, r . The demand for 
the non-traded input also falls which consequently lowers its price, 2P . Following the 
contraction of sector 3, sector 2 also reduces in size as its output is used in fixed 
proportion in the former.  Now a fall in r  implies that producers in both the 
manufacturing sectors use more (less) capital-intensive (labour-intensive) techniques of 
production than before. Labour is released by these two sectors which now goes to sector 
1, pressing down the competitive informal wage. On the other hand, an inflow of foreign 
capital leads to a fall in r and hence a hike in 2P  so as to satisfy the zero profit condition 
for sector 3 (equation 7.3). As the capital stock of the economy swells up, both the 
capital-using sectors expand. It raises the demand for labour in the two manufacturing 
sectors, making less labour available to sector 1 and hence exerts an upward pressure on 
the informal wage. Finally, a drop in the unionized wage makes it possible for the formal 
sector to save on labour input and raises the effective price of this commodity that the 
producers face. This leads to an expansion of this sector. An expansion of sector 3 raises 
the demand for the non-traded input. The price of the non-traded input, 2P , rises as a 
consequence. The demand for capital also goes up in this sector and so would be the 
return to capital. So capital moves out of sector 2 to sector 3. This raises the return to 
capital in sector 2. Given 2P , an increase in r  implies a plunge in the informal wage, W  
(see equation (7.2)). But, as 2P  has increased, it effectively produces a Stolper-
Samuelson effect in the two manufacturing sectors and exerts an upward pressure on 
W (note that sector 2 is labour-intensive vis-à-vis sector 3 in value sense). Thus, there are 
two opposite effects on the informal wage, W . The positive effect on W  is stronger than 
the negative effect under the sufficient condition as stated in the proposition.  
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7.3. Policy Implications of the Results  
 
We have shown that trade liberalisation, except in a very special case, produces 
depressing effect on the informal wage while inflows of foreign capital and/or structural 
reforms like deregulating the labour market are likely to produce favourable effects on 
the wage earnings of the poor workers. The latter result is extremely crucial as it explains 
why labour market reform should form an integral constituent of the liberalised economic 
package in the liberalizing countries. Furthermore, these results do not hinge on the 
nature of the capital mobility between the formal and informal sectors and, therefore, are 
robust.  So, removal of the protectionist policy, which aims at reduction of commodity 
market distortion, a common characteristic of the developing countries, must be 
undertaken very cautiously as it is likely to hurt the interest of the poorer group of the 
workforce. On the other hand, investment and labour market reforms should be 
encouraged.104 Therefore, the liberalizing countries should not attempt in implementing 
all reforms at a very brisk pace, without pre-calculating their possible outcomes. A proper 
balance among various policies should be made considering the institutional, 
technological and trade related characteristics in order to protect the interests of the poor 
informal sector workers. Making this balance is utterly essential for attaining the ILO’s 
(2006) objective of promotion of decent work for all. 
  
 
7.4. Economic Reforms and Skilled-unskilled Wage Inequality105 
 
Liberalised economic policies, according to the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
were expected to lower the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour in the 
developing countries following increases in the prices of the export commodities as these 
are generally exporters of commodities that are intensive in the use of unskilled labour. 
                                                      
104 However, as shown in chapters 5 and 6, labour market reform may have an adverse effect on 
the overall welfare of the economy. The result may vary depending on the presence and absence 
of foreign capital in the economy. 
 
105 This section draws upon revised version of excerpts of Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007).  
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But empirical studies strongly suggest that the wage inequality has increased in many 
developing economies during the liberalised regime. From the empirical studies of 
Robbins (1994a,b, 1995, 1996) and Wood (1997) it has been found that while the 
inequality has narrowed in the East Asian countries, the Latin American countries like 
Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica and Columbia have experienced increasing skilled-unskilled 
wage gap following the liberalised trade and investment policies. On the other hand, there 
are some indirect studies, which point out that economic reforms have led to a widening 
of the skilled-unskilled wage inequality also in the South Asian countries including India. 
For example, the findings by Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) that the incidence 
of poverty has increased in the post-reform period indicates that the relative wage 
inequality has aggravated, since unskilled workers constitute a significant proportion of 
the poor.     
 
The empirical literature in this area has identified the following as the prime factors 
responsible for the growing incidence of wage inequality in the Latin American 
countries: (i) removal of tariff restrictions from the sectors which were relatively 
intensive in the use of unskilled labour; (ii) growth in foreign direct investment which is 
positively correlated with the relative demand for skilled labour; and, (iii) falling real 
minimum wages and decline of union strength of the unskilled workers. See for example, 
Harrison and Hanson (1999), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Curie and Harrison (1997), 
Robbins (1994a,b), Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Beyer, et al. (1999).  
 
The theoretical literature explaining the deteriorating wage inequality in the Southern 
countries includes works of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Marjit, et al. (2000), Marjit et 
al. (2004), Marjit and Acharyya (2003), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007), and Yabuuchi 
and Chaudhuri (2007). They have shown how trade liberalisation, inflows of foreign 
capital and international mobility of labour, both skilled and unskilled, might produce 
unfavourable effects on the wage inequality in the developing world given the specific 
structural characteristics of the less developed countries, such as features of labour 
markets, structures of production, nature of capital mobility etc. The paper of Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) is based on the famous Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson continuum-of-
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goods framework. According to them, inflow of foreign capital has induced greater 
production of skilled-intensive commodities in Mexico, thereby leading to a relative 
decrease in the demand for unskilled labour. Besides, Marjit et al. (2000) have examined 
the impact of trade liberalisation on the wage inequality in the presence of informal 
sectors. They have shown that the impact of trade on skilled-unskilled wage gap crucially 
hinges on the nature of capital mobility between the formal and informal sectors. An 
important piece of work in this area is that of Marjit et al. (2004), who have analyzed 
how diverse trade pattern and market fragmentation in world trade can adversely affect 
the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the developing countries. They have also studied 
the consequences of an improvement of terms of trade and inflows of foreign capital on 
wage inequality with or without trade fragmentation.  
 
One of the salient features of the developing economies is the existence of distortion in 
the unskilled labour market. Unskilled workers are employed in different sectors of a 
developing economy. Workers employed in the organized (formal) sectors receive 
relatively high contractual (unionized) wage while their counterparts engaged in the 
informal sector earn a lower competitive wage.106, 107 The unionized wage is positively 
related to the competitive informal wage. As unskilled workers earn two different wages 
in the two different segments of the labour market, the average unskilled wage should be 
a weighted average of the two wages with weights being the proportions of unskilled 
labour employed in the two segments of the unskilled labour market. There are 
theoretical papers in the existing literature e.g. Carruth and Oswald (1981), Agenor and 
                                                      
106 The segmented nature of the labour market in the developing countries has been empi rically 
verified and theoretically analyzed by different authors. See Cole and Sanders (1985), Ma zumdar 
(1983, 1993), Fields (1990), Turham (1993), Agenor and Montiel (1995), Agenor (1996) and 
Marjit and Acharyya (2003) among others.   
 
107 On an average, more than 70 % of the working population in the developing countries is 
employed in the informal sector (see Agenor (1996)). The corresponding figure in case of India is 
more than 90 % including agriculture. The percentage of population engaged in the informal 
sector has increased in the post-reform period. See Marjit (2003) and Dev (2000) in this context. 
That the informal sector is growing in most developing countries has also been pointed out in 
Djankov (2003). 
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Montiel (1995), Marjit and Beladi (2002) and Marjit (2003) which have dealt with labour 
market distortion for different purposes.  
 
In this section of the chapter we are going to construct a general equilibrium model 
outside the H-O structure that emphasizes the existence of distortion in the market for 
unskilled labour and may be useful in explaining as to how some of the factors identified 
in the empirical literature can lead to deteriorating skilled-unskilled wage inequality in 
the developing countries in the post reform period. A three sector general equilibrium 
model which is similar to a full employment analogue of Jones and Marjit (2003) has 
been developed for the purpose of the analysis.108 Two of the three sectors use unskilled 
labour while in the other skilled labour is a specific input. Two types of distortion, a 
labour market distortion in the form of unionized unskilled labour market in the low-skill 
manufacturing sector and a commodity market distortion in the form of tariff protection 
of the import-competing sector, which the developing countries are plagued with, have 
been considered. Two different trade patterns109 have been taken into account.  
 
We consider a small open developing economy with three sectors. Sector 1 is the 
informal sector that produces a primary agricultural commodity using unskilled labour 
and land. Sector 2 produces a high-skill manufacturing commodity with the help of 
skilled labour and capital. Sector 3 uses unskilled labour and capital to produce a low-
skill manufacturing product. So land and skilled labour are specific factors in sectors 1 
and 2, respectively. The capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic and 
foreign capital, which are perfect substitutes. Capital moves freely between sectors 2 and 
3 while unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile between the informal sector and the formal 
sector. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal 
productivity to each factor. Markets, except the low-skill manufacturing sector labour 
market, are perfectly competitive. Unskilled workers employed in sector 3 earn a 
                                                      
108 The similarities and differences between Jones and Marjit (2003) and the present analysis have 
been discussed in details in Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007).  
 
109 See footnote 111 in this context. 
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unionized wage, *W , while their counterparts in the informal (agricultural) sector earn a 
competitive wage, W , with *W W . Due to our small open economy assumption 
product prices are given internationally. The following two alternative trade patterns110 
will be considered: the country exports both the agricultural and the high-skill 
commodities and is a net importer of the low-skill manufacturing commodity; 
alternatively, it only exports the agricultural commodity and is a net importer of the other 
two commodities. In both the cases the low-skill manufacturing sector (sector 3) is 
protected by an import tariff. A developing country which fits the first type of 
comparative advantage is India.111 On the contrary, an example of the second type of 
country is Mexico.112 Commodity 1 has been assumed to be the numeraire.  
 
As usual the price-unit cost equality conditions relating to the three sectors are as follows.  
111  NL RaWa           (7.12)                                                                                                              
222 PraaW KSS           (7.13)                                                                                                                         
* *
3 3 3L KW a ra P           (7.14)                                                                                                                   
where *,W W and SW  denote the informal unskilled wage, formal unskilled wage and the 
skilled wage, respectively. R  and r  are the returns to land and capital. Commodity 
prices are given internationally and *3 3 (1 )P P t   where t  is the ad-valorem tariff on 
commodity 3. 
 
All inputs are fully employed. The full-employment conditions for land ( )N , skilled 
labour ( )S , unskilled labour ( )L  and capital ( )K are given by the following equations. 
 
                                                      
110 The results of the model do not depend on the trade pattern of the economy. 
 
111 It may be mentioned that besides primary agricultural commodities, India is also a large 
exporter of high-skill products like computer software.  
 
112 Empirical evidence (e.g. Revenga (1997), Hanson and Harrison (1999)) suggests that Mexico 
does not have a comparative advantage in high-skill manufacturing commodities and that its 
exports are negatively correlated to skill intensity.  
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NXaN 11           (7.15)                                                                                                                                       
SXaS 22           (7.16)                                                                                                      
LXaXa LL  3311          (7.17) 
KXaXa KK  3322        `  (7.18)  
 
The formal sector faces a unionized labour market. The relationship for the unionized 
wage rate is specified as113: 
 
* *( , )W W W U          (7.19) 
with * *( / ), ( / ) 0W W W U      ⁭114,115     
where W  is the informal wage and U  denotes the bargaining strength of trade unions.                                                 
 
There are eight endogenous variables in the system: * 1 2, , , , , ,SW W W R r X X  and .3X  The 
parameters of the system are: LKNUtPP ,,,,,, 32  and ,S which are exogenously given. 
There are eight independent equations, namely, equations (7.12) to (7.19). Equations 
                                                      
113 See chapter 3 for detailed derivation.  
 
114 On one hand, the trade union requires a higher wage rate than the competitive one as usual and 
on the other, the competitive wage rate itself rises as the union wage rate increases if the 
collective bargaining institutions exist and have some effects on the unskilled-labour market. See 
Carruth and Oswald (1981) in this context. Besides, as mentioned earlier that many activities in 
the so-called informal sector of the developing countries are highly stratified, requiring skills, 
experience and contacts, with identifiable barriers to entry. Thus, impediments to entry make the 
wage rate downwardly rigid in many cases. Also, in the case of agriculture there are cases of 
downward wage rigidity that can be explained by the ‘collusive theory of unemployment’ 
(Osmani (1991)). However, as a first step to address the role of trade unionism on wage 
inequality, we emphasize in this chapter the role of trade union in the formal sector only.  
 
115 It should be pointed out, in this context, that the channels through which unionization of the 
unskilled labour market affects the skilled-unskilled wage dispersion are far more complex 
(covering wages and benefits, work rules limiting the intensity of work, stabilizing hours, 
reducing arbitrariness in management actions etc.) than has been worked out here. Although, the 
unionized wage function used in the present analysis is simple in form and does not consider 
some of the complex issues relating to collective bargaining, however, has solid micro -foundation 
with Nash bargaining behind the scene. Besides, use of this function provides us a theory of wage 
differential between the sectors and helps to derive some interesting results which are new in the 
literature on trade and development. 
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(7.12) − (7.14) and (7.19) together form the price system of the model. It is easy to note 
that this production structure does not possess the decomposition property. So the input 
prices cannot be solved from the price system alone, independent of the output system. 
From equations (7.15) − (7.18), it is easy to derive the following equation.  
LSaaKaaNaa SKKLNL  }])/(){/(})/[{( 223311 .     (7.20)                                                        
 
The working of the general equilibrium model is as follows. The five input prices, 
*, , ,SW W W R  and r  are determined by solving equations (7.12) – (7.14), (7.19), and 
(7.20) simultaneously. Once the factor prices are known the factor coefficients, jia s, are 
also known. 1X  and 2X  are obtained from equations (7.15) and (7.16), respectively. 
Finally, 3X  is found from either (7.17) or (7.18).  
 
Unskilled workers in this system earn two different wages  either the unionized wage, 
*W , in sector 3 or a lower competitive wage, W , in sector 1. The average wage for 
unskilled labour is given by 
*
1 3( )A L LW W W                                                                         (7.21) 
 
where 1L  and 3L  denote the proportion of unskilled labour employed in sectors 1 and 3, 
respectively. In this case, the skilledunskilled wage gap improves (worsens) in absolute 
terms if the gap between SW  and AW   falls (rises). On the other hand, the wage inequality 
improves (deteriorates) both in absolute and relative terms if  .0)()ˆˆ(  AS WW  
 
Here a liberalised economic policy implies any subset of the following: (i) an increase in 
the relative price of the high-skill manufacturing product, 2P ; (ii) a reduction in the ad-
valorem rate of tariff on the import of the low-skill manufacturing product, t  (i.e. a 
reduction in *3P ); (iii) an inflow of foreign capital; and, (iv) a decline of the trade union 
strength of the unskilled workers implying a reduction in the contractual wage rate, *W . 
Although trade and investment liberalisation actually implies a subset of the above policy 
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measures, to establish ideas we consider the effects of each of these changes one at a 
time.  
 
Totally differentiating equations (7.12) – (7.14), (7.19) and (7.20) and using envelope 
conditions we get the following expressions in the matrix form116  
1 1
22 2
**
3 3 3
ˆ 00 0 0
ˆˆ0 0 0
ˆˆ0 0 0
ˆ0 1 0 0 ˆ
ˆ ˆ
L N
S K S
L K
W U
W
PW
PW
E r E U
A B C D E R FK
 
 
 
                                          
             (7.22) 
                                                                             
where:  
0)( 111  NLLLL SSA  , 
0))(/( 22332  SSKSKLK SSB  , 
0)( 333  KLLLL SSC  , 
0)})(/(){( 2232
33
3  SKKKKKKKLKL SSSSD  , 
0)( 111  NNLNL SSE  , 
0)/( 33  KLF  , 
     
On the other hand, totally differentiating (7.21), we find that117  
1 1 * 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( )} (1 ) ( )A LL NL LN NNW S S W W S S R          ,    (7.23) 
where ;0)/( 1  AL WW  and, * 1(( ) / ) 0L AW W W    (as *)W W . 
 
                                                      
116 See Appendix 7.4 for detailed derivations.  
 
117 See Appendix 7.5. 
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Now, let us investigate the effect of the change in the skilled-intensive manufacturing 
product on the wage inequality. First, we can solve (7.22) for *ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,SW W W  and Rˆ  with 
respect to 2ˆP  by using the Cramer’ rule as: 
 
0/ˆ/ˆ 312  BPW KN  ,        (7.24) 
0/)(ˆ/ˆ 3312  DCEPW LKWNS  ,      (7.25) 
*
2 1 3
ˆ ˆ/ / 0N K WW P E B     , (7.26)  
0/)(ˆ/ˆ 2312  EBPR SKL  ,       (7.27) 
 
where   is the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the derived equation system 
(7.22), and it is expressed as 
0)()( 32323211132  DCBEEA LSKSLKWNLNKS  .              (7.28) 
 
Subtracting (7.23) from (7.25) we obtain  
1 1 * 1 1
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) / [ { ( )} (1 ) ( ) ] /S A S LL NL LN NNW W P W S S W W S S R P                 (7.29) 
                         
It can be seen that 0ˆ/)ˆˆ( 2  PWW AS since 0ˆ/ˆ 2 PWS , 0ˆ/ˆ 2 PW , 
*
2
ˆ ˆ/ 0W P  , 0ˆ/ˆ 2 PR , 
0 , 0kjjS , and  0
k
jiS  ( ji  ). Therefore, (7.29) implies that if 02ˆ P , then 
0)ˆˆ(  AS WW . 
 
Similarly we can examine the effect of the change in the price of the low-skill 
manufacturing product on the wage inequality. We obtain the result that if *3ˆ 0P  , then 
0)ˆˆ(  AS WW . 
 
Now let us investigate the effect of the change in capital endowment due to, for example, 
an inflow of foreign capital on the wage inequality. We can solve (7.22) for *ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,SW W W  
and Rˆ  with respect to Kˆ  by using the Cramer’ rule as: 
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0/ˆ/ˆ 321  FKW KSN  ,        (7.30) 
0/ˆ/ˆ 321  FEKW WLKNS  ,       (7.31) 
*
1 2 3
ˆ ˆ/ / 0N S K WW K E F      ,       (7.32) 
0/ˆ/ˆ 321  FEKR WLSN               (7.33) 
 
Using (7.23) and (7.30) – (7.33) and simplifying we obtain 
 


/])()}({
})1([{ˆ/)ˆˆ(
32
11
32
11
32321
LSNNLNKSNLLL
WKSLKNAS
SSSS
EFKWW


    (7.34) 
 
We can show that 0ˆ/)ˆˆ(  KWW AS  if 3232 LKKS    since 
WKSLKWKSKSLK
KSWKSLK
EE
E
)(})1({
})1({
3232323232
323232




   (7.35) 
  
(Note that 1)WE  .       
Thus, we obtain the result that if 0ˆ K , then 0)ˆˆ(  AS WW  under the sufficient 
condition 3232 LKKS   ⁮
118 i.e. 3 2K K  .⁮
119 These results are summarized in the 
form of the following proposition.  
Proposition 7.4: An increase in the relative price of the high-skill manufacturing product 
and/or a reduction of tariff restriction on the import of the low-skill manufacturing 
product unambiguously worsens the skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Besides, the wage 
inequality improves owing to an inflow of foreign capital if 3 2( )K K  .  
 
                                                      
118 While examining the consequence of emigration of skilled and unskilled labour on the wage 
inequality in an otherwise 2×3 specific factor model of Jones (1971), Marjit and Kar (2005) have 
shown that with international factor flows factor shares matter in determining the trend in wage 
distribution.  
 
119 Note that 2 2 2 2( ) 1 ( )S K L K       . 
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These results are more or less consistent with the empirical findings which have been 
mentioned at the very outset of the section. We explain the results presented in 
proposition 7.4 as follows. As the system does not possess the decomposition property 
and the five unknown factor prices are obtained by solving five equations simultaneously, 
any parametric changes in the system can affect all factor prices and output levels.  
 
An improvement in the relative price of the high-skill product leads to an expansion of 
sector 2. This raises the demand for skilled labour (a specific input) and capital. The 
skilled wage rate, SW , and the return to capital, r , both increase as a consequence. 
Capital moves from sector 3 to sector 2 leading to a contraction of the former. This 
releases unskilled labour to the informal sector (sector 1). As the expanding sector 1 has 
now to absorb more unskilled labour than before, the informal unskilled wage rate, W , 
falls. This also lowers the unionized unskilled wage, *W , in sector 3 given the bargaining 
strength of the trade unions, U . Thus we find that both W and *W  fall and the higher 
(lower) wage-paying sector 3 (sector 1) contracts (expands). The average unskilled wage 
rate, AW , falls and the skilled-unskilled wage inequality deteriorates unambiguously.  
 
On the other hand, a reduction of import tariff lowers the relative domestic price of the 
low-skill manufacturing commodity, *3P . This leads to a contraction of sector 3 and 
releases both capital and unskilled labour. The released capital goes to sector 2, which 
lowers the return to capital and leads to an expansion of sector 2. The demand for the 
sector specific input, skilled labour, rises. The skilled wage, SW , rises as a consequence. 
On the other hand, unskilled labour released from sector 3 moves to sector 1. The 
informal unskilled wage rate falls, which also lowers the unionized wage in sector 3. The 
two reasons that the unskilled wage rates have fallen and that the lower wage-paying 
sector has expanded at the cost of the higher wage-paying sector cause the average 
unskilled wage to fall. The skilled-unskilled wage inequality worsens unequivocally.     
 
An inflow of foreign capital, ceteris paribus, leads to a decrease in the return to capital, r . 
Both sectors 2 and 3 expand as they use capital. The demand for skilled labour rises in 
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sector 2 and that of unskilled labour increases in sector 3. Consequently, SW  and W  
increase. A rise in W  implies an increase in the unionized unskilled wage rate, *W . The 
informal sector contracts and releases unskilled labour to the expanding sector 3. The 
proportion of unskilled labour employed in the higher (lower) wage-paying sector 
increases (decreases). Therefore, the average unskilled wage, AW , rises as a consequence. 
What happens to the skilled-unskilled wage inequality crucially depends on the rates of 
increase in SW  and AW . However, if sector 3 is capital-intensive in a sense that 
3 2( )K K  ,
120 the fall in the return to capital is larger than that in sector 2. Thus, this 
implies that the increase in *W  is larger than the increase in SW  from (7.13) and (7.14). 
This improves the wage inequality. 
 
Finally, we want to examine the consequence of labour market reform on both the 
informal wage rate and relative wage inequality. In this model labour market reform 
implies a decline in the bargaining power of the trade unions, denoted by U . We can 
solve (7.22) for *ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,SW W W  and Rˆ  with respect to Uˆ by using the Cramer’ rule as: 
 
,0])[/(ˆ/ˆ 323231  LSKSLNU DCBEUW                                (7.36) 
*
2 3 1 1
ˆ ˆ/ ( / )( ) 0,U S K N LW U E A E                                                            (7.37)   
,0])()[/(ˆ/ˆ 323321  LKLKSUL BDCEUR                                   (7.38) 
 .0))(/(ˆ/ˆ 1132  EAEUW LNULKS                       (7.39) 
 
Now using equations (7.23) and (7.36) – (7.39) it is easy to find that 
 
                                                      
120 Here sectors 2 and 3 use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally 
mobile input which is capital. So, these two industries cannot be classified in terms of factor 
intensities which is usually done in the HOS model. Despite this, a special type of factor intensity 
classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile factor i.e. capital may be 
used for analytical purposes. The industry in which this share is higher re lative to the other may 
be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and Neary (1984) for details.  
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*
1 1 2 3 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [( / )( )( )S A U N L K L S KW W E U A E W             
                                            RSS NNLN ˆ)(
11  ]ˆ)}({ 11 WSS NLLL     (7.40) 
 
From (7.40) it follows that if 0ˆ U , then 0)ˆˆ(  AS WW  under the sufficient condition 
2 3K K  . This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 7.5: A decline in the trade union strength of unskilled labour unambiguously 
raises the competitive unskilled wage and does not necessarily lead to deterioration in 
the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the existing setup. This policy actually improves 
the wage inequality if 2 3( ).K K   
 
Proposition 7.5 can be intuitively explained as follows. A decline of the trade union 
strength of the unskilled workers, U , implies a reduction in the contractual wage rate, 
*W , given the informal wage, W . A reduction in the wage cost in sector 3 leads to an 
expansion of this sector, which in turn implies higher demand for both capital and 
unskilled labour. Capital is drained out of sector 2 to sector 3. The increased demand for 
unskilled labour is met by release of that input by the informal sector. Both sectors 1 and 
2 contract. The demand for skilled labour in sector 2 falls. Both r and W  increase while 
SW  falls. Two opposite forces work on 
*W . While *W  falls directly due to a fall in U , it 
rises with an increase in W . However, the net result would be a fall in *W . Thus, W rises 
but *W  falls. Besides, the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the higher wage-
paying sector 3 (i.e. 3L ) rises. But, what happens to AW  is somewhat uncertain. 
However, the wage inequality improves under the simple sufficient condition 2 3( )K K  . 
 
7.5. Policy Implications of the Results 
 
The model of this section, although stylized, does point to possible channels of influence 
that would explain as to why many of the developing countries have experienced 
deteriorating skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the regime of trade and investment 
liberalisation, belying the expectations of the proponents of these policies. The empirical 
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literature in this area has identified a few factors responsible for the deteriorating wage 
inequality in the liberalised regime. This model has made an attempt to provide a 
theoretical foundation of those empirical findings in terms of a three sector general 
equilibrium model reasonable for at least a few developing economies.  
 
The analysis has found that the wage inequality rises unambiguously due to policies like 
an increase in the relative price of the high-skill commodity and a reduction of import 
tariff from the low-skill manufacturing sector. On the other hand, an increase in capital 
endowment due to, for example, an inflow of foreign capital improves the wage 
inequality if the skill-intensive sector is not more capital-intensive (in a special sense) 
vis-à-vis the low-skill manufacturing sector. Interestingly, contrary to the common 
wisdom a decline in the trade union power of the unskilled labour that results from a 
policy of labour market reform does not necessarily lead to deterioration in the skilled-
unskilled wage inequity. In fact, such a policy may improve the wage inequality under 
reasonable condition. This result is important especially, when many of the developing 
countries are hesitant to undertake labour market reforms seriously in the fear that such a 
move would be vehemently resisted by the political parties and trade unions on the plea 
that it would lead to general wage reductions of the poorer groups of the working 
population engaged in different sectors of the economy and accentuate the wage 
inequality. But, this model has shown that there is very little substance in such a common 
and populist belief. The vast section of the poor working population engaged in the 
different unorganized sectors of the economy will ultimately be benefited from such a 
policy and the wage inequality is also much likely to improve. 
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APPENDIX 7.1: 
 
Totally differentiating equations (7.1) – (7.3), using the envelope conditions and solving 
by Cramer’s rule, the following expressions can be derived easily.  
]ˆˆˆ))[((ˆ *322222331 WtTPW LKKKKN 
                                            (7.A.1)                                   
]ˆˆˆ))[((ˆ *322222331 WtTPR LKKKKL 
                                    (7.A.2)                      
)ˆˆˆ()(ˆ *32232121 WPtTr LLNNL 
                                                      (7.A.3)           
where: 
;0)
1
( 


t
tT and, 
)( 212!3 LNNLK    (7.A.4) 
 
Now differentiating equations (7.4) – (7.6), using (7.A.1) – (7.A.3) and solving the 
following expressions can be obtained. 
tAAAPAAAX NLKNKLNLKNKL ˆ)(ˆ))[(
1(ˆ 81323153127131314312 
                            
]ˆˆ)( 13
*
913331631 KWAAA NLNLKNKL              (7.A.5)                  
                                          
and; 
21217124217213
ˆ))[(1(ˆ PAAAAX KNNLKLNL 
            
                                 tAAAA KNNLKLNL ˆ)( 221812521821    
  ]ˆ)(ˆ)( 1221
*
321912621921 KWAAAA NLNLKNNLKLNL    (7.A.6)  
where: 
 
 Page | 187 
)( 213312321 KNLKNLKNL                                                      (7.A.7) 
2
221212322331 )(())[(
1( LKLLNNL
k
LjLiKK SSA 
 )]33 LKL S ;                                                                                                                  
)])(()[( 33
2
2212122 LKLLKLLNNL
k
LjLiK SSS
TA 

 ; 
)}];(){()[1( 33
3
3
2
232121323 KLLKLLKLLLNNL
k
LjLiLK SSSA 

0)( 1
2
2
2
2
1
1  NLKLLNLLNL
k
LjLi SSSS  ; 
])())[(1( 2221212322334 NKNLNNL
k
NjNiKK SSA 
 ; 
])()[( 22212125 NKNLNNL
k
NjNiK SS
TA 

 ; 
 ])()[( 222121236 NKNLNNL
k
NjNiK
L SSA 

  ;                                          (7.A.8)  
0)( 1
2
2
2
2
1
1  LNKNNLNNLN
k
NjNi SSSS  ; 
])())()[(1( 21212321
2
1
2
22337
k
KjKiLNNLKLKNNKLKK SSSA 
 ;              
])()()[( 2121
2
1
2
1228
k
KjKiLNNLKNLKLNKK SSS
TA 

 ;                                                                                             
])()()[1( 32121
2
1
2
12239 L
k
KjKiLNNLKNLKLNKKL SSSA 
 ;                                                                                                
0])([ 33
22
2  KLKKNKLK
k
KjKi SSSS  ; and, 
0)]()([ 222333
3
33  KNKLKLKLKLKL
k
KjKi SSSS   
 
Differentiating equation (7.7) and using (7.A.5) and (7.A.6) and simplifying we obtain:  
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ˆ
(ˆ 121513122182 NLNLNLNL AAA
tP  

    
               ])()[
ˆ
( 131612219
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NLNLNL AAA
W  

   
                           ))(
ˆ
( 131221 NLNLNL
K  

                              (7.A.9) 
where: ])([ 11411312217 AAA NLNLNLNL                (7.A.10) 
 
Finally, using (7.A.9) and colleting terms equation (7.A.1) can be rewritten as follows.  
])}()()[{
ˆ
(ˆ 22233121513122181 TAAA
tW KKKNLNLNLNLN 


 

                                                                                              
            ])}()()[{
ˆ
( 322233131612219
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LK
KK
NLNLNL
N AAAW 

 

    
                      ))(
ˆ
)()(( 13122122331 NLNLNLKKN
K 

 

            (7.A.11) 
 
 
APPENDIX 7.2: Derivation of stability condition in the market for the non-traded 
input 
 
As commodity 2, produced by sector 2, is internationally non-traded its market must clear 
domestically through adjustments in its price, 2P . The stability condition in the market 
for commodity 2 requires that 
0)/)(( 222  dPXXd
D . This implies around equilibrium, initially, 22 XX
D  . Thus, 
.0))ˆ/ˆ()ˆ/ˆ(( 2222  PXPX
D           (7.A.12) 
 
Now the demand for the non-traded input is given by 
.3232 XaX
D  Differentiating this equation we find 
.ˆˆ 32 XX
D  Using equation (7.A.6) one can find:  
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))(1()ˆ
ˆ
( 121712421721
2
3 AAAA
P
X
KNNLKLNL 
                         (7.A.13) 
On the other hand, from (7.A.5) it follows that:  
))(1()ˆ
ˆ
( 713131431
2
2 AAA
P
X
NLKNKL 
                                            (7.A.14) 
 
Using (7.A.12) – (7.A.14) we find the following stability condition for equilibrium in the 
market for commodity 2. 
0])()[1( 11411312217  AAA NLNLNLNL 
; 
i.e. 
0)( 

                                                                                                         (7.A.15) 
 
APPENDIX 7.3:  Two possible cases 
 
Depending on the nature of the non-traded input produced by sector 2 and the nature of 
capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors the following two cases are 
possible. 
 
Sub-case I: Sector 2 produces an agricultural input for the formal sector and hence uses 
land and does not use capital. These imply that  
,, 22 KKa  ;1;0 32  KK  and, 2KLS , ,2KNS ,2LKS 2 ,NKS 02 KKS .                         (7.A.16)  
As per our assumption that sector 2 is more labour-intensive than sector 1 we have 
.0,   
 
Using (7.A.16), the expressions presented in (7.A.7) and (7.A.8) can be reduced to:  
 
0)( 1221  NLNL  ;                                                                       (7.A.17)  
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1 2 3
1 3 1 2 3 23 1 2 1 2
1( )[ ( ) { ( )K L LN L LN L LK L N N LA S S S        
     
                                                             1 3 3( )}] 0N K L                                                                                                                       
;0])/[( 3332  LKLK STA  ;0)]()/[( 333333  KLLKKL SA   
;0)]()[1( 22
1
134  NLNNLNK SSA 
;065  AA                                    (7.A.18) 
3
7 1 3 23 2 23 3 1 2( )[ ( ) {( / ) ] 0;KL N K K K N L
SA         

      
3
8 3( / ) 0;KL KA TS    .0)])(/[( 33339  LKKKLSA                                                                                               
 
Using (7.A.16) – (7.A.18) and equation (7.10) it is easy to check from (7.A.15) that: 
.0  
 
With the help (7.A.17) and (7.A.18) and simplifying from (7.A.9) one can write:                                       
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ˆ
( 131221 NLNLNL
K  

         (7.A.19) 
                                                 (+)                    () 
 
From (7.A.19) we find that:  
(i) 0ˆ2 P when ;0ˆ t (ii) 0ˆ2 P when 
*ˆ 0;W  and, (iii) 0ˆ2 P when .0ˆ K   
Using (7.A.17) and (7.A.18) the expression (7.A.11) can be rewritten to as follows.  
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The following results are evident from (7.8).  
(i) 0ˆ W  when ;0ˆ t (ii) 0ˆ W  when *ˆ 0;W  and, (iii) 0ˆ W  when .0ˆ K   
A special case:  
 
We consider a special case where sector 2 is land-intensive relative to sector 1 and the 
proportion of the workforce employed in the formal sector is significantly low. These 
imply that:  
;0,  and, .03 L                                                                                    (7.A.20) 
Using these specifications from (7.A.10) one finds that:  
0                                                                                                                (7.A.21) 
 
Now using (7.A.20) and (7.A.21) from equation (7.8) the following results are obtained: 
0ˆ W  when ;0ˆ t (ii) 0ˆ W when *ˆ 0;W   and, (iii) 0ˆ W when 0ˆ K .We should note 
that these results hold under the necessary and sufficient conditions that: ,  
;0;0  and, .03 L     
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Sub-case II: Sector 2 produces a non-traded manufacturing input for the formal sector. 
So it uses capital and not land. All these suggest that  
;1;0,, 1222  NNNNa  and, 2NLS , ,2NNS ,2LNS
2
,NKS 02 KNS   (7.A.22)  
 
Sector 3 is capital-intensive relative to sector 2 in both physical and value terms. This 
implies that: 3 2 2 3( )K L K L    and 3 2 2 3( )K L K L    . 
 
Using (7.A.22) the expressions presented in equations (7.A.4), (7.A.7) and (7.A.8) can be 
reduced to as follows. 
1 2 3 3 2( ) 0;N K L K L                                                                                 (7.A.23)  
1 2 3 2 3( ) 0N K L L K                                                                                 (7.A.24) 
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Using (7.A.23) – (7.A.25), from (7.A.10) one finds that  .0  
 
Using (7.A.23) – (7.A.25) and collecting terms from (7.A.9) one can write  
 Page | 193 
)()()[
ˆ
(ˆ 22
2
21
11
212 KLKLKLNNLLNKL SSSS
tTP 



  
           (+)()                                                   (+)  
                                                             2 32 3 2 3( )( )}]L L K KL K KLS S       
                                                                                    (+) 
*
1 1 2 2
1 3 2 1 3 2 2 2
ˆ
( )[ ( ) ( )L L K LN NL N L L K KL L LK
W S S S S       

   

 
   (+)()                                                (+) 
             3 31 3 3 3 2( )( )]N L L LK K L KLS S         ))(
ˆ
( 32
2
LL
L
K 



         (7.A.26) 
                              (−)           (+)                              (+)  
 
From (7.A.26) it follows that:  
(i) 0ˆ2 P when ;0ˆ t (ii) 0ˆ2 P when 
*ˆ 0;W  and, (iii) 0ˆ2 P when .0ˆ K   
 
Finally, using (7.A.22) – (7.A.25) and simplifying equation (7.A.11) may be rewritten as 
follows. 
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From (7.A.27) the following results trivially follow.  
(i) 0ˆ W  when ;0ˆ t (ii) 0ˆ W  when 0ˆ K . Also, (iii) 0ˆ W  when *ˆ 0W   if  
2 2 3 2 2 3 3( ( ).L L K K L L L         
 
APPENDIX 7.4: Derivation of equation (7.22) 
 
Totally differentiating (7.12), we have 
011  dRadWa NL ,        (7.A.28) 
since 011  NL RdaWda  by the envelope property of the unit cost function. Thus, from 
(7.A.28), we obtain 
0ˆˆ 11  RW NL  .                   (7.A.29) 
Similarly we have following equations corresponding to (7.13) and (7.14), respectively  
222
ˆˆˆ PrW KSS                     (7.A.30) 
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and 
* *
3 3 3
ˆ ˆˆL KW r P   .        (7.A.31) 
 
Now totally differentiating (7.19), we obtain 
*ˆ ˆ ˆ ,W UW E W E U  .        (7.A.32) 
where * *( / )( / )WE W W W W   and
* *( / )( / )UE W U U W   . 
 
Finally, totally differentiating (7.20), we have 
0)/()/(/})/(
/{)/(/
2
332233
2
222
22333
2
11111


KKSKLKSSK
SKLLNNLNL
adaaaKaaadaSa
aSdadKadaXadaNaaNda
.                (7.A.33) 
           
Each coefficient is a function of the factor prices employed in the sector, for example, 
),(11 RWaa LL   Thus, the derivative is expressed as 
dRSdWSda LNLLL
11
1  ,       (7.A.34) 
where )/)(/( 11
1 WaaWS LLLL  and )/)(/( 11
1 RaaRS LLLN  . Using the same calculation 
to other coefficients, and arranging terms, we obtain  
*ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆSAW BW CW Dr ER FK      ,           (7.A.35) 
where A to F are defined in the main text. Equations (7.A.29) – (7.A.32) and (7.A.35) are 
expressed as (7.22) in the matrix form. 
 
 
APPENDIX 7.5:  Derivation of equation (7.23) 
 
Equation (7.21) can be rewritten as 
* *
1 3 1 1(1 )A L L L LW W W W W        ,     (7.A.36) 
since 131  LL   by definition. Totally differentiating (7.A.36), we have  
* *
1 3 1 1A L L L LdW dW dW Wd W d       .     (7.A.37) 
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Since LXaLL /111  , we obtain using (7.A.34) 
1
11
1
ˆˆˆˆ XRSWS LNLLL  ,       (7.A.38) 
On the other hand, from (7.15), we have  
)ˆˆ(ˆˆ 1111 RSWSaX NNNLN  .      (7.A.39) 
 
Thus, substituting (7.A.38) and (7.A.39) into (7.A.37), we obtain  
1 1 * 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( )} (1 ) ( )A LL NL LN NNW S S W W S S R          , 
where  AL WW /1   and *( ) / 0AW W W    as *.W W   
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Chapter 8 
 
Incidence of Child Labour, Informal Sector and Economic 
Liberalisation 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Child labour is presently a phenomenon pervasive mostly in the transitional societies of 
the developing economies where multi-class social structures exist and a complex of 
traditional and pre-capitalist production relations are operative in an articulated capitalist 
mode of production and exploitation. In particular, child labour is predominant in the 
informal segment of the labour markets in developing countries, which are generally 
outside the purview of governmental regulation. It is mainly the poor working families 
employed in the informal sector who are the largest potential suppliers of child labour. 
Economic liberalisation has led to a contraction of the formal segment of the labour 
market and a significant expansion of the informal sector. The consequences of 
liberalised policies on the incidence of child labour depend on how the poor working 
families get affected by these policies.  
 
According to ILO (2002b) one in every six children aged between 5 and 17 - or 246 
million children are involved in child labour in the developing countries.121 India is one 
among these countries where the concentration of child labour is the highest in the world. 
Out of 246 million about 170 million child workers were found in different hazardous 
works. Some 8.4 million children were caught in the worst forms of child labour 
including slavery, trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced 
recruitment for armed conflict, prostitution, pornography and other illicit activities.  
 
                                                      
121 If the “invisible” workers who perform unpaid and household jobs are included, it is likely that 
the estimate would shoot up significantly further. 
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In the recent literature, the supply of child labour has been attributed to factors such as 
poverty122, lack of educational facilities and poor quality of schooling, capital market 
imperfection, parental attitudes123 and their objectives to maximize present income, and a 
dualistic economy characteristic of developing countries with the co-existence of formal 
and informal sectors. However, it is generally contemplated that the root cause is abject 
poverty, which induces people to have large families and children to go out in the job 
market and supplement their low family income. 
 
However, policy prescriptions directed towards poverty alleviation are difficult to be 
implemented properly due to various bottlenecks and vicious circles typical of 
developing economies; even if implemented, they take a long time to mitigate the 
problem, so that legal restrictions can be more instrumental to deal with child labour. 
Legislative fiats to combat child labour range from an outright ban on child labour to 
social labeling of products. A total ban, again, would be counterproductive in the sense 
that it may adversely affect the welfare of the poor households and force the children to 
take resort to more hazardous and illegal activities. Moreover, most of the children work 
in domestic service or informal sector, where labour law enforcement is virtually absent. 
Social labeling can be applied only to a few products (mostly exported ones), so that the 
potential effect is limited; it is also difficult to monitor the labeling operations and may 
have disastrous consequences on the developing economies as the Bangladeshi 
experience124 has shown. It is largely believed that the betterment of educational 
                                                      
122 Perceived poverty instead of actual poverty and desire for consumer goods and better living 
standards may sometimes contribute to the incidence of child labour.  
 
123 Parental attitudes, reflecting cultural norms  and social values, nevertheless play a major role 
in sending a child to work or to school. Parents’ expectations that children will provide for them 
in their old age may lead to their having larger numbers of children and, where household 
incomes are limited, there may be a lower level of investment in each child, including in 
education. Parents may genuinely believe that they are doing the best for their children by 
allowing or encouraging them to work, not realizing the hazards that the work might entail (ILO, 
2002b). 
124 Owing to the possibility of introduction of the US Harkins Bill, which calls for complete ban 
on imports of any good that were manufactured wholly or partly by child workers, the employers 
in the booming garments industry in Bangladesh that had employed a large number of child 
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opportunities and a policy of compulsory education designed for human capital formation 
can more effectively remove children from work125.  
 
In the recent theoretical literature on child labour the notable contributors are Eswaran 
(1996), Basu and Van (1998), Ranjan (1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Jafarey 
and Lahiri (2002) and Dessy (2000). Eswaran (1996) has found an explanation in the 
need for old age security of the parents behind the incidence of high fertility rate and 
lower investment on the education of their offspring (and hence the high incidence of 
child labour) in a backward society where the child mortality rate is quite high. Thus he 
has suggested improvement in healthcare services and legislation of compulsory 
education to eradicate child labour from the system. Basu and Van (1998) have shown 
that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes (Substitution Axiom) and if child 
leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury Axiom), unfavourable 
adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving force behind the 
incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom126, there exists a critical level 
of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself 
poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to school. He is forced to send his 
children to the job market to complement low family income out of sheer poverty. What 
follows from the paper by Basu and Van (1998) is that labour market interventions that 
raise adults’ wages are expected to mitigate the problem of child labour. There are some 
papers in the literature focusing on capital market failure. Ranjan (1999), Baland and 
Robinson (2000) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) emphasize the importance of capital-
market imperfection as a contributing factor to child labour. The dynamic implications of 
capital market imperfection have been studied by Ranjan (2001), with similar conclusions 
reached by Basu (1999). On the other hand, Dessy (2000) has advocated in favour of 
imposition of compulsory education as a means to combat the incidence of child labour. 
                                                                                                                                                              
labourers began removing the child workers drastically. The consequence was a chaotic process 
that left many children worse off than they had been before. See UNICEF (1997). 
 
125 To eradicate the incidence of child labour, World Development Report 1995 called for a 
multifaceted approach with programmes that increase income security, reduce education costs, 
and improve the quality of schooling. 
 
126 See footnote 128 for the Substitution Axiom. 
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Dessy (2000) has shown that in an economy where the benefits of having children are 
outweighed by rearing costs, a policy of free education with no compulsory education 
laws, may lead the economy to an underdevelopment trap with high fertility rate and 
higher incidence of child labour. On the contrary, a compulsory education policy is 
expected to eradicate the existence of the evil from the system.  
 
The ongoing process of globalisation was expected to produce considerable downward 
pressure on the problem of child labour in the developing countries by reducing the 
extent of poverty. It was believed that liberalised economic policies would take the 
developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits of which would eventually 
percolate down to the bottom of the society, thereby leading to reduction of poverty and 
poverty-driven child labour incidence. Despite most of the developing economies 
choosing free trade as their development strategies, empirical evidence suggests that in 
many of the transition economies the incidence of child labour has been on the rise. For 
example, a recent study of child labour by Swaminathan (1998) in a city in western India 
concluded, “The prevalence and absolute expansion of child labour in a period and region 
of relatively high growth of aggregate output indicates that the nature of economic 
growth is flawed”. Why liberalised trade policies and free education policy have not so 
far been successful in eradicating the problem is quite puzzling.  
 
Unfortunately, the existing theoretical literature on child does not deal adequately127 with 
issues like the supply of child labour and its linkages with the adult labour markets in a 
multi-sector general equilibrium framework, which is especially crucial when child 
labour and adult labour are substitutes128 in different informal sectors of a developing 
                                                      
127 The Basu and Van (1998) model, of course, can be easily embedded in a general equilibrium 
framework. Besides, Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Gupta (2002) have examined the efficacy of 
imposition of trade sanctions on export items of the developing countries produced by child 
labour as a policy in curbing the incidence of child labour in terms of general equilibrium models. 
128 In the developing economies child workers are mostly found in the production of carpets, 
glass, bangles, leather bags, shoes, garments, matchbox and fireworks and cattle feeding. It is 
sensible to assume that adults can perform all these tasks. First, all these industries exist in 
countries where there is no child labour. Second, not all the firms producing these goods in 
countries where child labour exists actually use child labour after all, this is the justification for 
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economy. One cannot get the overall effect of a policy on the incidence of child labour in 
a partial equilibrium framework. This is because, as the Bangladeshi experience has 
shown, a policy designed to mitigate the problem of child labour in a targeted sector may 
drive the children into other sectors of the economy and undertake illegal and more 
hazardous activities. So, one cannot evaluate the success of a particular policy unless one 
takes into account its effect on the aggregate number of child workers, spread over 
different sectors of a developing economy. Neither do we find any work where the effect 
of an education subsidy policy on the supply of child labour has been studied although 
the traditional wisdom recommends a hike in educational opportunities to eradicate the 
problem. Also, economists have not so far paid adequate attention to analyse the 
implications of the liberalised economic policies on the problem of child labour.129 This 
attempt should have been made earlier, especially when trade liberalisation was expected 
to exert downward pressures on the incidence of poverty-driven child labour.  
 
The present chapter aims at filling up this gap in the existing literature by constructing 
two general equilibrium models with child labour. First, a three-sector full-employment 
model with informal sector and child labour is considered and then a three-sector Harris-
Todaro type general equilibrium model is used for examining the implications of a free 
education policy and liberalised economic policies on the incidence of poverty-induced 
child labour and adult labour market in a developing economy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘social labelling’. The ‘nimble fingers’ argument, which once has been put forward, especially to 
carpet weaving, is an excuse given by employers and fails to convince researchers (see Burra 
(1995) and Weiner (1991)). Even if present technologies required the use of child labour and not 
adult labour in certain production activities, major changes in economic conditions coupled with 
the mobility of capital across sectors, would certainly result in the adoption of different 
technologies allowing the substitution of adult for child labour.  
 
129 Chaudhuri and Gupta (2004) and Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006, 2007) are among the few 
notable exceptions. 
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8.2. Effects of Education Subsidy and Economic Liberalisation on the Incidence of 
Child Labour 
 
We begin our theoretical analysis with a three-sector full-employment model where there 
are two informal sectors and one formal sector. One of the two informal sectors produces 
an agricultural product, X , with the help of labour and capital. The informal 
manufacturing sector uses labour and capital to produce an internationally non-traded 
input, Y  for the formal manufacturing sector. In the two informal sectors both adult 
labour and child labour are used and these are perfectly substitutes to each other. 130  
 
Following Basu and Van (1998), we make the assumption of ‘substitution’ in the 
informal sectors, which suggests that adult labour is a perfect substitute for child labour, 
or more generally, adults can do what children do. It is assumed that an adult worker is 
equivalent to   number of child labourers, where 1  . Thus, adult and child labour are 
perfect substitutes subject to a child-equivalent scale correction of  . So when the adult 
wage rate is W  the child wage rate, CW  must be equal to ( )/ W . Complete mobility of 
both types of labour between these two sectors ensures that the respective wage rates 
must be the same across both the informal sectors.  
 
The formal sector is the tariff protected import-competing sector producing a 
manufacturing good, Z . It uses adult labour, capital and the produced input from the 
informal sector. Owing to effective wage legislation and unionization of labour, the adult 
wage rate in the formal sector, *W , is greater than the competitive informal sector adult 
wage rate, W .131  
                                                      
130 In the second model we will consider the case where child labour may be an essential  input in 
the urban informal sector. 
  
131 In a developing economy the supply of child labour comes largely from the poor working 
families employed in the informal sectors. Their incomes from non-child labour sources are quite 
low and uncertain. In the rural areas, workers get employment in the peak season. But in the lean 
season, employment is not guaranteed, as the demand for labour remains low. However, it has 
been observed that the market for child labour remains relatively stable throughout the year as 
child workers are mainly employed to look after the cattle (see Gupta, 2000). Therefore, the poor 
families often send out their children to work for the purpose of ‘consumption smoothing’. In 
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Production functions in sectors X and Y satisfy constant returns to scale with positive but 
diminishing returns to each factor. But, fixed-coefficient technology is assumed for sector 
Z . Markets except the formal sector labour market are perfectly competitive and all 
inputs are fully employed. Owing to the small open economy assumption, prices of the 
traded goods, X and Z are given internationally. Since Y is non-traded its price is 
endogenously determined by the demand-supply mechanism. We assume that sectors 
Y and Z  as a whole is more capital-intensive132 than sector X . 
 
Derivation of Supply Function of Child Labour 
 
We assume that there are L  numbers of working families in the economy, which are 
classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members. The adult 
workers who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise the richer 
section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the 
informal sectors constitute the poorer section. Following the ‘Luxury Axiom’133 of Basu 
and Van (1998) we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) 
income, W , from non-child labour sources, such that the parents will send their children 
out to work if and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We can 
fairly assume that each worker in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income, 
*W , sufficiently higher than this critical level. So, the workers belonging to this group do 
not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
urban areas also there is very little employment security for the  workers employed in the informal 
sectors. The present analysis, unfortunately, cannot take into consideration the aspect of income 
uncertainty on the part of informal sector workers. However, there is no reason to deny that the 
incidence of child labour is likely to fall significantly if the poor working families are protected 
by employment and social securities.  
 
132 Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) have also made this assumption. However, in 
these papers, the Harris-Todaro framework has been considered. 
 
133 An empirically testable hypothesis of Basu and Van’s model is that child labour arises if adult 
household income falls below some benchmark level. This hypothesis has been tested by different 
economists for different countries. Studies by Ray (1999) for India, Ray (2000) for Pakistan and 
Peru, Addison et al. (1997) for Ghana and Pakistan and Bhalotra (2000) for Pakistan have found 
the ‘Luxury Axiom’ of Basu and Van (1998) more or less to be statistically valid.  
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informal sectors earn W amount of wage income, which is less than W and therefore, 
send many of their children to the job market to supplement low family income.  
 
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the 
utility maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household. We assume that 
each working family consists of one adult member and ‘ n ’ number of children. The 
altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides the number of children to be sent 
to the work place. The rest of the children are sent to schools. We also assume that there 
is only public educational system134, 135 available to the children in the economy and it is 
entirely financed by government subsidy on this account. The richer section of the 
workers does not send their children to the job market. In a society with high fertility rate, 
poor perception of the parents about future benefits of children’s education, low quality 
of schooling and households’ objectives to maximize present income, one of the main 
motives behind the decision of the poorer households in sending some of their offspring 
to public schools is to derive the immediate benefits of free education policy136. In the 
public education system in the developing economies there are provisions for the children 
from the poorer families to get stipend, free educational goods and free mid-day meals137. 
                                                      
133 Governments all over the world devote substantial resources to their education sector. This is 
especially true in developing countries. In 1995, public spending on education accounted for 
15.7% of total government expenditure in developing countries (see Bedi and Garg (2000)).  
Furthermore, the majority of students in developing countries are educated in publicly funded and 
publicly managed educational institutions. According to Jimenez and Lockheed (1995), almost 
90% of all primary and 70% of all secondary enrollments in developing countries are in public 
schools. 
 
135 We here do not deal with an important aspect of child labour its relation to education and 
human capital. However, Basu and Van (1998) also share the same limitation. 
136 In this context, mention should be made of the empirical paper by Ravallion and Wodon 
(1999) who have found that the school enrollment subsidy reduced the incidence of child labour 
in Bangladesh. However, they have admitted that the magnitude of decline in the incidence of 
child labour as a proportion of the total amount of enrollment subsidy is insignificant. This is 
because parents are clearly substituting other uses of their children’s time, so as to secure the 
current income gain from access to the program with modest impact on earnings from their 
children’s work. 
137 The education subsidy policy is undertaken in different countries in a number of ways. Among 
the most popular incentive schemes are school meal programs. In countries like Brazil, Egypt, 
South Africa and India mid-day meals are offered to poor children attending schools.  However, 
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It is sensible to assume that higher the subsidy on education, E , the higher would be the 
free educational facilities and the related benefits, ,B associated with child schooling.  On 
the other hand, the larger the number of children sent to schools the higher would be the 
aggregate benefits accruing to the poor families. We make the simplifying assumption 
that the money value of such benefits is strictly proportional to the number of children 
sent to schools. The utility function of the household is given by 
))(,,( CZX lnCCUU    
 
The household derives utility from the consumption of the final goods, XC  and ZC  and 
from the children’s leisure measured by ( )Cn l where Cl  denotes the supply of child labour 
by each poor working family. However, children’s leisure here does not imply that the 
children who are not sent out to work are kept at home. They are rather sent to schools.138 
The altruistic guardian of the family derives utility from this source because at least some 
of his children have been kept out from the work hazards. Besides, by sending some of 
the children to schools, the family secures current income gain from access to the 
different incentives that the free education scheme provides. For analytical simplicity let 
us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of the utility function.  
 )()()( CZX lnCCAU                                                                                           (8.1) 
with 0A and 0,,1   ; and, 1)(    
It satisfies all the standard properties and is homogeneous of degree 1. The parameter   
denotes the degree of altruism of the guardian towards the well being of his children. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
as noted by Brown, et al. (2001), school-lunch programs themselves do not provide a sufficient 
incentive to draw children out of work and into school. As a result of the low financial value of 
the meal combined with the poor quality of schools, school-lunch programs cannot generally alter 
the poor parents’ calculation of the value of school relative to work. Alternatively, in a few 
countries like Bangladesh and Mexico, governments have instituted cash stipends or in -kind gifts 
for children attending schools. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) have found the Food-for-Education 
(FFE) program quite successful in keeping the children from poor families into schools in rural 
Bangladesh. However, the impact of this program on the incidence on child labour was not 
satisfactory. 
 
138 This is a static model. So the aspects of education and human capital formation and its role on 
the incidence of child labour have not been dealt here.  
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value of   crucially depends on the social values and norms of the society towards child 
labour. In a relatively educationally advanced society the value of    is likely to be 
comparatively high.139 
                       
Ruling out the possibility for any child worker attending school to undertake any part 
time job, the budget constraint of the representative poor household is given by the 
following. 
)()()()1( EBlnWlWCtPCP CCCZZXX                                                         (8.2) 
where, W  is the income of the adult worker, CC lW  measures the income from child 
labour and )()( EBln C  is the money value of the benefits derived by the household 
from sending )( Cln   number of children to schools. Note that (.)B  is positive. Here the 
effective child wage rate is ))(( EBWC  .
140 
 
Maximization of the utility function subject to the above budget constraint gives us the 
following first-order conditions.  
)))()(/()(()))1(/()(())/()(( EBWlnUCtPUCPU CCZZXX                         (8.3) 
From (8.3) we get the following expressions. 
)}/())()(({ XCCX PEBWlnC                                                                               (8.4) 
))}1(/())()(({ tPEBWlnC ZCCZ                                                                       (8.5) 
Substitution of the values of XC and ZC  into the budget constraint and simplification give 
us the following labour supply function. 
Cl ))((
])}(){([
EBW
WEBWn
C
C

                                                                                (8.6) 
This is the supply function of child labour by each poor family. We now analyse its 
properties. First, Cl  varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise in W produces 
                                                      
139 A comparative static result relating to a change in  on the incidence of child labour in the 
economy has been discussed in details in footnote 144. 
 
140 We assume that ( )CW B E . Otherwise, no children are sent to the job market.  
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a positive income effect so that the adult worker sends a larger number of children to 
schools and therefore decides to send a lower number of children to the workplace. An 
increase in CW (or an increase in ))(( EBWC  ), on the other hand, produces a negative 
price effect, which increases the supply of child labour from the family.  
 
As adult labour and child labour are perfect substitutes in this model subject to a child-
equivalent scale correction of  , the child wage rate, CW , must be )/( W when the adult 
wage rate is .W  Substituting )/( W in place of CW  in (8.6) we get 
Cl ))()/((
])}()/)({([
EBW
WEBWn



                                                                    (8.6.1) 
 
Differentiating (8.6.1) with respect to W we get 
.0])
))()/(
1)(1()([)/( 2 


EBW
nEBdWdlC 
  In this case, the negative price effect 
of an increase in the adult wage rate, ,W  taking place through an increase in the effective 
child wage rate, ))()/(( EBW   outweighs the positive income effect so that the net 
effect would be an increase in the supply of child labour. Thus, an increase in the adult 
wage, ,W  leads to an increase in the supply of child labour by each poor working family 
when the two types of labour are perfect substitutes.  
 
There are )( ZaLL LZI   number of adult workers engaged in the two informal sectors 
and each of them sends Cl  number of children to the workplace. Thus, the aggregate 
supply function of child labour in the economy is given by 
)](
))()/((
])}()/)({([[ ZaL
EBW
WEBWnL LZC 


                                                  (8.7) 
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three 
equations.  
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XKXLX PRaWa                                                                                                       (8.8) 
YKYLY PRaWa                                                                                                        (8.9) 
* (1 )LZ YZ Y KZ Za W a P a R P t                                                                                (8.10) 
 
The formal sector faces a unionised labour market. The relationship for the unionized 
wage rate is specified as:141 
* ( , )W f W U                                                                                                             (8.11) 
(.)f satisfies the following properties: 
*W W for *0,U W W  for .0,;0 21  ffU *W W for *0,U W W  for 0U ; 
.0, 21 ff  
 
Using (8.11), equation (8.10) may be rewritten as  
)1(),( tPRaPaUWfa ZKZYYZLZ                                                                   (8.10.1) 
 
Since the intermediate input, Y , is used only in the production of Z , its full-employment 
condition is as follows. 
YZaYZ                                                                                                                   (8.12)  
The capital endowment equation is given by 
KZaYaXa KZKYKX  . Using (8.12), this may be rewritten as follows.  
KZaaaXa KZYZKYKX  )(   .  (8.13) 
                                                                               
 
As in the two informal sectors child labour and adult labour are perfectly substitutes, the 
effective adult labour endowment equation of the economy is given by the following.  
)/( CLZLYLX LLZaYaXa   
Using (8.7) and (8.12) and after simpl ification this may be rewritten as follows. 
                                                      
141 See chapter 3 in this context.  
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                   (8.14) 
 
In this model there are eight endogenous variables *, , , , , ,YW W R P X Y Z and CL  and eight 
independent equations, (8.7), (8.8), (8.9), (8.10.1), (8.11) and (8 .12)  (8.14)). The 
parameters of the system are:  ,,,,,,,,,, UtELKPPx Z  and .n  Equations (8.8), (8.9) 
and (8.10.1) constitute the price system and the rest of the equations form the output 
system. The system possesses the decomposition property since the three unknown input 
prices, RW , and YP , can be determined from the price system alone, independently of the 
output system. Once the factor prices are known the factor coefficients, sa ji , are also 
determined. As W  is already known, *W  is obtained from (8.11). X and Z are 
simultaneously solved from equations (8.13) and (8.14). Given Z  the equilibrium value 
of Y is found from (8.12). Finally, CL  is obtained from equation (8.7).  
 
In this section of the chapter, we examine the effectiveness of an improvement of the 
educational facilities and liberalised trade and investment policies to control the supply of 
child labour. Although, these policies are undertaken simultaneously in a developing 
economy, we consider their effects one by one for better understanding of the ideas . 
 
Totally differentiating equations (8.8), (8.9) and (8.10.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule 
the following expression can be obtained.142 
]ˆ)(ˆ)[/1(ˆ tTPW KXKZYZKYX                                                                        (8.15) 
and 
)](ˆˆ)[/1(ˆ WLZYZLYXLX EPtTR                                                                     (8.16)  
where 0)}()({  WLZYZLYKXKZYZKYLX E as the industrial sector as a 
whole (sectors Y and Z taken together) is more capital-intensive than the agricultural 
                                                      
142, 141 These results have been derived in the Appendices 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. 
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sector (sector X ), * *( /(1 )) 0, (( / )( / )) 0.WT t t E W W W W       WE  is the elasticity 
of the unionized wage rate, *W , with respect to the informal sector wage rate, W . 
So, a policy of trade liberalisation in agriculture or a reduction in import tariff 
unequivocally raises the informal sector wage rate. 
 
Now totally differentiating equations (8.14) and (8.13) one can derive143 the following 
expressions, respectively. 
EAtAPAZlX XCLZLYLX ˆˆˆˆ)}/1({ˆ 321                                                 (8.17) 
where )1(1)()[(/1(1 WLZYKYLYXKXLX EA     
                        *
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
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                       *
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
 
  ˆ)(ˆ ZX KZKYKX   tAPAK X ˆˆˆ 54                                                                 (8.18)                                               
 
where ;0)}]1(1}{(/)[{(4  WLZYLYKYXLXKX EA  and, 
.0]}/)[{(5  TA YLYKYXLXKX     
                                                                                                       
Solving (8.17) and (8.18) by Cramer’s rule we get the following expression.  
]ˆˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)[/1(ˆ 32514 EAtAAPAAKZ KXKXLXXKXLXKX                     (8.19)   
where ))]/1(()([  CLZLYKXKZKYLX l                                          (8.20) 
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So, 0)(  iff )()}()({  LZLYKXKZKYLX  )./(  CLZKX l Alternatively, 
0)(  under the following necessary and sufficient condition:                                                
]
)(
)/()[(]
)(
)([
ZaYa
la
ZaYa
ZaYa
a
a
KZKY
CLZ
KZKY
LZLY
KX
LX



                                                            (8.21)   
 
From equation (8.19) one can now trivially establish the following proposition.  
Proposition 8.1: An inflow of foreign capital or a hike in subsidy on education leads to a 
contraction (an expansion) of the formal sector (sector Z ) both in terms of employment 
and output if and only I f .0)(  On the other hand, sector Z  contracts (expands) 
owing to an increase in the price of agricultural commodity or a reduction in the import 
tariff iff .0)(  
 
We shall now try to interpret the necessary and sufficient condition (given by (8.21)) for 
  to be negative (positive). It should be remembered that each adult worker employed in 
the two informal sectors sends Cl  number of his children to the job market and the rest 
are sent to schools. On the other hand, labourers engaged in the formal sector of the 
economy constitute the richer section of the working class and do not send their children 
to the job market. In the two informal sectors adult labour and child labour are perfect 
substitutes. So, the effective adult labour endowment of the economy including child 
labour is given by *( / )CL L L   . The labour-capital ratio in sector X  is given 
by )/( KXlX aa . Sector Z  uses capital directly as well as indirectly through use of Y as 
production of one unit of Z  requires YZa  units of Y and sector Y also requires capital in 
its production. Thus, )( ZaYa KZKY   gives the direct plus indirect requirement of capital 
in the production of Z . Sector Y  requires labour in its production. So this should be 
included in the calculation of labour requirement for sector Z . The effective labour-
capital ratio for sector Z  is given by )}./(){( ZaYaZaYa KZKYLZLY  The left-hand side 
of (8.21) gives the difference between the actual labour-capital ratio of sector X and the 
effective labour-capital ratio of sector Z . This difference is positive because it is sensible 
to assume that the agricultural sector (sector X ) is more labour-intensive vis-à-vis the 
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aggregate industrial sector (i.e. sectors Z and Y taken together). Now turning back to 
interpreting the right-hand side of (8.21), we note that ZaLZ number of workers who are 
engaged in sector Z do not send their offspring to the job market. However, if they were 
employed in either of the two informal sectors each of them would have sent Cl  number 
of children to work. As these ZaLZ  numbers of workers are used in sector Z , the 
economy is deprived of having CLZ Zla  number of potential child workers, which is 
equivalent to )/( CLZ Zla  units of adult labour. Thus, the right-hand side of (8.21) gives 
the ratio between the forgone labour endowment and aggregate amount of capital used in 
the industrial sectors. Thus,   is negative (positive) under the necessary and sufficient 
condition that the latter ratio must be greater (less) than the difference between the 
labour-capital ratios of the agricultural and the industrial sectors. We should note that the 
jia s depend on the unknown factor prices, which in turn depend on the parameters in the 
price system like, tPP ZX ,, and .U The value of Cl , on the other hand, depends on the 
values of ,,,,  tPP ZX ,, and .U  So, depending on the parameter values   would be 
negative or positive. 
 
Finally, totally differentiating equation (8.7) using (8.15), (8.19) and (8.20) and 
simplifying we can derive the following expression.144 , 145  
                                                      
144 See the Appendix 8.3 for detailed derivations. 
 
145 It may be an interesting idea to carry out a comparative static exercise with respect to   . The 
parameter denoting the degree of altruism on the part of the guardian of a poor working family 
depends crucially on the social values and tradition. Owing to mass literacy and adult education 
programmes and vigorous public campaign against child labour social values and tradition may 
change over time and raise the value of  . From equation (8.6.1) it is easy to check that an 
increase in   lowers the supply of child labour from each poor family, Cl . To find out the effect 
on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy after differentiating equation (8.7) with 
respect to  and using (8.15) and (8.19) we find that 
 
 Page | 213 
CLˆ  KL
Zal
C
KXLZC ˆ)(

  
  
)(
))()(()()[1(ˆ
BW
lnWZaL
L
P CKZYZKYLZ
C
X 

 
 )({ KZKYLX    
       )}({ LZLYKX   )()){1(1( YLYKYXLXKXLXWLZLZC EZal    
       )}]( YKYLYXKXLXKX                                                                                                                                           
)}()(}{
)(
))()(()[{(ˆ LZLYKXKZKYLXCLZKX
C BW
lnZaLW
L
Tt 





     
                          )}]()({ YKYLYXKXLXKXYLYKYXLXKXLXLZC Zal    
     )]1()}()(){][(
)(
)([ˆ CKXLZCLZLYKXKZKYLXC
C
LZ llln
BWL
ZaLEBE 

 

             
                ………………………      (8.22) 
From (8.22) we find that 
(i) 0)(ˆ CL  when 0ˆ K  iff ( )0   ; 
 (ii) 0)(ˆ CL  when 0ˆ E  iff ;0)(  
 
Let us now explain these results intuitively. We note that any policy change affects the 
supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in the size of the informal sector 
                                                                                                                                                              
)}()(][{
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                                                                               )]/11(   KXLZCl                                                  
From this expression it follows that 0)()/( ddLC  if and only if  .0)(  So, the 
incidence of child labour declines iff  .0  This result may be intuitively explained in 
terms of direct effect and labour reallocation effect. 
 
 Page | 214 
labour force, ))(( ZaLL LZI  , as these families are considered to be the suppliers of 
child labour (we call this the labour reallocation effect); and, (ii) through a change in 
Cl (the number of child workers supplied by each poor family), which results either from 
a change in the adult wage rate, W , or from a change in the benefit derived from sending 
children to schools, )(EB (this is called the direct effect).  
 
An inflow of foreign capital cannot alter the factor prices including the informal sector 
adult wage rate, W , as the production system possesses the decomposition property. So 
the supply of child labour from each poor working family,  Cl , does not change. However, 
it produces a Rybczynski effect leading to a contraction (expansion) of sector Z and an 
expansion (contraction) of sector X  if and only if .0)(  As sector Z contracts 
(expands), more (less) adult workers would now be employed in the two informal sectors 
than before. Consequently, the number of poor families, from which the supply of child 
labour comes, increases (decreases). This is the labour reallocation effect. The supply of 
child labour in the economy increases (decreases) following an inflow of foreign capital 
if and only if .0)(  
 
On the other hand, an increase in the subsidy on education affects the incidence of child 
labour in two ways. First, it lowers the effective price of child labour, ))()/(( EBW  . 
This lowers the supply of child labour from each family, Cl . This is the direct effect of 
the policy, which exerts a downward pressure on the incidence of child labour. Second, 
an induced effect is generated as the direct effect lowers the number of available child 
labour and hence the effective adult labour endowment of the economy.146 This causes 
sector Z  to shrink (grow) and the X  sector to expand (contract) owing to Rybczynski 
                                                      
146 As child labour and adult labour are substitutes in X  and Y sectors, the effective labour force 
must include child labour subject to a scale correction of  . Thus, a reduction in the number of 
child labour lowers the effective adult labour endowment of the economy.  
 
 
 Page | 215 
effect if and only if .0)( 147 If the formal sector contracts, the number of child 
labour supplying families employed in the informal sectors increases. This is the labour 
reallocation effect, which tends to push up the number of child labour in the society. The 
incidence of child labour gets a boost when the labour reallocation effect outweighs the 
contractionary direct effect. This happens under the necessary and sufficient condition 
that .0 On the contrary, when ,0 a larger number of working families would 
now be engaged in the formal sector (sector Z ) resulting in a decrease in the number of 
families supplying child labour. Hence, both the direct and induced effects of an 
education subsidy policy work together to lower the incidence of child labour in the 
society when 0  . 
 
So the following proposition can now be established. 
Proposition 8.2: An increase in the subsidy on education and /or an inflow of foreign 
capital will raise (lower) the supply of child labour iff .0)(  
 
We are now interested to study the consequences of the trade liberalisation policies. If 
trade in agriculture is liberalised in the developed nations, the prices of primary 
agricultural exports of the developing countries are expected to rise possibly owing to the 
multilateral tariff reductions by the large trading countries and the consequent increase in 
their import demands. In the context of the present model trade liberalisation in 
agriculture in the developed countries implies an increase in the price of the export 
commodity of the developing country, XP . On the contrary, tariff reform in the case of 
manufacturing product means a reduction in the import tariff, t , on Z . 
From (8.22) it is easy to check that  
(iii) 0)(ˆ CL when 0ˆ t iff ;0)( and, 
 (iv) 0)(ˆ CL when 0ˆ XP  iff .0)(  
 
                                                      
147 The interpretation of this condition has already been provided. 
 
 Page | 216 
If the price of the agricultural commodity, XP , soars or the import tariff on sector Z  
falls, the informal sector adult wage rate, W , rises following a Stolper-Samuelson effect 
as sector X  is more intensive in the use of labour vis-à-vis the industrial sectors as a 
whole. The child wage rate, /W , also rises as a consequence. The supply of child 
labour from each poor family, ,Cl swells (see equation (6.1)). As a consequence, the 
incidence of child labour mounts up. This is the direct effect of the trade liberalisation 
policies, which exerts an upward pressure on the incidence of child labour. However, as 
the direct effect raises the number of available child labour and hence the effective adult 
labour endowment of the economy, sector Z  expands (contracts) if and only if 
.0)(  If the formal sector expands, some workers move out of the informal sectors 
to join the formal sector. Hence, the number of families, supplying child labour, shrinks. 
This is the labour reallocation effect, which produces a favourable effect on the incidence 
of child labour. The net result would be a decrease in the aggregate supply of child labour 
as the labour reallocation effect outweighs the direct effect. On the contrary, when 
0 sector Z  contracts. More adult workers are now employed in the two informal 
sectors, thereby raising the total number of families supplying child labour. Thus, in this 
case both the direct effect and the labour reallocation effect work on the same direction 
and accentuate the incidence of child labour in the society. This leads to the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 8.3: Tariff reform in manufacturing import or a policy of trade liberalisation 
in agriculture lowers (raises) the incidence of child labour in the society if and only if 
.0)(  
 
A close look at Propositions 8.2 and 8.3 reveals that when ,0 an inflow of foreign 
capital or a hike in education subsidy lowers the incidence of child labour while a policy 
of tariff reform and/or trade liberalisation in agriculture accentuates the problem. On the 
contrary, the former policies raise the incidence of child labour while the latter produce 
the opposite effect when .0 In a developing economy, a subsidy policy on education 
and trade and investment liberalisation policies are undertaken concurrently. In the given 
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setup, we find that if these policies are undertaken concurrently, some of these will work 
to reduce the incidence of child labour while the others will accentuate the problem, 
thereby counterbalancing each other’s effects, partially, if not fully. Thus, the net effect 
may be ambiguous irrespective of the sign of .  This establishes the final proposition of 
the model. 
Proposition 8.4: If a subsidy policy on education and different trade and investment 
liberalisation policies are adopted in a developing economy concomitantly, the net effect 
on the incidence of child labour may be uncertain. 
 
Thus our theoretical investigation has shown that if different trade and investment 
liberalisation programs and a free education policy are undertaken simultaneously in a 
transition economy, their overall effect on the supply of child labour may not be quite 
satisfactory as different policies produce mutually opposite effects on the incidence of 
child labour, thereby nullifying each other’s effects, at least partially. For example, when 
,0  an inflow of foreign capital or a hike in education subsidy exerts a downward 
pressure on the incidence of child labour while a policy of tariff reform or trade 
liberalisation in agriculture accentuates the problem. On the contrary, the former two 
policies raise the child labour incidence while the latter policies produce the opposite 
effect when .0  The actual sign of   depends on the parameters of the system. So, 
taking into account all parameter values, the policymakers of the country should decide 
which policies ought to be given priority and carried out in order to mitigate the 
incidence of poverty-induced child labour in the system. 
 
8.3. An Extension: Urban Unemployment of Adult Labour in a Harris-Todaro 
Framework 
 
The analysis of the previous section has used a full-employment structure and hence 
ignored the problem of unemployment which is one of the salient features of the 
developing countries. We are now going to build up a three-sector Harris-Todaro type 
general equilibrium model to analyse the consequences of liberalised economic policies 
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and an education subsidy policy on the child labour problem in the urban sector. We shall 
show that these policies may raise the level of urban unemployment of adult labour even 
when two types of labour are not substitutes to each other.  
 
We consider a small open dual economy, which is broadly divided into an urban sector 
and a rural sector. The urban sector is subdivided into two sub-sectors  the urban 
informal sector and the urban formal sector, so that there are three sectors in the 
economy. The rural sector produces an agricultural product X , with the help of labour, 
both adult and child, and capital. Following Basu (1999), we assume that child labour and 
adult labour are substitutes in the rural sector. The rural sector is concerned mainly with 
activities relating to cultivation. For no such activities children are essential, so that 
adults can always replace them. Thus the substitution axiom is quite relevant in the rural 
sector. It is assumed that a child’s labour is equivalent to   units of an adult’s labour, 
where 0 <  < 1. Thus, adult and child labour are perfect substitutes subject to an adult-
equivalent scale correction of  . The adult labour earns an institutionally given rural 
wage148 of XW , while a child labour earns XW . The rigidity of rural wage can be 
justified149 by the ‘efficiency wage hypothesis’ or the ‘collusive theory of 
unemployment’ (Osmani, 1991). 
                                                      
148 An exogenously given rural wage for adult labour does not give rise to the possibility of rural 
unemployment of adult labour as we have considered a Harris-Todaro type economy. The levels 
of production and employment of labour in the rural sector (in other sectors of the economy as 
well) are determined by factor endowments, technological and other parameters of the system. 
Those adult workers who are unable to find employment in the rural sector migrate to the urban 
sector with their children as both adult and child wage rates in the urban informal sector are 
absolutely flexible. The complete flexibility of informal sector wage rates leads to the equality 
between the expected urban income for a prospective rural migrant family and their actual family 
income in the rural sector (given by equation (8.29)). In a completely different context, Gupta 
(1994) has also made the same assumption and explained the simultaneous existence of informal 
sector and open unemployment in the urban area.  
 
149 According to the ‘wage efficiency hypothesis’ the nutritional efficiencies of the workers are 
positively related to their respective wage incomes (at least for some minimum levels). Thus the 
employers in the rural labour market would prefer to pay efficiency wages to their respective 
workers rather than lower wages even if there is excess supply in the labour market. In this 
situation, competition would fail to lower the wage rates and clear the labour market. For surveys 
of the nutritional evidence from the perspective of economics one can look at Dasgupta and Ray 
(1990) and Osmani (1990). On the other hand, Osmani (1991) has observed that in the casual 
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The informal sector uses adult labour, child labour, and capital to produce an 
internationally non-traded input, Y , for the formal sector. Many of the large industries 
like the carpet weaving industries, the glass manufacturing industries, the bangles 
industries, leather bag and shoe manufacturing industries, garment industries, etc. have 
split up into tiny units and shifted the production process to urban slums, in order to 
utilize the services of children at lower wages. Some among these industries give 
subcontract to enterprises, which produce a component of the formal sector output, on an 
informal basis, hiring child labour. For many of these industries, child labour may be 
essential since their ‘nimble fingers’ are typically suited to perform activities like carpet 
weaving, stitching buttons, etc. Hence, we consider a separate child labour market in this 
sector, with perfectly flexible wage rate, CW . The informal sector adult wage rate is YW  
and quite obviously, YC WW  . 
 
The formal sector is the tariff protected capital-intensive import-competing sector 
producing manufactured good, Z . It uses adult labour, capital and produced input from 
the informal sector. Owing to effective wage legislation and unionization of labour, there 
is rigidity of wages, so that ZW  is given exogenously. Throughout we shall assume that 
the urban sector, as a whole is more capital-intensive than the rural sector.  
 
There is homogeneity of labour so that each adult worker has exactly  number of 
potential child worker at his disposal and without any loss of generality we can 
choose 1  . So, each working family comprises of one adult and one child worker each. 
Production functions are of fixed coefficient type; markets are competitive; capital is 
fully employed and is completely mobile among the three sectors. There is presence of 
Harris-Todaro type of adult unemployment, while child labour is assumed to be fully 
                                                                                                                                                              
labour market in the rural areas, workers generally refuse to undercut other workers, even if they 
are unemployed, for fear that this would lower wages for everybody at present and in the future. 
In other words, they may prefer to remain unemployed in the hope that in the next period they 
would find employment at the prevailing high wage rates. Thus, the wage rates would not fall 
even when there is open unemployment in the labour market.  
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employed150. We assume that a child worker cannot migrate151 to the urban sector unless 
his guardian migrates. In other words, migration of an adult worker is always 
accompanied by migration of the child worker in his family. The rural and urban adult 
and child wage rates are related by the migration equilibrium condition where the wage 
income of a rural working family is equal to the expected urban wage, consisting of 
expected urban adult wage and child labour wage rate. Owing to the small open economy 
assumption, prices of the traded goods, X  and Z  are given internationally. Since Y  is 
non-traded its price is endogenously determined by the demand-supply mechanism the 
supply of Y is constrained by the demand for Y in the formal sector.  
  
In addition to the symbols used so far we will use the following as well.  
CYa : child labour-output ratio Y sector; 
YW : adult wage rate in the informal sector;  
iW : institutionally given wage rates in the i-th sectors, i= X, Z; 
r  : rate of return to capital; 
L : total adult labour endowment; 
UL : level of unemployment of adult labour in the urban sector;  
CL ; supply of child labour in the urban sector.  
 
A general equilibrium of the system is given by the fol lowing set of equations: 
XKXLXX PraaW                                                                                                  (8.23)  
YKYLYYCYC PraaWaW                                                                                    (8.24) 
                                                      
150 Complete flexibility of the wage rate of child labour ensures full-employment of child labour 
in the urban sector. 
 
151 This is not true in general. In some cases the children who especially work in the informal 
service sector of the urban area migrate without the other members of their families. Besides, 
there may be many cases where adult members of rural families come to the urban areas for work 
without their offspring. However, there is some empirical evidence in support of our assumption 
(see Mohsin, 1996). 
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 )t1(PraaWaP ZKZLZZYZY                                                                            (8.25) 

 )1(
Xa LX LLZaYa ULZLY  ,                                                                             (8.26) 
CCY LYa  ,                                                                                                               (8.27)        
KX KY KZa X + a Y+ a Z = K                                                                                          (8.28) 
 
Equations (8.23)  (8.25) are the usual price-unit cost equality conditions in the three 
sectors of the economy. Equations (8.27) and (8.28) are the full employment conditions 
of child labour and capital, respectively. Equation (8.26) is the endowment equation of 
adult labour. In equation (8.26) LX(a X/(1+ ))  is the number of adult workers (or working 
families) employed in the rural sector. This is because one working family, consisting of 
one adult and one child worker each, is equivalent to (1+ )  units of adult labourers. 
 
The Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition is given by 
)1(WW
LZaYa
ZaWYaW
XC
ULZLY
LZZLYY 

 .                                                                  (8.29) 
The right-hand side of (8.29) is the total income of a working family in the rural sector, 
which must be equal to the expected total income of the family in the urban sector (the 
left-hand side) in migration equilibrium152. 
 
The supply of child labour in the urban sector153 is given by 
                                                      
152 The Harris-Todaro (1970) model with urban unemployment fails to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question how the unemployed workers persevere having no income at all. It is 
supposed that they survive as social parasites on the earnings of their employed counterparts. 
Fortunately, the present analysis furnishes a more acceptable answer to the above question. It 
explains that the offspring who find no problem to be absorbed in the urban informal sector take 
up the responsibility to feed their unemployed guardians and this case is common in the 
developing countries. 
 
153 We here assume that no child in the rural sector goes to schools. This is not totally unrealistic 
because in the rural sector of the developing countries the very availability of educational 
opportunities is extremely limited. 
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C LY UL = a Y + L  - f(E)                                                                                               (8.30) 
where ( )f E is the number of school-going children from the poorer section of the urban 
sector, 0f   . This relationship can be explained as follows. Abject poverty and lack of 
educational facilities are claimed to be the two most important factors responsible for the 
persistence of child labour. If one admits the luxury axiom of Basu and Van (1998) there 
is enough justification to assume that a household would not send its children out to work 
if their incomes from non-child labour sources are sufficiently high. In the urban sector of 
the economy in our model, each worker employed in the formal sector earns relatively 
high contractual wage, ZW , while the labourers in the urban informal sector earn low 
wage incomes and the unemployed adult workers have no income at all. So it would be 
justified to assume that the last two categories of workers in the urban sector send their 
children out to work to supplement their low-income levels from non-child labour 
sources. Thus the higher the number of labourers in these two categories, the larger 
would be the potential supply of child labour. In accordance with our assumption that 
each adult worker has exactly one child in his family, the number of potential child 
workers in the urban area will be LY U(a Y + L ) . To get the actual supply of child labour 
one has to deduct the number of school-going children from the potential supply of child 
labour. Now, higher the subsidy on education, E , the higher would be the free 
educational facilities and the related incentives to attract children from the poorer urban 
households and the larger would be the number of school-going children, ( )f E . Thus an 
increase in E  lowers the actual supply of child labour, CL , and vice versa. We also 
assume that the school-going children cannot undertake any part-time job.   
 
The demand-supply equality condition for the intermediate good, Y , is given by 
YZa YZ  .                                                                                                                  (8.31) 
 
There are nine endogenous variables in the system: C Y Y CW , W , r, P , X, Y, Z, L and 
UL which are solved from equations (8.23 – 8.31). This is an indecomposable system. 
Given XW and XP , r  can be determined from equation (8.23). Substituting the value of r  
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in equation (8.25), YP  is determined. YW  and CW  can be obtained by solving equations 
(8.24) and (8.29). Using (8.31), X  can be expressed as a function of Y . Inserting the 
expression for X  into (8.26), one can obtain an equation containing the two variables 
Y and UL . Also, using (8.27) and (8.30), another equation with Y and UL  is found. The 
equilibrium values of Y and UL  are obtained as functions of parameters of the system by 
solving these two equations simultaneously. Once Y is known, Z  is found from equation 
(8.31). From the expression for X , the equilibrium level of X  is obtained. Finally, CL   is 
found (8.27) as Y is known. It is easy to check that the level of urban unemployment for 
adult labour is positive in migration equilibrium under the simple sufficient condition: 
LY CYa a . 
 
A pertinent question at this juncture is why urban unemployment of adult labour may 
exist particularly when the urban informal sector wage rate is flexible. Given the fixed 
coefficient nature of the production technologies in different sectors of the economy, the 
output composition does not depend on factor prices. It entirely depends on the factor 
endowments, technological and other parameters of the system. Sector Y  produces a 
non-traded intermediate input, which is solely used by sector Z . So, the demand for the 
informal sector’s product (and hence its level of production) completely depends on the 
output of sector Z  and the technological parameter, YZa . This together with another 
technological parameter, LYa , ultimately determines the level of employment in the urban 
informal sector. Hence, unemployment154 for adult labour in this model arises due to the 
inadequacy of demand for the intermediate input used in sector Z . The simultaneous 
existence of the informal sector and open unemployment in the urban sector has been 
dealt in chapter 4. 
 
 
                                                      
154 In a very special case, however, full employment of adult labour may occur depending on the 
parameter values of the system.  
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The effects of subsidy on education and foreign capital inflow on the supply of child 
labour in the urban sector 
  
To analyse the impacts of any changes in the amounts of subsidy on education and inflow 
of foreign capital on the child labour market we proceed as follows.  
Using (8.27) and (8.30) we can write  
CY LY Ua Y = a Y + L  - f(E)                                                                                         (8.30.1) 
 
Totally differentiating equations (8.26), (8.30.1), (8.28) and (8.31) and solving by 
Cramer’s rule, the following expressions can be derived.  
LU 1 LY LZ LU KY KZ
ˆ ˆ ˆX = - ( / )[{ + +  - (f(E)/L)}K + ( + )f (.)EE]                   (8.32.1) 
LU 1 LX KX
ˆ ˆ ˆY = ( / )[ K + f(.)EE]              (8.32.2) 
and,  
U LX 1 LY LZ KY KZ LY LZ KX LX LU
ˆ ˆL = ( / )[f (.)E( + ){(( + )/( + )) - ( / )}E + {           
                                                                                     ˆ- (f(E)/L)}K]            (8.32.3) 
where 1 LU LX LY LZ LU KY KZ LY LZ LU = { + +  - (f(E)/L)}[{( + )/( + +  - (f(E)/L))}           
                                                                                                 KX LX - ( / )]   
 
As the urban sector as a whole is more capital-intensive than the rural sector we have 
KY KZ LY LZ LU KX LX[{( + )/( + +  - (f(E)/L))} > ( / )]        which implies that 1> 0 . 
 
Now from (8.32.3) we find that ˆ 0UL  when ˆ 0E   as 
KY KZ LY LZ LU KX LX[{( + )/( + +  )} > ( / )]       if the urban sector as a whole is more 
capital-intensive than the rural sector. Also ˆ 0UL   > 0 when ˆ 0K  > 0 if and only if 
LU  > (f(E)/L) . So the following proposition is imminent. 
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Proposition 8.5: A policy of free education to the children in the urban sector raises the 
level of urban unemployment of adult labour. Inflow of foreign capital also leads to an 
increase in adult unemployment iff LU  > (f(E)/L) . 
 
The urban families whose adult members are either employed in the informal sector or 
remain unemployed are termed as the poor urban families. The number of such families, 
denoted, PL , is given by 
P LY UL  = a Y + L                                                                                                      (8.33) 
 
Totally differentiating (8.33) and using (8.32.2) and (8.32.3), one can easi ly derive155 the 
following expression. 
P P LU LX C 1 LU 1 LY KX
ˆ ˆ ˆ(L /L)L = K( L /L ) + E[(E f (.)/ )[       
                                        (+)                    (+)(+)  
                       LX LY LZ KY KZ LY LZ KX LX+ ( + ){( + )/( + )} - ( / )]           (8.34) 
                                                                                    (+) 
So, from (8.34) it follows that ˆ 0PL   if ˆ ˆK, E > 0 . However, ˆ 0PL  if t falls or XP rises 
as t  and XP are not included in (8.34). This establishes the following corollary.  
 
Corollary 8.1:  An increase in education subsidy or inflow of foreign capital raises the 
number of poor urban families. On the other hand, any reduction in the import tariff or 
an increase in the primary agricultural commodity cannot change it.  
 
The intuition behind corollary 8.1 is fairly straightforward. Inflow of foreign capital 
and/or an increase in the education subsidy leads to an expansion of the urban sector as a 
whole (formal plus informal). The expected urban income for a rural migrant family 
rises, leading to more migration from the rural sector. However, the number of new jobs 
created in the urban formal sector always falls short of the number of newly migrated 
                                                      
155 This has been derived in Appendix 8.4. 
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families to the urban sector. The consequence would be an increase in the number of poor 
families in this sector. 
 
 Now, differentiation of (8.27) yields 
ˆ ˆ
CL Y                                                                                                                    (8.27.1) 
Thus, from (8.32.2) and (8.27.1) it follows that  
C LU 1 LX KX
ˆ ˆ ˆL  = ( / )[ K + f (.)EE]                 (8.27.2) 
So ˆ 0CL   when Eˆ and / or ˆ 0K   (as 1, f (.) > 0 ) 
This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 8.6: A policy of providing free education to children in the urban sector and 
/or inflow of foreign capital unambiguously accentuates the incidence of child labour in 
the urban area. 
 
Propositions 8.5 and 8.6 can be intuitively explained as follows. A policy of providing 
free education to the urban children raises the number of school-going children, which in 
turn temporarily lowers the supply of child labour in the urban sector. As a consequence, 
the urban informal sector that produces an intermediate input for the formal sector 
contracts releasing capital. Now if the urban sector, as a whole is more capital-intensive 
than the rural sector, both of the urban sectors would ultimately expand at the expense of 
the rural sector. But as child labour is an essential input in the urban informal sector its 
expansion implies an ultimate increase in the supply of child labour. This may seem to be 
puzzling when the supply of child labour decreased initially following an increase in the 
number of school-attending children. We should note that as the formal manufacturing 
sector expands, the expected income of a rural migrant family in the urban sector rises 
leading to more migration from the rural sector. This raises the level of adult 
unemployment in the urban sector as new migrants outnumber the new job opportunities. 
Children from these new migrant families add to the size of the child workforce in the 
urban sector, which outweighs the initial drop in their number resulting from an increase 
in the free educational opportunities. So the net effect would be an increase in the number 
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of child workers in the urban sector156. However, this lowers the incidence of child labour 
in the rural sector as more and more adult workers along with their children are drawn 
from the rural sector to the urban sector and as the fa mily size of each working family has 
been assumed to be the same and given exogenously across the families irrespective of 
the employment status of their adult members. On the other hand, inflow of foreign 
capital leads to an expansion of the two urban sectors and a contraction of the rural sector 
due to Rybczynski effect. Expansion of the informal manufacturing sector implies an 
increase in the supply of child labour that comes from the newly migrated working 
families into the urban sector. However, given the fixed-coefficient production 
technologies, as the capital endowment of the economy has risen in this case, the 
employment opportunities of the adult workers would increase relatively more compared 
to the education subsidy case. Thus the effect on the level of urban unemployment of 
adult labour is ambiguous. It increases if and only if  LU  > (f(E)/L) .    
 
 The effects of education subsidy and trade liberalisation on the child wage rate and 
welfare of the poorer section of the urban working families  
 
Now we are interested to study the effects of free education policy and different 
liberalised trade policies on the child wage rate and also on the welfare of the poorer 
section of the working families in the urban sector. The working families, in which the 
adult members are either unemployed or find employment only in the low wage-paying 
informal sector, constitute the poorer section of the urban families. The welfare of each 
family in this category of urban families, for the sake of analytical simplicity, is measured 
simply by the average income of these families although there are actually two sub-
sections within the poorer section of families depending on the status of employment of 
their adult members. 
                                                      
156 See footnote 135 in this context. 
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To analyse the effects of the tariff reform and possible trade liberalisation in agriculture 
in developed nations, after differentiating equations (8.23 – 8.25) and (8.29), using 
(8.26), (8.32.1) and (8.32.2) and solving by Cramer’s rule we get 157 
C 2 Y LY X LY
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆW = (1/ )[W (Tt - HP ) + (AK + BE)]               (8.35) 
                                 (+)  (+)               (+)     (-) 
and,  
Y 2 CY C LX X
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆW = (1/ )[- (AK+ BE) - W (1- )(Tt - HP )]               (8.36) 
                               (+)   (-)                          (+)  (+)    
where, 
2 C LY LZ- (W /L)[a Z + f(E)] < 0   
From (8.35), it is seen that ˆ 0CW   if ˆ 0t  or ˆ 0XP  or ˆ 0E  . On the contrary, ˆ 0CW   if 
ˆ 0K  . This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 8.7: The wage rate of child labour in the urban sector rises if (i) the 
education subsidy increases; or if (ii) import tariff on the final manufacturing product 
falls; and if (iii) the price of the primary export commodity rises owing to worldwide 
liberalised trade policies in agriculture. 
 
The total number of the poor families in the urban sector is LY U(a Y + L ) . Some of the 
adult members of these families find employment in the informal sector at the wage rate, 
YW , while the others remain unemployed and earn nothing. A few of the children from 
these families go to schools and the rest work in the informal sector at the child wage 
rate, CW . So the average income of these working families, G , is given by the following. 
Y LY C C LY U LY Y CY C LY UG = [{W a Y + W L }/{a Y + L }] = [{Y(a W + a W )}/(a Y + L )]       (8.37) 
 
                                                      
157 See Appendix 8.5 for detailed derivations of equations (8.35) and (8.36).  
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We should note that the total income of the urban poor families entirely comes from the 
urban informal sector. In (8.37), LY Y CY C(a W + a W ) , is the share of adult and child labour 
in the value of production of the informal sector per unit.  
 
As the price of the primary commodity, produced by the rural sector, XP  hikes, the rental 
on capital r  also rises as the rural sector wage rate, XW  is given, which in turn lowers the 
price of the product produced by the informal sector, YP , to satisfy the zero profitability 
condition. Again, a reduction of the import tariff, t  on the formal sector’s product lowers 
YP  directly as r  is determined from the price-unit cost equality condition (equation 8.23) 
of the rural sector. In both of these cases, LY Y CY C(a W + a W )  falls (see equation (8.24)). Y  
also does not change (see (8.32.2)). So, the aggregate income of the poor urban families 
falls. However, the number of urban poor families does not change (see corollary 8.1). 
The consequence would be a drop in the average income of the deprived families of the 
urban sector. 
 
On the contrary, an increase in the amount of education subsidy and/or inflow of foreign 
capital leads to an expansion of both of the two urban sub-sectors, as the urban sector as a 
whole is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the rural sector. The share of adult and child 
labour in the value of production of the informal sector per unit, LY Y CY C(a W + a W ) ,  does 
not change. But the aggregate income of the urban sector poor families rises as Y  rises. 
On the other hand, the total number of poor families also rises (see corollary 8.1). The net 
effect on their average income must depend upon the relative increases of the two terms. 
It can be easily shown158 that in the case of foreign capital inflow the proportionate 
increase in their aggregate income would be greater than that of their family number. On 
the contrary, in the case of a hike in education subsidy the opposite will happen. Thus, 
the average income of the poor families in the urban sector rises due to foreign capital 
inflow but it falls owing to an education subsidy policy. So, we can now state the 
following proposition. 
                                                      
158 This has been proved in Appendix 8.6. 
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Proposition 8.8: Trade reforms in the form of tariff reductions and / or increase in the 
price of the export commodity, and increases in subsidy on education lower the welfare 
of the urban poor families. On the contrary, the urban poor people experience an 
increase in their welfare owing to foreign capital inflows.        
 
Thus, our analysis159 has shown that inflow of foreign capital in the economy and / or a 
free education policy may raise the supply of child labour in the urban sector by forcing 
rural workers to migrate to the urban sector with their children and accentuate the 
problem of urban unemployment of adult labour. Besides, trade reforms like tariff 
reductions on the urban final manufacturing product or rise in the price of the export 
commodity resulting from worldwide liberalised trade policies in agriculture and the 
education subsidy policy lowers the welfare of the poor people of the urban sector while 
foreign capital inflow unambiguously improves their welfare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
159 There are a large number of assumptions embodied in the model, some of which are 
restrictive. Fixed-coefficient technologies have been assumed in all the three sectors of the 
economy. Otherwise, it becomes very difficult to derive straightforward analytical results. Also, 
the assumption that a child worker cannot migrate to the urban sector unless his/her guardian 
migrates is restrictive. Although, there is some empirical evidence in support of this assumption, 
it may not be the case in general. 
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APPENDIX 8.1: 
 
Totally differentiating equations (8.8), (8.9) and (8.10.1) we get the following 
expressions. 
XKXLX PRW ˆˆˆ                                                                                                   (8.A.1) 
0ˆˆˆ  YKYLY PRW                                                                                              (8.A.2)   
tTPRWE YYZKZWLZ ˆˆˆˆ                                                                                   (8.A.3)   
where 0))1/((  ttT and * *(( / )( / ))WE W W W W   . WE  is the elasticity of the 
unionized wage rate, * ,W with respect to the informal sector wage rate, .W  
 
Solving equations (8.A.1), (8.A.2) and (8.A.3) by Cramer’s rule one gets expressions 
(8.15) and (8.16) presented in the text.  
 
APPENDIX 8.2: 
 
Totally differentiating equation (8.14) one gets the following.  
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)}/1({ˆ RWRWZlX YKYLYXKXLXCLZLYLX    
                                          * 2
( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ[( ){ ( ) }
( )
LZL a Z W B n WW WW n B EE
L W B
    

     

 
                                              )]ˆˆ}()({ EEBWWWBnWn          
where * ( / )CL L L   is the effective adult labour endowment of the economy. Thus, 
*( / )Li Li ia X L  for .,, ZYXi  Note that )ˆˆ(ˆ RWa iKiLi   where i is the elasticity 
of substitution between labour and capital in the i -th sector for YXi , . But 0Z , 
since we have assumed fixed-coefficient technology for sector Z . Simplification gives 
ZlX CLZLYLX ˆ)}/1({ˆ    
                    )ˆˆ)(( RWYKYLYXKXLX    
                         *
( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ { ( ) )} ( )]
( )
LZ
C
L a Z WW n n B EE l WW B EE
L W B
    

       

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Using (8.15) and (8.16) we write  
]ˆˆ)}1(1[{)(ˆ)}/1({ˆ tTPEZlX XWLZYKYLYXKXLXCLZLYLX 
 

  
                        *
( ) ˆ ˆ{ ( ) }[( ) ]
( )
LZ
C KY YZ KZ X KX
L a Z W n l P Tt
L W B
      
 
     

                     
                                               *
(1 )( ) ˆ[ ]
( )
LZB E n L a Z E
L W B


  

 
or, EAtAPAZlX XCLZLYLX ˆˆˆˆ)}/1({ˆ 321                                         (8.A.4) 
where )1(1)()[(/1(1 WLZYKYLYXKXLX EA    
                              *
( ) { ( ) }( )] 0;
( )
LZ
C KY YZ KZ
L a Z W n l
L W B
     

     

 
))[((2 YKYLYXKXLX
TA 

  
                       *
( ) { ( ) )( )] 0;
( )
KX LZ C KY YZ KZL a Z W n l
L W B
      

     

and, 
3 *
(1 )( )[ ] 0.
( )
LZB E n L a ZA
L W B


   

 
 
Similarly totally differentiating (8.13) we obtain 
])}1(1(
ˆˆ){([ˆˆ)(ˆ

 WLZXYLYKYXLXKXKZKYKX
EPtTKZX   
                                           tAPAK X ˆˆˆ 54                                                        (8.A.5) 
where ;0)}]1(1}{(/)[{(4  WLZYLYKYXLXKX EA  and, 
.0]}/)[{(5  TA YLYKYXLXKX   
                                                                                                         
Solving (8.A.4) and (8.A.5) by Cramer’s rule we get the following expression.  
]ˆˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)[/1(ˆ 32514 EAtAAPAAKZ KXKXLXXKXLXKX                  (8.19) 
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APPENDIX 8.3: 
 
Totally differentiating equation (8.7) we write  
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Using (8.15) and (8.19), the above expression can be rewritten as follows.  
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Rearranging terms one finds 
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Now ]
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Inserting the value of   and after simplification the above expression becomes 
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Inserting the value of   and after simplification the above expression becomes   
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We also write 
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Inserting the value of   and after simplification the above expression becomes   
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Using (8.A.7), (8.A.8) and (8.A .9) from (8.A.6) we finally get  
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APPENDIX 8.4: 
 
Totally differentiating equation (8.33) one gets the following expression. 
P LY UdL = a dY+dL  
or, P P LY LU Uˆ ˆ ˆ(L /L)L = Y + L     
 
After inserting the expressions for Yˆ and ULˆ  from (8.32.2) and (8.32.3), it becomes  
P P LY LU 1 LX KX LU LX 1 LY Z KY
ˆ ˆ ˆ(L /L)L = ( / )[ K + f (.)EE ] + ( / )[f (.)E( + ){((L            
                                                          KZ LY LZ+ )/( + ))   KX LX LUˆ ˆ- ( / )}E + {  - (f(E)/L)}K]    
                LU LX 1 LY LU LU 1 LY KXˆ= ( / )[ +  - (f(E)/L)]K +  ( f (.)E/ )[ +          
                                      LX LY LZ KY KZ LY LZ KX LX ˆ( + ){(( + )/( + )) - ( / )}]E          
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With the help of (8.30) it becomes 
P P LU LX C 1 LU 1 LY KX
ˆ ˆ ˆ(L /L)L = K( L /L ) + E[(E f (.)/ )[       
                                        (+)                   (+)(+)  
                       LX LY LZ KY KZ LY LZ KX LX+ ( + ){( + )/( + )} - ( / )]           (8.34)      
                                                                                     (+) 
 
APPENDIX 8.5: 
 
Total differentiation of equations (8.23 - 8.25) yields 
XKX Pˆrˆ  ,                                                                                                            (8.A.10.1) 
YKYYLYCCY PˆrˆWˆWˆ                                                                                (8.A.10.2)              
)t1/t(tˆrˆPˆ KZYYZ                                                                                        (8.A.10.3)     
 
From equation (8.A.10.1) one can write  
)/1(Pˆrˆ KXX                                                      (8.A.10.4) 
 
Substitution of rˆ  into equation (8.A.10.3) yields                                                                
)}t1(/t{tˆPˆ YZY  )/(Pˆ KXYZKZX                                                                (8.A.10.5)                     
After substituting rˆ and YPˆ  into equation (8.A.10.2), we get  
 )/(PˆWˆWˆ KXKYXYLYCCY )}t1(/t{tˆ YZ  )/(Pˆ KXYZKZX   
or, )}t1(/t{tˆWˆWˆ YZYLYCCY  ]/})/[{(Pˆ KXKYYZKZX    
                               = ˆTt – ˆH XP                                                                               (8.A.11) 
where YZT= t/(1+t) > 0 ; KX KY KZ YZH= (1/ )[ +( / )] > 0    . 
 
Using (8.26), equation (8.29) can be rewritten as  
ZaWYaW LZZLYY  = [{ (1 )X CW W   }{L /(1 )}]LXa X                                  (8.A.12) 
 
Totally differentiating equation (8.A.12) we obtain 
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YLY YdWa dYWa YLY dZaW LZZ { (1 ) }X CW W    { /(1 )}LXa dX  
                                                              { /(1 )}LX CL a X dW    
or, C LX C LY Y Yˆ ˆW {L - (a X/(1+ ))}W +a YW W = LX ˆ{ (1 ) }(a X/(1+  ))X X CW W     
                                                    LY Y Z LZ ˆ- [a YW  +W a Z]Y (since from (8.31.1), Yˆ = Zˆ ) 
                    LX LXˆ ˆ{ (1 ) }[{a X/(1+ )}X+ {L - (a X /(1+ ))}Y]X CW W                                                           
                                                                  (obtained using equations (8.A.12) and (26))  
Dividing both sides by L  we get 
C LX C LY Y Y
ˆ ˆW (1 - )W + W W =  LX LXˆ ˆ{ (1 ) }[ X + (1 - )Y]X CW W      
After inserting the values of Xˆ and Yˆ from (8.32.1) and (8.32.2) the above expression 
becomes 
C LX C LY Y Y
ˆ ˆW (1 - )W + W W =  LU 1 LX LX KXˆ ˆ{ (1 ) }( / )[(1 - ){ K + f EE}X CW W          
                                                       LX LX LX KXˆ ˆ- K {1 - (f(E)/L)} - (1 - )f EE]      
 
After a little manipulation this reduces to 
C LX C LY Y Y
ˆ ˆW (1 - )W + W W =    A. Kˆ   B. Eˆ                                                        (8.A.13)                                 
where, LU 1 LX{ (1 ) }( / ) (f(E)/L)] > 0X CA W W        
                                  (+)            (+)  
and, LU 1 KX LX{ (1 ) }( / )f E( - ) < 0X CB W W        
                              (+)             (+) (+)      () 
 
We should note that 1> 0 and KX LX<   since it is assumed that the urban sector as a 
whole is more capital-intensive than the rural sector, in accordance with the Chandra-
Khan capital-intensity condition with UL > 0  i.e. ( .(1 ) / )KX LXa a   
 LZKYYZKZ aaaa /().{( )}/. LLaa ULYYZ  . 
Solving (8.A.11) and (8.A.13) by Cramer’s rule, we get  
C 2 Y LY X LY
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆW = (1/ )[W (Tt - HP ) + (AK + BE)]              (8.35) 
                                    (+)  (+)                 (+)      ( -) 
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and,  
Y 2 CY C LX X
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆW = (1/ )[- (AK+ BE) - W (1- )(Tt - HP )]             (8.36) 
                              (+)    (-)                         (+)  (+)    
where, 
2 Y LY CY C LX LY= W  - W (1 - )     
     Y C LY Y C LX= (W W a /P L)[L  - L + {(a X)/(1+ )}]  
     C LY LY U LX= (W /L)[a Y + L - f(E) + {a X/(1+ )} - L]    (using (8.30)) 
     C LY LZ= - (W /L)[a Z + f(E)]   (obtained after using (8.26)) 
     0  
 
APPENDIX 8.6: 
 
With the help of (8.24) and (8.27), the expression (8.37) may be rewritten as  
Y KY LY U LYG = [{P  - ra }/{a + (L /Y)}] = {M/(a + N)}         (8.A.14) 
where, Y KYM = {P  - ra } ; and, UN = (L /Y)  
 
Since the jia s are given owing to the assumption of fixed-coefficient technology the 
effects of the policy changes on G must depend upon the consequent changes on Yr, P  
and U(L /Y) . Differentiating M and N and using (A.10.4), (A.10.5), (32.2) and (8.32.3) 
we get the following expressions. 
Y YZ KZ YZ KY Y KX X
ˆ ˆˆMM  = {P t/ (1+t)}t - {( / ) + }(P / )P             (8.A.15) 
and, 1 LX KY KZ KX LY LZ LUˆNN = {f (.)E/ }[ ( + ) - ( + + )]          
                    (+)   (+)                          (+)  
                                                                           LX 1 ˆ- { f(E)/L }K          (8.A.16) 
                                                                                        (+) 
(Note that 1> 0 and LX KY KZ KX LY LZ LU( + ) > ( + + )       as the urban sector as a whole 
is more capital-intensive than the rural sector.). 
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Now if XPˆ > 0 or tˆ < 0  from (8.A.15) it follows that ˆ 0M  . From (8.A.14) it now follows 
that G  falls when XP  rises or t  falls. Again, if ˆ 0K  from (8.A.16) it follows that 
ˆ 0N  . So G  augments as K rises. On the contrary, ˆ 0N  when ˆ 0E  . Thus, G  falls 
if E goes up.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Informal Sector, Pollution and Waste Management 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
The Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century has ushered into a new phase of 
industrialization, propelling the world economy towards growth and prosperity. Improved 
economic performance due to industrial production has been accompanied by the 
inevitable consequence of discharges to the environment in the form of emissions, wastes 
and garbage causing pollution. Commensurate with growing consumption demand and 
population size over time, along with higher standards of living, industrial production has 
been impressively rising, inflicting further detriment to the environment. In the last few 
decades, environmental degradation due to rampant industrialization has assumed such 
alarming proportions that pollution level has exceeded the carrying capacity of the earth, 
seriously jeopardizing the environment and human life.  The pursuit for economic growth 
and development is evidently consonant with environmental pollution and the menace of 
solid waste. Both environmental scientists and economists have been making ardent 
endeavours to identify the sources of this degradation and formulate policies t o arrest it. 
 
9.1.1. Informal sector and Pollution 
 
Most countries have taken significant strides to protect environment, and the developed 
ones have successfully been able to combat pollution to a large extent. But for the 
developing countries, a major problem in regulating environmental standards is the 
persistence of the informal sector. The informal sector plays a pivotal role in the context 
of environment pollution, referring primarily to emissions and discharges of hazardous 
effluents. Empirical evidences suggest that it is a major source of environmental 
pollution. For example, Biller and Quintero (1995) have examined leather tanneries in 
Bogota (Colombia) and also identified the metalworking, electroplating, and textile 
industries, automobile repair shops, and brick manufacturing as typical informal sector 
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activities causing severe contamination. Blackman and Bannister (1996) have presented 
the results of an econometric analysis of the diffusion of propane among informal 
'traditional' brick-makers in Cd. Juárez (Mexico). 
 
In developed countries the major legislative instruments to combat pollution are 
command and control and economic incentives. In case of command and control, the 
regulator specifies the steps to control pollution after collecting the necessary information 
regarding the polluter. Economic incentives can take the form of pollution fees, 
marketable permits and liability160. However, these measures for environmental 
regulation become largely ineffective in developing countries due to the predominance of 
unregistered informal manufacturing units. They continue to operate with the help of 
indigenous, backward and obsolete technology, which are in most cases, highly polluting. 
Yet they can neither be induced nor compelled to internalize the environmental costs 
inflicted on the society by their activities mainly due to two reasons. First, these units are 
unregistered, geographically dispersed and it is quite difficult to identify them. Hence 
they can hardly be brought under the surveillance of the regulating authority. Secondly, 
the informal sector units with a nominal capital base cannot afford to pay pollution fees 
or install pollution abating equipments. 
 
However, pollution control efforts have traditionally focused on large industrial sources, 
giving minimal cognizance whatsoever, to the fact that a considerable magnitude of 
pollution emanates from the informal sector and its polluting effects may, in fact, have 
unfavourable impact on the efficacy of different pollution regulating policies. It becomes 
imperative to explore and devise methods for bringing the informal sector into 
consideration while formulating environmental policies.  
 
9.1.2. Informal Sector and Solid Waste Management  
 
Along with pollution, solid waste constitutes a major problem in developing countries. 
Solid waste is defined to include refuse from households, non-hazardous solid (not sludge 
                                                      
160  See Kolstad (2000) for more details. 
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or semisolid) wastes from industrial and commercial establishments, refuse from 
institutions (including non-pathogenic waste from hospitals), market waste, yard waste, 
and street sweepings (Cointreau-Levine, 1994). Solid waste is associated with both 
higher production and consumption. While in developed countries solid waste 
management is executed mainly by the formal sector with the involvement of the 
government, in developing countries, the formal or the municipal waste management 
network is crunched by budget crisis so that their contribution in collection and recycling 
of wastes is inadequate to tackle the huge magnitude of solid wastes161. The insufficient 
collection and inappropriate disposal of solid wastes represent in turn, a source of water, 
land and air pollution, and pose risks to human health and the environment. The respite to 
this potential formidable situation is provided by the informal sector162 comprising of 
street pickers, landfill scavengers and itinerant buyers that are active in waste recovery or 
collection. They consider urban waste as economic resource and are self-motivated in 
waste management by income earning potentials.  
 
The doctrine of ‘waste management hierarchy’ presents three ways to reduce the flow of 
waste. They are waste minimization, reuse and recycling. Although waste minimization is 
advocated to be the best solution, it hardly seems to be relevant and plausible for 
                                                      
161 In India only about 50 % of the total refuse generated is collected, while the corresponding 
figures are 33 % in Karachi, 40 % in Yangoon, and 50 % in Cairo. Disposal receives even less 
attention: as much as 90 % of the munipal solid waste collected in Asian cities end up in open 
dumps. 
162 For Mexico, waste pickers are estimated to remove 10% of the municipal waste (Bartone et 
al., 1991). In Bangalore (India), the informal sector is claimed to prevent 15% of the municipal 
waste going to the dumpsite (Baud and Schenk, 1994). In Karachi, the informal sector reduces 
municipal waste collection by 10% (Ali et al., 1993). In Metro Manila an estimated number of 
17,000 people make their living as dumpsite scavengers (CAPS, 1992). The number of waste 
pickers in Bangalore is estimated to range from 20,000 to 30,000 (Baud et al., 1994), while over 
20,000 women work as paper pickers in Ahmedabad (Bentley, 1988).  
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developing countries. Massive population growth and urbanization foster increased 
production and consumption, both of which tend to generate large quantum of solid 
wastes. Unnecessary packaging materials and extravagant consumer behaviour is rare to 
be found in developing countries so that possibilities of prevention of consumption waste 
at source are remote. Waste generation is an unavoidable accomplice of development. 
Evidently, efforts to tackle the harmful effects of wastes on environment and human 
health by recycling are likely to be more appropriate. However, in these countries, a large 
quantity of waste is dumped in an uncontrolled manner or burned in open air. These have 
serious environmental and health hazards. The decomposition of organic materials 
produces methane, which can cause fire and explosions, and contributes to global 
warming. The biological and chemical processes that occur in open dumps produce 
strong leachates, which pollute surface and groundwater. It may be contemplated that 
recycling, although not the best may be the only viable solution for managing solid 
wastes in these countries.  
 
Recycling involves collecting end-of-life products, sorting and then transforming the 
scrap through a mechanical recycling process into either new secondary raw materials 
that can be fed back into the manufacturing process or reprocessed into another product. 
In developing countries, it is again the informal sector that plays a crucial role in 
recycling of wastes163. Recovery and pre-treatment of wastes constitutes a crucial stage in 
the recycling process. The collection and transformation are usually carried out in the 
informal sector. The secondary recycling industry using processed waste as raw material 
also largely operates in the informal sector. The comprehensive informal recycling 
network not only improves the environmental standard, but also provides low-cost, 
labour-intensive solutions that reduce unemployment and poverty, particularly among the 
most underprivileged segments of the society.  
 
                                                      
163 In Cairo more than 400 small plastics reprocessing enterprises exist, which recycle 
approximately 70% of the waste plastics generated (EQI, 1991).  
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Evidently, the informal sector has a dual impact on the environment in developing 
countries. On one hand, absence of any governmental environmental regulations in the 
informal manufacturing sector engenders uncontrolled pollution, while on the other, 
informal recycling of wastes produces significant benefits in terms of reduced energy use 
and emissions, avoiding of emissions from landfills and itinerators, conservation of raw 
materials and reduction in hazard due to improper disposal. It is essential to incorporate 
the informal sector in the understanding of environmental damages and formulation of 
policy prescriptions to regulate the environment. 
 
 
9.2. Trade off between pollution and welfare in the presence of an informal sector  
 
In developing countries, the existence of the informal sector is made use of by the formal 
sector to continue with their polluting production activities. Since the informal sector is 
outside the purview of governmental regulation, the formal sector often shifts its 
manufacturing processes to these informal units and manages to evade the abatement 
costs or penalty taxes for excessive pollution. Empirical evidences suggest that the urban 
informal sector units mostly produce intermediate inputs for the formal manufacturing 
sector on a subcontracting basis. Apart from facilitating elusion of environmental 
regulations this is also economically cost-effective for the formal sector since due to the 
absence of labour legislation laws and consequent lower wages in the informal sector, 
labour can be fully exploited. Because of this outsourcing it is the informal units that 
become the major players in environmental pollution. For example, in the city of Kolkata 
in India leather-tanning process is carried on by the informal sector. In the garments 
industry the dyeing of garments are done by the informal sector participants on a 
subcontracting basis. Both tanning and dyeing pollute the environment considerably.  
 
One of the possible solutions to tackle the pollution generated by the informal units may 
be to target the formal sector with the capability of bearing the external costs. If the 
formal sector is made to pay for its use of the output of the polluting informal sector, it 
may be effective as an indirect incentive to reduce informal sector production, generating 
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less pollution. In this section, we develop a three-sector general equilibrium model with 
an informal sector, the output of which is used as an input in the formal sector. We 
assume that environmental pollution is generated through the production of goods in the 
informal sector. The formal sector firms are made to pay a pollution emission tax if the 
actual level of pollution exceeds a certain permissible limit, which is decided by the 
pollution regulatory authority. The tax revenue collected from this source is transferred to 
the workers, since they are victimized by environmental pollution. Labour endowment is 
measured in efficiency units where the efficiency of a representative worker is inversely 
related to the level of pollution. So, any change in the actual level of pollution affects the 
efficiency of the workers and hence affects the effective labour endowment. This again 
causes a change in the inter-sectoral output and the level of pollution. Higher the use of 
informal sector product, higher is the pollution created and higher the discrepancy 
between actual and permissible levels of pollution, so that the emission taxes payable by 
the formal sector is also higher.  
 
In this situation, we examine whether a reduction in the permissible pollution level by the 
regulating authority actually results in the desired outcome of diminishing pollution in the 
economy; the implications on welfare are also studied. Next, we analyse the effects of 
indirect policies like an inflow of foreign capital on the level of pollution and welfare of 
the economy. From the results we try to make a conjecture whether there exists a trade-
off between economic welfare and pollution. This is extremely significant in today’s 
perspective since we have to shift our approach from positive to normative and make a 
rational choice so that development goes hand in hand with environmental sustainability.  
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors operating at close vicinity. Sector 1 
(rural sector) produces an agricultural (export) commodity using capital and labour. 
There are two manufacturing sectors: formal (sector 3) and informal (sector 2). The 
informal manufacturing sector produces a non-traded input for the formal sector using 
capital and labour. The formal sector is the tariff-protected import-competing sector 
producing a manufacturing commodity using capital, labour and the non-traded input 
produced by the informal sector. Capital is mobile among the three sectors. On the other 
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hand, labour is perfectly mobile between the agricultural and informal manufacturing 
sectors. But the formal sector faces an imperfect labour market. It is assumed that labour 
in the formal sector earns a contractual wage, *W  while the wage rate in the informal 
sector W  is market determined and * .W W  Owing to our small open economy 
assumption, we consider that the final commodity prices, 1P and 3P are given 
internationally. The price of the non-traded input, 2P , produced by sector 2 is determined 
endogenously. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale164 with diminishing 
marginal productivity to each factor. The three inputs, capital, labour and the non-traded 
input, are fully employed. The aggregate capital stock of the economy consists of both 
domestic and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes. Income from foreign 
capital is completely repatriated. Finally, commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire. 
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions of the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three equations, 
respectively. 
111  KL raWa                                                                  (9.1)                                 
222 PraWa KL         (9.2)                                                                                                                        
3
2
323233
* ))(()1(
X
ZXZTmPaPraaW KL
           (9.3)                                  
where (.)T , Z , Z and m  denote aggregate pollution emission tax; permissible level of 
pollution; actual level of pollution in the economy; and, ad-valorem rate of tariff on the 
import of commodity 3, respectively.   
                       
The rural sector does not generate any pollution165 and without any loss of generality it is  
                                                      
164 Production in the import-competing sector, apart from capital and labour inputs, requires a 
non-traded input, per-unit requirement of which is assumed to be technologically fixed. However, 
labour and capital are substitutes and the production function displays the property of constant 
returns to scale in these two inputs . 
 
165 This is only a simplifying assumption. A typical rural sector is assumed to produce a primary 
exportable commodity. Production of primary exportable commodities also vitiates the 
environment through use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. However, the amount of pollution 
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assumed that the informal sector is the only polluting sector166 so that pollution level 
(industrial emission), Z , is a positive function of the production level of the informal 
sector, 2X , i.e. 
)( 2XZZ  ; Z  .0                                                                        
For the sake of analytical simplicity, we assume that (.)Z is strictly proportional to 2X . 
So, we write 
0,0;2  ZZXZZ       (9.4)                                                                                                  
In other words, Z  is a constant. 
 
Even though the informal sector is the only polluting sector, it cannot be brought directly 
under government regulation simply because these are unregistered units. Hence it is only 
the formal sector, which can be compelled to maintain the environmental standards by 
making them pay emission tax for the pollution created by them indirectly by the usage 
of the input produced by the polluting informal sector. Z is a policy parameter of the 
government. Greater the discrepancy between the permissible level, Z , and the actual 
level of pollution, Z , more is the deterioration in environmental standards and hence 
higher the aggregate pollution emission tax, T , to borne by the formal sector.  
 
We define the emission tax function as follows. 
 
             0   for 22 XX  ; and,   
T                                                                                                                            (9.5)                               
             0);)(( 2  TZXZT  for 22 XX  .   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
generated by the rural sector is insignificant relative to that produced by the manufacturing 
sectors. 
 
166 Qualitative results of the model remain unchanged even if the formal sector is also assumed to 
produce pollution. As formal manufacturing sector uses an input produced by the informal sector 
at a fixed proportion, an expansion of the formal sector implies an expansion of the informal 
sector. Thus, the qualitative effect of any policy on the informal sector’s output (and hence 
pollution) is equivalent to the case where both the sectors are assumed to generate pollution . 
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We explain this emission tax function as follows. We have already stated that the 
informal sector is the only polluting sector, the level of pollution increases with an 
increase in the level of production of this sector and that there is a permissible level of 
pollution, denoted by Z . Let 2X be the level of production at which .(.) ZZ   So, for 
any 22 XX  , the level of pollution in the economy does not exceed the permissible limit 
and the emission tax borne by the formal sector is zero. But, once 2X surpasses 2X , the 
pollution level goes above the permissible limit and the emission tax on the formal sector 
becomes positive. The amount of tax increases as the difference between 2X and 2X (and 
hence between (.)Z and Z ) increases. As our policy analysis is meaningful only when 
,(.) ZZ  we concentrate solely on the case where .22 XX        
 
The entire emission tax revenue is transferred to the workers in a lump-sum fashion.  The 
right-hand side of equation (9.3) denotes the unit domestic price of 3X  net of emission 
tax where 
3
2 ))((
X
ZXZT   is the effective emission tax per unit of output that the formal 
sector has to bear. 
 
Complete utilization of capital in the economy implies that 
KXaXaXa KKK  332211        (9.6)                                                                                                
 
The output of the informal sector, 2X , is used entirely for producing 3X , so that the 
supply of 2X is circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand – supply 
equality condition is given by 
32322 XaXX
D     (9.7)                                                                                                                                  
Here, 23a  is assumed to be a constant. This means that to produce one unit of the formal 
sector’s product 23a units of the non-traded input is required.
167 
 
                                                      
167 See footnote 64.  
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It is assumed that the efficiency of a representative worker, h , is inversely related to the 
level of pollution, Z , in the economy. Environmental pollution leads to health hazards168, 
thus adversely affecting the worker’s efficiency. Although in this model the informal 
sector only creates pollution, it is assumed that pollution affects the efficiency of the 
entire workforce, not only those who are engaged in the informal sector activities. This is 
because the three sectors operate at close vicinity so that environmental degradation 
affects all the members of the working class equally. Thus,  
h ))(( 2XZh ; h 0 .           (9.8)                                                                                                           
 
After normalizing the labour endowment in physical units to unity, the full-employment 
of labour in efficiency units implies the following:  
))(( 2332211 XZhXaXaXa LLL          (9.9)                                                                                   
where iLi Xa is the employment of labour in the ith
 sector in efficiency units for i = 1, 2 
and 3. As the labour endowment of the economy in physical units has been normalized to 
unity, the labour endowment in efficiency units is ))(( 2XZh . 
 
Throughout the model, we assume that the agricultural sector is more labour-intensive 
than the formal manufacturing sector and that the industrial sector as a whole (formal 
plus informal) is more capital-intensive than the agricultural sector in value terms. The 
latter implies that the industrial sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the agricultural 
sector in physical terms as well. In mathematical terms, we write the capital intensity 
conditions as follows.  
0)( 1331  KLKL  ; 
 
;0)}()({ 2233122331  LLKKKL  and,                    (9.10)                                                      
                                                                                                                                                          
.0)}()({ 2233122331  LLKKKL                                                                          
                                                      
168 Air pollution can lead to irritation, breathing problems and lung diseases; water pollution 
causes contaminated drinking water; improper waste disposal management involves significant 
human pathogens; all these contribute directly to reduce human performance. 
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From (9.10) the following relationships trivially follow. 
 
;0)}({ 212313  LLLK  and, 
                                                                                                                    (9.10.1)                                                       
0)}]((.))}/(.)({[ 3212321  KKLLLK hXZh   
 
However, the informal manufacturing sector can independently be either capital-intensive 
or Labour-intensive relative to the agricultural sector. In this section, we concentrate on 
the case where the agricultural sector is more labour intensive than the informal 
manufacturing sector.169 In terms of algebra, this can be expressed as follows.  
)( 1221 KLKL   i.e. )( 21 LL   ;and, )( 1221 KLKL            (9.11)                                                
 
There are nine endogenous variables in the system: ZhXXXPrW ,,,,,,, 3212 and T . This 
is an indecomposable production system where any changes in factor endowment affect 
factor prices and factor coefficients. By solving equations (9.1) and (9.2) W  and r can be 
obtained in terms of 2P . Substituting the values of W  and r  into (9.3), solving 
simultaneously with (9.6) and (9.9) and using (9.7), the values of 21 , XX  and 2P  can be 
obtained.170 Having obtained 2X , one can find 3X from (9.7). Again, Z  can be obtained 
                                                      
169 The case where the informal manufacturing sector is more labour intensive vis-à-vis the 
agricultural sector has been taken up in Appendix 9.5. In that case, some of the results of the 
model hold under different sufficient conditions. Instead of dealing with both the cases, we 
consider only one case in details, since our main intention is to question the desirability of 
policies rendering a lower permissible level of pollution. If we can show this by considering just 
one case, our purpose is served.  
 
170 We should note that 2X  is nothing but the supply of commodity 2 i.e. SX 2 . Conversely, 
323 Xa  in equation (9.7) gives the demand for the non-traded input i.e. 
DX 2 . Usually, 
DX 2 and
SX 2  would not match if one starts from a random 2P . Therefore, we can define an excess 
demand function for commodity 2 as: ).()()( 22222 PXPXPE
SD  Equation (9.7) is valid if and 
only if 0)( 2 PE say at .22
ePP  For making the entire system consistent, we assume that such 
a 02 
eP exists and it is unique. See, Marjit (2003) in this context.  
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from (9.4) and h  from (9.8) once 2X  is obtained. Having obtained Z , from equation 
(9.5) T can be found. 
 
The measure of welfare in this small open economy is national income at world prices,Y , 
which is expressed as follows171: 
DLLL rKXaWXaXaWY  33
*
2211 )( 332 ))(( XmPZXZT     
Using equation (9.9) the above expression becomes 
Y DL rKXaWWWh  33
* )((.) 332 ))(( XmPZXZT                 (9.12)                                 
 
In equation (9.12), )( 2211 XaXaW LL   is the total wage income of the workers engaged 
in the first two sectors of the economy. 33
* XaW L  is the amount of the wage income of 
the labourers employed in the formal sector. DrK is the rental income from domestic 
capital.172 ))(( 2 ZXZT  is the revenue from the emission tax, which the workers receive 
as transfer payments. Finally, 33 XmP measures the cost of tariff protection of the import-
competing sector. 
 
According to the conventional wisdom, any policy that entails an improvement in 
environmental standards is welfare enhancing. Thus, a lowering of the permissible level 
of pollution by the pollution controlling authority appears to be a highly desirable policy. 
But, in this section, we reanalyse the efficacy of such direct environmental policy in 
lowering pollution level and improving welfare in a developing country in the presence 
of an informal manufacturing sector generating considerable amount of pollution. We 
                                                      
171 One may argue that the national welfare function does not explicitly contain any social cost 
due to pollution. However, the welfare function indirectly takes care of the cost due to pollution. 
This is because it contains the labour endowment in efficiency units, which is negatively related 
to the level of pollution. So as pollution level rises the endowment of labour in efficiency unit 
falls leading to a decrease in aggregate wage income. However, qualitative results of the paper 
hold under different sufficient conditions even if we consider welfare 
as: *Y DL rKXaWWWh  33
* )((.) ))(( 2 ZXZT   )( 2XZ , where   is the 
marginal social cost due to pollution. 
 
172 Income from foreign capital is fully repatriated. Hence, it is not included in equation ( 9.12). 
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then examine the effects of an inflow of foreign capital on the level of environmental 
pollution as well as on welfare of the economy in the given setup.  
 
Total differentials of (9.1) and (9.2) and use of envelope cond itions yield: 
0ˆˆ 11  rW KL         (9.13)                                                                                                                            
222
ˆˆˆ PrW KL         (9.14)                                                                                                                          
  
Solving (9.13) and (9.14) by Cramer’s rule, one gets the following expressions:  
 /)ˆ(ˆ 21PW K      (9.15)                                                                                                                            
 /ˆˆ 21Pr L ;and,     (9.16)                                                                                                                             
)/ˆ()ˆˆ( 2 PrW          (9.17)                                                                                                                     
where, 
2121 LKKL   = 21 LL   .   
 
Now, differentiation of (9.7), gives  
23
ˆˆ XX           (9.18)                                                                                                                                         
Total differentiation of equations (9.3), (9.9) and (9.6) and use of (9.15) – (9.17) and 
(9.18) yield173 the following expressions, respectively. 
2222232123132
ˆ(.)}(.)){/()]()[/ˆ( XTXZTXPP LLLK        
                                                                  )ˆ(.))(/( 2223 ZZTXP    (9.19)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
))]1/(()[/ˆ( 2331332221112   LKLKLKLP  
                                                       112232 ˆˆ(.))}/(.)({ XXhXZh LLL    0    (9.20)           
and, 
))]1/(()[/ˆ( 2331332221112   LLKLKLKP    
                                                                           11232 ˆˆ)( XX KKK   Kˆ           (9.21)                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                      
173 See Appendix 9.1 for detailed derivation. 
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Solving equations (9.19) − (9.21) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions can be 
obtained. 
 
KX LLLLK ˆ)]()[/1(ˆ 12123132    
                                                   (+) 
             )()}[/()(.){(ˆ 22122121112223 LKLKLKLKXPZTZ           
                                                           + )]))(1/(( 3313312331 LKLKLKL       (9.22)                                                             
                                                                                     (+)                 
and, 
)}/()(.)[{(ˆˆ 22232 XPZTZP   )}]((.)))/(.)(({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh    
                                                                                                           () 
                                           )]/((.)}(.)){[(ˆ 222231 XPTXZTK L                (9.23)                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
where, 
)[/1(  { )( 212313 LLLK   } )}]((.))/(.)({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh         
                                              (+)                                                            ()  
                  )]/((.)}(.){[ 22223  XPTXZT  )([ 2212212111 LKLKLKLK    
                                                       )]))(1/(( 3313312331 LKLKLKL     (9.24)        
                                                                                   (+) 
As commodity 2 is a non-traded input, its market must clear domestically and the 
comparative static exercises are meaningful only if the equilibrium in the market for 
commodity 2 is stable. It can be checked that the stability condition in the market for the 
non-traded input is as follows.174 
 
.0)/()/(            (9.25)                                                                                                           
 
 
                                                      
174 This has been derived in Appendix 9.2. 
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where: )( 2121 LKKL   ; 
)([{ 212313 LLLK   } )}]((.))/(.)({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh         
                                     (+)                                                            ()  
             )]/((.)}(.){[ 22223 XPTXZT  )([ 2212212111 LKLKLKLK    
                                                         )]))(1/(( 3313312331 LKLKLKL     (9.26.1)         
                                                                                                    (+) 
(.))}]/(.)({)([ 221211331 hXZhHG LKKLKLKL   ;        (9.26.2)                        
;0)/(.)( 3
*
32  XPXZTG and,                   (9.26.3)                                                                                   
.0)/(.)( 3
*
3  XPTH           (9.26.4)                                                                                                              
 
In the present case where the agricultural sector is more labour-intensive vis-à-vis the 
informal manufacturing sector,175 we have .0 Using (9.26.3) and (9.26.4) from 
(9.26.2) we obtain that .0  Then using (9.10.1), from (9.25) and (9.26.1) we find that 
for the fulfillment of the stability condition in the market for the non-traded input one 
requires 0 and .0 The necessary condition for .0 is: (.)}.(.){ 2 TXZT   This, 
in turn, implies that )/1( ZZET  where (.)}])/))}{((/(.)[{( TZZZZddTET  is 
the elasticity of the emission tax function.  
     
Policy effects on environmental pollution 
 
In the stable equilibrium in the market for the non-traded input we have found that 
.0 From (9.22), it now follows that 2Xˆ 0  when 0
ˆ Z ; and, 2Xˆ   0  when Kˆ 0 . 
Differentiating equation (9.4) one gets 
22
ˆˆ XXZZZ      (9.27)                                                                                                                                     
 
From (9.27) it is easy to derive the following results.   
                                                      
175 See footnote 171 in this context. 
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0ˆ Z when 0ˆ Z and 0ˆ Z when 0ˆ K . This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 9.1: A reduction in the permissible level of pollution in the presence of an 
informal sector leads to an increase in pollution while an inflow of foreign capital lowers 
the level of pollution in the economy. 
 
To explain these results in economic terms, let us first examine the effects of these 
policies on the effective pollution emission tax rate, say, F , where 
F
3
2 ))((
X
ZXZT   
Differentiating F , using (9.22) and simplifying we get176 
 
 3ˆXFF = Kˆ (.)}(.){ 2 TXZT  [ 1)/1( L )}]({ 212313 LLLK    
                                                                                                   (+) 
                 ZTZ (.){ˆ  /( )}[{ )( 212313 LLLK   } )(.)({ 2321 XZhLLK    
                                                                               (+)  
                                                                                           )}]( 321 KKL        (9.28)                    
                                                                                               () 
                                                                         
We have already mentioned that the comparative static exercises are meaningful only if 
equilibrium in the market for the non-traded input is stable. In the present case we have 
found that in the stable equilibrium 0 and (.)}.(.){ 2 TXZT   From (9.28) it then 
follows that Fˆ 0  when Kˆ 0 ; and, Fˆ 0  when Zˆ 0 .  
 
If in an attempt to check further deterioration in environmental quality, the pollution 
control authority fixes the permissible level of pollution at a lower level, Z  takes a lower 
value. From equation (9.28) it follows that the average pollution emission tax that the 
formal sector has to bear decreases. As a consequence, the effective price of the formal 
                                                      
176 For detailed derivation see Appendix 9.3. 
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sector’s product (net of average emission tax) rises leading to an expansion of the formal 
sector. As the formal sector uses the output of the informal sector at a fixed rate, the latter 
sector also expands, thereby raising the pollution level of the society. On the other hand, 
owing to an inflow of foreign capital the aggregate capital stock of the economy swells 
up. It produces a Rybczynski effect leading to an expansion of the formal sector (also 
informal manufacturing sector) and a contraction of the agricultural sector as the 
manufacturing sector as a whole (formal plus informal) is more capital-intensive than the 
agricultural sector. The average pollution emission tax, F , rises and the effective price of 
the formal sector’s product decreases as 0 (see equation (9.28)). This produces a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect and exerts downward pressures on the output levels of the two 
manufacturing sectors. So two opposite effects on 3X  (and hence on 2X ) are generated. 
Since the negative effect of an increase in F  outweighs the positive Rybczynski effect, 
3X (and hence 2X ) falls in the new equilibrium.  
 
Policy effects on welfare 
 
To analyse the welfare implications of the two policies, totally differentiating equation 
(9.12) and using (9.15), (9.16), (9.22) and (9.23) the following expression c an be 
derived.177  
 
2322 )}[/()(.).{(
ˆˆ  AXPZTZYY  )}((.))/(.)({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh    
                                                                                                                ()                    
                                                                                                     CB 23 )]( 22 XP                                
                                                                                                                           (+)                                                                     
          (.)}(.)){/)[(/.(ˆ 222231 TXZTXPAK L    
                                                                      )}]({ 212313 LLLKB                 (9.29) 
                                                                                                      (+)                 
 
                                                      
177 See Appendix 9.4 for detailed derivation. 
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where A * 3 3 1 3 23 1 3 1[{( ) (.) / (1 )} (.) (1 ) ],L K L K L D LW W h Wh rK             
*
3 2 3 3[( ) (.) { (.) (.) } ]LB W W h T h W Z X mP X        ; and, 
C 33123312212212111 ))(1/(()([ KLKLLKLKLKLK    
                                                                                                          .0)]331  LKL   
Using the stability condition from (9.29) we find that Yˆ 0 when 0ˆ K and 0ˆ Y when 
0ˆ Z  if (i) 0A ; and, (ii) .0B This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 9.2: A reduction in the permissible level of pollution in the presence of an 
informal sector leads to an improvement in welfare if (i) 0A ; and, (ii) .0B On the 
contrary, an inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of income on foreign capital 
is welfare deteriorating under the same set of sufficient conditions. 
 
Proposition 9.2 can be intuitively explained as follows. With the lowering of the 
permissible pollution level, Z  the discrepancy between the actual and permissible 
pollution level increases. However, from equation (9.28) it follows that the average 
pollution emission tax that the formal sector has to bear decreases. The effective price of 
the formal sector’s product (net of average emission tax) rises leading to an expansion of 
the higher wage-paying formal sector. This we call the labour reallocation effect, which 
works favourably on welfare. The polluting sector (sector 2) also expands as its output is 
solely used in the formal sector in a fixed proportion. The labour endowment in 
efficiency units decreases as the level of pollution rises. Besides, a reduction in 
Z lowers 2P , which in turn raises r  and reduces W  following a Stolper-Samuelson 
effect. Thus, the aggregate wage income is affected due to three different effects: (i) 
direct negative effect on W  following a reduction in Z , (ii) the labour reallocation effect 
as the higher (lower) wage-paying formal (agricultural) sector expands (contracts); and, 
(iii) changes in labour endowment of the economy in efficiency units. The net outcome 
on the aggregate wage income is ambiguous. There are other effects on welfare as well. 
Both the aggregate capital income and transfer payments to the workers (the pollution 
emission tax revenue collected from the formal sector) increase unambiguously. On the 
contrary, the cost of tariff protection rises as the formal sector expands. This lowers 
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welfare. The net impact of all these effects would be an increase in welfare under the 
sufficient conditions: (i) 0A ; and, (ii) .0B  
 
On the other hand, if foreign capital enters into the economy with full repatriation of 
foreign capital income the aggregate capital stock of the economy swells up. We have 
seen (proposition 9.1) that it leads to a contraction of the formal (and informal) sector. As 
the higher (lower) wage-paying formal (agricultural) sector contracts (expands), 
aggregate wage income falls due to the labour reallocation effect. However, there are two 
other effects on the aggregate wage income of the workers. As the polluting (informal 
manufacturing) sector contracts the labour endowment in efficiency units rises. Besides, 
an inflow of foreign capital lowers the price of the informal sector’s price, 2P , which 
lowers W and raises r . There are again three different effects on the aggregate wage 
income. However, the aggregate capital income on domestic capital falls. Also, the 
transfer payments that the workers receive from the government also falls as the level of 
pollution (and hence the emission tax revenue) falls. On the contrary, the cost of tariff 
protection falls as the tariff-protected formal sector contracts, which works favourably on 
welfare. The net effect of all these effects on welfare is negative if: (i) 0A ; and, (ii) 
.0B However, it is easy to check that welfare may fall due to an inflow of foreign 
capital even in the absence of any tariff protection.178 Actually, in the absence of any 
tariff the possibility of welfare deteriorating effect of foreign capital is strengthened.  
 
Thus, we have shown that even if the permissible pollution level is reduced, the polluting 
sector may expand and lead to a deterioration in the environmental standard. Quite 
unexpectedly, this policy may improve welfare of the economy. This has a very 
important policy implication due to the counterintuitive results of direct environmental 
policies. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital may be effective in lowering the 
level of pollution although it may affect welfare of the economy adversely. Therefore, the 
above theoretical analysis finds that there might exist a trade-off between the economy’s 
                                                      
178 This is an interesting result because it is different from the conventional Brecher-Alejandro 
proposition as discussed in chapter 5.  
 
 Page | 260 
objectives of lowering the level of pollution and improving national welfare. These 
results are new in the literature on trade and environment, which would help the policy 
makers in the developing countries in designing appropriate policies because reduction of 
pollution level and improvement of national welfare are both desirable for a developing 
economy. 
 
 
9.3. International Trade in Wastes and Recycling – Role of the Informal Sector179  
 
The informal waste management network usually operates in two stages - waste recovery 
and recycling. Waste recovery involves the services of waste pickers or scavengers who 
sort out recyclable wastes from dumping grounds and sell it to itinerant waste buyers. 
The collected wastes are subsequently sold to waste dealers, wholesalers and finally to 
recycling units. The recycling units transform the recovered wastes either into new 
secondary raw materials for the formal sector manufacturing process or into final goods 
for consumption. The low production costs, and consequently the low prices of the 
secondary intermediate products as well as final products create sufficient demand in the 
low-income countries (Beukering et al., 1997). Some of the most popular recycled items 
are metals, paper, plastics, textiles, glass and tyres.  
 
The growing demands for both primary and secondary manufactured products encourage 
increased recycling activities. Waste recovery is an integral part in the expansion of the 
recycling industry. However, in developing countries, domestic waste recovery is 
inadequate due to budget constraints of the municipal authorities, lack of institutional 
infrastructure and political will, and fragmented divisions of labour and responsibility. 
There exist several bottlenecks of the informal recovery sector as well. As a result, 
recyclers often resort to the international market for waste trade180. The developing 
                                                      
179 This section is based on Mukhopadhyay (2007). 
 
180 For details, please refer Beukering et al., (1997); Beukering and Sharma, (1996) and 
UNCTAD, (1996). 
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countries are primarily the importers of recyclable wastes181. Moreover, the recent sweep 
of liberalization and free trade policies, which emphasize inflow of foreign capital and 
reduction in tariff protection, have been promoting the waste imports.  
 
International trade in wastes is subject to controversies among economists and 
environmentalists. Critics of trade in wastes argue that imports are in reality a disguise 
for waste dumping by the exporting country. Besides, cheap imports of waste tend to 
crowd out the local recovery system adding to domestic waste disposal problem 
(Duraiappah, et al, 1999). A relaxation of restrictions in trade in wastes, arguably, is 
economically and environmentally not desirable since it results in the setback of the 
domestic recovery sector producing employment and disposal problems. However, 
proponents of waste trade are of the view that trade in recyclables offer economic and 
environmental benefits for importing developing countries (Ogilvie, 1996, Grace, 1978). 
They postulate that trade liberalization is generally not the main source of environmental 
problems. It is market failure that causes environmental degradation, rendering policies 
directly addressing the failures to be the most functional. Trade liberalization can affect 
the environment by increasing economic growth, which can, in the presence of 
environmental externalities, increase environmental problems. On the other hand, 
economic growth fosters increased expenses to be incurred on environmental 
upgradation. The net environmental effects of trade liberalization 182, therefore depends on 
the relative strength of the two forces (Wilson, 1994).  
 
                                                      
181 China is the world’s largest importer of waste plastics (Beukering et al., 1997). Imports of 
waste paper currently constitute 60 % of India's imports of pulp and waste paper (Beukering and 
Sharma, 1996). In 1992, the developing countries imported only 36% of globally traded primary 
plastics, while they accounted for 69% of the wa ste plastic trade (UNCTAD, 1996). 
  
182 In view of the fact that some western countries dumped refuse in China in the name of 
exporting recyclable materials, the Chinese government introduced a ban on imports of waste 
plastics. This policy received strong reactions because of its positive and negative effects. On the 
positive side, the policy aimed to protect the environment and safeguard national interests. On the 
negative side, many factories especially those engaged in plastic recycling with waste plastics  as 
raw materials risked being forced out of the business.  
 
 Page | 262 
It is relevant to note that the desirability of waste trade depends on its hazardous and non-
hazardous nature183. Hazardous wastes, being environmentally perilous, are restricted for 
trans-boundary movements by international agreements like the Basel Convention on 
Trade in Hazardous Waste (1991), but there exists no explicit policy for trade in non-
hazardous recyclable wastes. However, imports of recyclable wastes like paper, solid 
plastic, metal-bearing wastes, ceramic, etc have been significantly growing in a large 
number of developing countries, especially those in South-East Asia. Thus, a pertinent 
question that arises is whether liberalization in non-hazardous waste trade affects the 
economy and environment positively so that restrictions on waste trade should be 
increasingly relaxed or is it detrimental, requiring stringent regulations prohibiting waste 
trade.  
 
On the other hand, the developing countries often have a fetish to attract foreign direct 
investment to strengthen their capital base, sometimes even by relaxing the 
environmental norms for industries where foreign capital flows in. However, due to 
financial crunch these countries are unable to provide proper disposal facilities for the 
wastes associated with higher industrial production. Therefore, the desirability of 
pursuance for foreign capital from the point of view of environmental issues is highly 
debatable.  
 
In this section we examine the effects of liberalization of waste trade and foreign capital 
inflow on waste management and pollution in a three-sector general equilibrium model. 
A small open economy is considered to consist of a formal manufacturing sector, an 
informal waste recovery sector and an informal waste-recycling sector that uses 
recovered wastes as intermediary good. It is to be noted that the existence of the informal 
sector has a two-fold benefit on environment. First, the recovery and processing sector 
contributes in solid waste management and make the environment cleaner. Moreover, 
secondary production, using wastes as raw materials have obvious advantages in terms of 
savings in energy and resources and the emission level is also lower than that of primary 
                                                      
183 See UNEP/CHW.4/35, 18 March 1998 for classification.  
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production, thus contributing significantly to environmental improvement (Beukering et 
al., 1997). In this situation, we analyse the effects of both reduction in tariff on wastes 
and foreign capital inflow on domestic waste recovery, recycling and pollution due to 
emissions. 
  
The Model  
 
There are three sectors in a small open economy, a formal sector and two informal 
sectors, where all the sectors operate at close vicinity. Sector 1 is the informal waste 
recovery and processing sector producing processed waste 1X , using labour and capital. 
Sector 2 is the informal recycling sector producing a non-traded final manufacturing 
product, 2X , using labour, capital and processed waste, 1X . Sector 3 is the formal sector 
producing a manufacturing product, 3X , by using capital and labour. It is assumed that 
the formal sector is more capital - intensive than the informal sector as a whole. It is also 
assumed that sector 1 is the tariff-protected import-competing sector while sector 3 is the 
export sector. This pattern of trade is particularly relevant to the newly industrializing 
countries that have adopted an export-oriented growth strategy and have emerged to be 
large manufacturing exporters184. Labour in the formal sector earns a contractual wage, 
W while the wage rate in the informal sector, W  is market determined. Due to the 
assumption of small economy, the product prices of sectors 1 and 3 are internationally 
given. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal 
productivity to each factor. Capital and labour are fully employed and are mobile 
between the three sectors. The endowment of labour in physical units is given. The 
efficiency of the representative worker, h is inversely related to the pollution level in the 
economy. All the workers are assumed to possess identical efficiency functions. Pollution 
is positively related to 3X  and inversely to 2X . 
 
 
 
                                                      
184 See Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002). 
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The general equilibrium is represented by the following set of equations:  
1 1 1 (1 )L KWa ra P t    (9.30) 
2 2 1 12 2(1 )L KWa ra P t a P     (9.31) 
3 3 3L KWa ra P   (9.32) 
Equations (9.30), (9.31) and (9.32) are the competitive industry equilibrium conditions in 
the two informal and formal sectors respectively.  
 
12 2 1a X X M   (9.33) 
Equation (9.33) depicts that the total input requirement of wastes in the recycling sector 
is satisfied by domestic recovery, 1X , and import of wastes, M . Both are perfect 
substitutes so that higher the amount of recovered wastes, lower are the imports. Here, 
12a  is assumed to be a constant, to rule out the possibility of substitution between the 
intermediary waste and other factors of production in sector 2.  
 
Now, it is assumed that the efficiency of a representative worker, h , is inversely related 
to the level of pollution, Z , in the economy. Environmental pollution leads to health 
hazards, thus adversely affecting the worker’s efficiency (Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay, 
2006). Since all the three sectors operate at close vicinity it is assumed that pollution 
affects the efficiency of the entire workforce equally. Thus,  
( )h h Z ; ' 0h   (9.34) 
where Z  is a positive function of net manufacturing production.  
Thus, 3 2( )Z Z X X  ;
' 0Z   (9.35) 
 
It is assumed that formal sector production is always accompanied by pollution, 
especially in developing countries with lax in environmental regulations. Even if the 
formal sector firms abide by whatever regulations that do exist and opt for pollution 
abatement, some pollution is necessarily generated by them. On the other hand, methods 
of waste disposal in these countries indirectly affect the environment, through pollution 
of ground and surface water by leachates from disposal sites, generation of greenhouse 
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gas like methane in landfill sites and air pollution caused by open burning at dumps. 
Secondary production or recycling, using wastes as raw materials has obvious advantages 
in terms of savings in energy and resources and the emission level is also lower than that 
of primary production, (Beukering et al., 1997; USEPA, 1998). Thus, higher the formal 
sector production and lesser the recycling activities, higher is the level of pollution. 
 
After normalizing the labour endowment in physical units to unity, the full-employment 
of labour in efficiency units implies the following:  
1 1 2 2 3 3 3 2( ( ))L L La X a X a X h Z X X     (9.36) 
As the labour endowment of the economy in physical units has been normalized to unity, 
the labour endowment in efficiency units is ( )h Z . 
 
Complete utilization of capital in the economy implies that 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K Ka X a X a X K    (9.37) 
 
Since the recycled final product, 2X  is internationally non-traded, it is determined by the 
domestic demand-supply mechanism. The demand for 2X  is represented by 2D , and 
depends on its price, 2P  and national income, Y . Thus, 
2 2( , )D f P Y ; 1 0f   and 2 0f   
  
Equality in demand and supply for 2X  requires  
2X = 2( , )f P Y  (9.38) 
 
National income measured at world prices, Y , is expressed as follows. 
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1( )L L LY W a X a X Wa X rK tP X      (9.39) 
where, 1 1 2 2( )L LW a X a X gives the total wage income in the two informal sectors of the 
economy. W 3 3La X  is the amount of the wage income of the labourers employed in the 
formal sector. rK is the rental income from capital. Finally, 1 1tP X  measures the cost of 
tariff protection of the import-competing sector.  
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There are 10 endogenous variables, 2 1 2 3, , , , , , , ,W r P X X X h Z M and Y which can be 
solved from the above 10 equations. The system possesses the decomposition property. 
So the factor prices are determined independently of the output system. As W is given, 
r is found from equation (9.32). Given r , equation (9.30) can be solved to get W . Once 
W  is known, the equilibrium value of 2P  is determined from equation (9.31). If factor 
prices are known the factor coefficients, jia s, are also known. Solving equations (9.36), 
(9.37) and (9.38) can yield the product-mix and use of (9.33) gives M . The pollution 
level Z  can be obtained from equation (9.35). The efficiency of each worker, h , is found 
from equation (9.34). Finally, the national income Y  can be determined from equation 
(9.39). 
 
The model analyzes the effects of reduction in tariff on import of non-hazardous wastes 
and inflow of foreign capital on pollution and solid waste in the presence of informal 
recovery and recycling sectors, with the latter generating a favorable impact on pollution.  
 
Total differentials of (9.30), (9.31) and (9.32) and use of envelope conditions yield:  
1 1
ˆ ˆˆL KW r Tt    (9.40) 
12 2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ ˆL KTt W r P      (9.41) 
3 3ˆˆK r P   (9.42) 
where, T  ( /(1 ))t t  
 
From (9.40), (9.41) and (9.42) respectively it follows that  
3 3
ˆˆ / Kr P   ; 1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( / )LW W r Tt     and 2 1 12 1 2ˆ ˆ{( / )( )}L L LP Tt       (9.43) 
In this model we do not consider the effects of change in the price of 3X  so that 3ˆ 0P  , 
implying that ˆ 0r  .  
 
Total differentiation of equation (9.34) gives  
'
3 3 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )ZZ Z X X X X   (9.44) 
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Total differentiation of equation (9.33) gives 
1 12 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / )X X M X M   (9.45) 
 
Differentiating (9.39) one gets 
ˆYY = 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( / )L L L L K L K LW tP X X W X W X W Tt             
         1 2 1ˆ( ) ( / )L L LW Tt    1 1ˆtP X t  (9.46) 
 
For simplifying the algebra, the production functions of each sector are assumed to be of 
the Cobb-Douglas type, implying that the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour in each sector is unity.  
 
Total differentiation of equations (9.36), (9.37) and (9.38) and use of (9.43), (9. 44) and 
(9.46) yield respectively, 
' ' ' '
1 1 2 2 1 12 2 3 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( ) ( )L L L LM X M h Z X X h Z X X             
                                                                                1 1 2 2 1ˆ( )( / )L K L K LTt           (9.47) 
                                                                           
1 1 2 1 12 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( ) ( )( / )K K K K K L K L LM X M X X K Tt                 (9.48) 
 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 12 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( / ) {( ) ( ) }Y L Y L Y L Y LW tP X M X M W Y W tP X X W X                
             1 1 2 2 1ˆ( )( / )Y L K L K LW Tt       1 2 1ˆ( ) ( / )Y L L LW Tt     1 1ˆY tP X t  
                                                                           1 2 12 1ˆ( / )( )P L L LY Tt         (9.49) 
where, P  and Y  are the elasticities of demand for 2X  with respect to its price 2P  and 
national income, Y  respectively. 2 2 2 2( / )( / ) 0P X P P X      and 
2 2( / )( / )Y X Y Y X    0 . 
 
Solving (9.47), (9.48) and (9.49) by Cramer’s rule and simplifying yields the following 
expressions. 
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' ' ' '
1 3 2 2 1 12 2 1 12 3 3
ˆ ˆ( / )[ { ( ) ( )( )}L K L L K K LM Tt A h Z X h Z X                
         ' ' ' '1 1 2 2 2 2 1 12 3 3 3( ){( ) ( ) }K L K L L L Y L Lh Z X W h Z X B                
          + 1 1 2 2 2 1 12 3 3( ){( ) }]L K L K K K Y L KW B            +
' '
3 3
ˆ( / )[( )LK h Z X B   
          ' '2 2 1 12 3( ) ]L L Y Lh Z X W          (9.50) 
 
2Xˆ  ' '1 1 1 3 1 3 3ˆ( / )( / )[ { ( )}L L K K LTt M X A h Z X        
         ' '1 1 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1( ){ ( )( )}Y K L K L L L L LW h Z X W tP X              
         1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 1 1( ){ ( )}]Y L K L K K L K LW W tP X              
          + ' '1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3ˆ( / )( / ) [( )( ) ]Y L L L LK M X h Z X W tP X W          (9.51) 
and 
3Xˆ  ' '1 1 1 2 2 1 2ˆ( / )( / )[ { ( ) }L K L L KTt M X A h Z X        
 ' '1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 12 1( ){( ) ( ) }K L K L L Y L L LW tP X h Z X B                
 1 1 2 2 2 1 12 1 1 1 1( ){( ) ( ) }]L K L K K K Y L KW tP X B               
  1ˆ( / )( / )K M X  ' '1 1 1 1 2 2 1 12[ ( ) ( )]L L Y L LB W tP X h Z X          (9.52) 
 
where, A 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 1( ) ( )Y L K L K L P L LW Y              > 0   
            B 2 1 1 1 12( ) ( )Y L Y LW Y W tP X        < 0  
           ' '1 3 1 2 2 1 12 1 2 1 12( / ) { ( ) ( )}Y L K L L L K KM X W h Z X                                
               ' '1 3 1 3 3{ ( )}L K K LB h Z X      1 1 1 2 1 12( ){( )Y L K KW tP X        
               ' '3 3( )L h Z X   ' '3 2 2 1 12( )}]K L Lh Z X      < 0 if 1 1 1LW tP X   
 
It should be noted that it is assumed here that the formal manufacturing sector (sector 3) 
is more capital-intensive than the informal sector (as a whole) implying that 
' '
2 1 12 3 3( )( )K K L h Z X     ' '3 2 2 1 12( )K L Lh Z X      < 0 and the informal recycling 
sector (sector 2) is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal recovery sector (sector 1) 
so that ' '1 2 2 1 12 1 2 1 12( ) ( )K L L L K Kh Z X           < 0, even when the indirect input 
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requirements and effects of pollution on the labour endowment (in efficiency units) are 
taken into account. 
 
Effects of tariff reform on the economy 
 
It is assumed that the capital stock remains unchanged while the tariff rate is reduced. 
This implies that Kˆ  = 0 and tˆ < 0. 
 
From (9.51) it can be concluded that  
2
ˆ 0X   when tˆ < 0 under the following sufficient conditions:  
(i) 1 1 1LW tP X    
(ii) 1 3 3 1 1 1( )K L K LW W tP X       
 
So we can establish the following proposition 
Proposition 9.3: Reduction in tariff rates on import of non-hazardous wastes may lead to 
increase in recycling of wastes. 
 
Now, substitution of (9.50) and (9.51) in (9.45) and simplification we get  
1Xˆ  = ' ' ' '1 1 2 3 3 3 2 2ˆ( / )( / )[ { ( ) ( )}L K L K LTt M X A h Z X h Z X         
      1 1 2 2( )K L K L     ' '3 3 2{( )( )L Y Lh Z X W Y    ' '2 2 3( )L Y Lh Z X W    } 
      1 1 2 2 3 2 2 3( ){ ( ) }]L K L K K Y L Y K LW Y W              
      ' '1 2 2 3ˆ( / )( / )[( )L Y LK M X h Z X W     ' '3 3( )L h Z X  2( )]Y LW Y     (9.53) 
                              
From (9.53) it is evident that 1Xˆ  > 0 when tˆ  < 0 under the sufficient conditions: 
(i) 1 1 1LW tP X   (ii) ' '2 2L h Z X   < 0 and  
(iii) ' ' ' '2 3 3 3 2 2[ { ( ) ( )}K L K LA h Z X h Z X      1 1 2 2( )K L K L     ' '2 2( )L Yh Z X   
3 ]LW > 1 1 2 2[( )K L K L    ' '3 3 2( )( )L Y Lh Z X W Y     
                                                      1 1 2 2 3 2( ){ ( )L K L K K Y LW Y         2 3}Y K LW    
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So we establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 9.4: Liberalization of imports of non-hazardous wastes may lead to increase 
in domestic recovery of wastes, even when imported and domestic wastes are perfect 
substitutes. 
 
Propositions 9.3 and 9.4 can be explained as follows. Owing to a reduction in tariff rate 
the domestic price of the informal recovery sector falls. The informal sector wage rate, 
W, also falls, which in turn reduces 2P  in order to satisfy the zero-profit condition in 
sector 2. The informal recycling sector (sector 2) expands in order to satisfy the increased 
demand for 2X , resulting from a fall in 2P . The fall in W  leads to reduction in the wage - 
rental ratio in the informal sector, inducing the producers to adopt more labour-intensive 
techniques of production. Given 1X  and 2X  adoption of more labour intensive 
techniques means a shortage of labour leading to contraction (expansion) of sectors 1 and 
2 (sector 3) as the formal sector is more capital-intensive than the informal sector (as a 
whole). As a result, the initial increase in 2X  may be partly offset. The effect on national 
income is somewhat ambiguous. With a fixed wage, W and given labour-output ratio, 
expansion of the formal sector leads to a rise in the formal sector wage income. The 
contraction of sector 1 plummets the cost of tariff protection and hence raises the national 
income.  The total informal sector labour income is affected due to: (i) fall in W , (ii) rise 
in 1La  and 2La  and (iii) contraction in 1X  and expansion in 2X . The national income Y 
increases if the positive effects outweigh the negative ones. This again leads to expansion 
in 2X  via income effect. The net expansion of sector 2 leads to fall in the pollution level 
producing a positive effect on the efficiency of labour so that labour endowment (in 
efficiency units) rises. This produces a Rybczynski effect so that the informal sectors 1 
and 2 expand and the formal sector contracts since the informal sector (as a whole) is 
more labour intensive than the formal sector.  
 
There is a net expansion in the recycling sector if the initial expansion due to fall in its 
price is reinforced by an increase in national income due to labour reallocation and 
change in output composition, which is possible under the sufficient conditions stated in 
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proposition 9.3.  The recovery sector expands despite the initial contraction if proposition 
9.3 holds, that is, the recycling sector expands and the resulting favorable effect on 
pollution and efficiency of labour is strong enough to produce a Rybczynski effect that 
may have sufficient expansionary effect on sector 1 to outweigh the initial contraction. 
This requires another sufficient condition: ' '2 2 0L h Z X   . It implies that due to one 
additional unit of production of 2X , pollution falls by 
'
2Z X  which in turn raises the 
efficiency of labour by ' ' 2h Z X . Thus instead of 2L  the availability of labour to other 
sectors decreases by only ' '2 2L h Z X  . Now, if ' '2 2 0L h Z X    production of an 
additional unit of 2X  actually raises the availability of labour (in efficiency unit) to the 
rest of the economy. 
 
Now it would be worthwhile to analyse the effects of tariff reduction on pollution level in 
the economy.  
     
Substitution of (9.51) and (9.52) in (9.44) yields  
' ' '
1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( / )( / )( / )[ [ { ( ) }L K L L KZ Z Z Tt M X A X h Z X         
    ' '2 1 3 1 3 3{ ( )}]L K K LX h Z X      1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1( )[ {( )K L K L L YX W tP X         
     ' '2 2 1 12 1( ) }L L Lh Z X B      ' '2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1{ ( ) ( )}]Y L L L Y LX W h Z X W tP X          
    1 1 2 2 3 2 1 12 1 1 1 1( )[ {( ) ( ) }L K L K K K Y L KX W tP X B              2 1 3{ K LX W   
    3 1 1 1( )}]]K LW tP X    
'
1
ˆ( / )( / )( / )Z Z K M X  3 1[ { LX B 1 1 1 2( ) (L Y LW tP X     
    ' ' 2 1 12 )}Lh Z X    ' '2 3 3 1 1 1{( ) ( )L Y LX h Z X W tP X      1 3}]Y L LW     (9.54) 
     
Thus, Zˆ < 0 when tˆ < 0 under the sufficient conditions: 
(i) 1 1 1LW tP X   
(ii) 3 2 1 12 1 1 1 1{( ) ( ) }K K Y L KX W tP X B         2 1 3 3 1 1 1{ ( )}K L K LX W W tP X      
(iii) 3 1{( LX W 1 1 ) YtP X  ' '2 2 1 12 1( ) }L L Lh Z X B      2 1 3{ Y L LX W     
        ' '3 3 1 1 1( ) ( )}L Y Lh Z X W tP X      
 Page | 272 
This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 9.5: Reduction in tariff rates on import of non-hazardous wastes may lower 
the pollution level. 
 
It follows from the explanation for Propositions 9.3 and 9.4 that the expansion of sector 2 
produces a favorable effect on the pollution level, raising the efficiency of labour so that 
labour endowment (in efficiency units) rises. This produces a Rybczynski effect so that 
the informal sector expands and formal sector contracts since the informal sector (as a 
whole) is more labour intensive than the formal sector. Since pollution is positively 
related to the magnitude of formal sector production, its contraction lowers the level of 
pollution. Again, if Proposition 9.3 holds, expansion of the recycling sector has a further 
lowering effect on pollution. 
 
Effects of foreign capital inflow on the economy 
 
Now to examine the effects of foreign capital inflow it is assumed that tˆ  = 0 and Kˆ  > 0. 
From (9.51) it is obtained that 2Xˆ > 0 when Kˆ > 0 under the sufficient conditions:  
(i) 1 1 1LW tP X   and 
(ii) ' '3 3 1 1 1 1 3( )( )L L L Lh Z X W tP X W       
  
So the following proposition can be established. 
Proposition 9.6: Foreign capital inflow may lead to expansion of the domestic waste 
recycling sector 
 
From (9.53) it is evident that 1Xˆ  > 0 when Kˆ > 0 under the sufficient conditions:  
(i) 1 1 1LW tP X   ; (ii) ' '2 2( )L h Z X  < 0 and  
(iii) ' '2 2 3( )L Y Lh Z X W   ' '3 3( )L h Z X  2( )Y LW Y    
 
This establishes the following proposition. 
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Proposition 9.7: Foreign capital inflow may lead to increase in domestic waste recovery 
 
Propositions 9.6 and 9.7 can be explained in the following fashion. An inflow of foreign 
capital leads to expansion of the formal sector and contraction of the informal sectors 1 
and 2 in accordance with the Rybczynski theorem. Since the informal recovery sector is 
the tariff-protected sector its contraction reduces the cost of tariff protection and hence 
raises Y. Expansion of the higher wage-paying sector enhances Y as well. On the other 
hand, the total wage income in the two informal sectors fall, lowering Y. National income 
augments if the positive effects outweigh the negative effects. This leads to the expansion 
of 2X . If the rise in 2X  due to income effect is stronger than its initial fall, pollution level 
reduces so that the labour endowment in efficiency units rises. This produces another 
Rybczynski effect leading to fall in the formal sector and expansion of the informal 
sectors. If the increase in efficiency of labour due to fall in pollution is sufficiently 
strong, the Rybczynski effect outweighs the initial Rybczynski effect and leads to 
expansion of the two informal sectors and contraction of the formal sector.  
 
Now the effect of an increase in foreign capital inflow on pollution level in the economy 
is analyzed. 
From (9.54) we obtain that ˆ 0Z   when ˆ 0K   under the sufficient conditions: 
(i) 1 1 1LW tP X   
(ii) ' '1 1 1 1 2 2 1 12( ) ( )L L Y L LB W tP X h Z X          
(iii) ' '1 1 1 3 3( ) ( )L Y LW tP X h Z X     1 3Y L LW    
So we can establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 9.8: An inflow of foreign capital may lower the pollution level in the 
economy 
 
It follows from the explanation for Propositions 9.6 and 9.7 that if national income rises 
due to inflow of foreign capital and produces strong income effects, sector 2 expands and 
produces a favorable effect on the pollution level, raising the efficiency of labour so that 
labour endowment (in efficiency units) rises. This produces a Rybczynski effect so that 
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the informal sector (sectors 1 and 2) expands and the formal sector contracts since the 
informal sector (as a whole) is more labour intensive than the formal sector. This leads to 
lowering of the level of pollution since pollution is positively related to the magnitude of 
formal sector production and inversely with recycling.  
 
The above model shows that tariff reforms in wastes and foreign capital inflow may 
produce effects that tend to increase domestic waste recovery as well as recycling and 
lower the level of pollution in an economy where waste recovery and recycling are 
carried out in the informal sector.  
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APPENDIX 9.1: Derivations of certain expressions 
 
Total differentiation of (9.3) gives 
](.))}(.)({)[)/(( 222
2
223 dXTZddXZTXXa   
or, 2323232232233 ˆ(.)))1(/(ˆ(.)))1(/(ˆˆ XZTtPaXTtPXaPrK                              
                                                                                              ))1(/( 3223 tPXa  ZZT
ˆ(.)           
or, 22223223213 ˆ(.))/(ˆ)/ˆ( XTXPPPLK    2223 ˆ(.))/( XZTP     
                                                                                                         + ZZTXP ˆ(.))/( 2223                                                                                                                 
or, 2222232123132 ˆ(.))(.))(/()]()[/ˆ( XTXZTXPP LLLK        
                                                                                    ZZTXP ˆ(.))(/( 2223  )          (9.19) 
Again differentiation of (9.9) yields, 
)/ˆ()/ˆ(ˆ(.))/(.)(ˆ)(ˆ 222221112223211  PPXhXZhXX KLKLLLL   
                                                                                     )/ˆ)}(1/({ 2233133  PLKL                                                                                                                                               
Rearranging terms we get 
)]1/(()[/ˆ( 2331332221112   LKLKLKLP   
                                                 0ˆˆ(.))]/(.)([ 112232  XXhXZh LLL           (9.20)               
 
Finnaly, differentiation of (9.6) gives, 
)/ˆ()/ˆ(ˆˆ)(ˆ 2222211123211  PPKXX LKLKKKK     
                                                                                      )/ˆ))(1/(( 2233133  PLLK               
or, 112322331332221112 ˆˆ)()}]1/({)[/ˆ( XXP KKKLLKLKLK    
                                                                                                         Kˆ                      (9.21)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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APPENDIX 9.2: Derivation of stability condition in the market for the non-traded 
input 
 
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through 
adjustments in its price, 2P . 
 
The stability condition in the market for commodity 2 requires that  
0)/)(( 222  dPXXd
D . This implies around equilibrium, initially, 22 XX
D  . Thus, 
.0))ˆ/ˆ()ˆ/ˆ(( 2222  PXPX
D                                                                                        (A.1) 
 
We note that 21 , XX and 3X can be simultaneously solved from equations (9.3), (9.6) and 
(9.9) as functions of 2P . Differentiating equations (9.3), (9.9) and (9.6) and keeping the 
parameters unchanged, we get the following three expressions, respectively.  
2132
ˆˆˆ PMXHXG                                                                                                 (A.2) 
223322211
ˆˆˆ(.))}/(.)({ˆ PMXXhXZhX LLL   ; and,                                   (A.3)  
23332211
ˆˆˆˆ PMXXX KKK                                                                                 (A.4) 
 
where:  ;0)/(.)(;0)/(.)( 3
*
33
*
32  XPTHXPXZTG  
)/1)}(({}/){( 21231323131  LLLKLKM   
);/1))}(1/(({ 2331332221112   LKLKLKLM        and,                  (A.5) 
)/1))}(1/(({ 2331332221113   LLKLKLKM  
 
Solving (A.2)  (A.4) by Cramer’s rule we get: 
)];()()[/ˆ(ˆ 21311331122 MMHMPX KLKLKL   and,                           (A.6)  
(.))}]/(.)({)()[/ˆ(ˆ 2211211213123 hXZhMMMMGPX LKKLKL      (A.7)    
where: (.))}]/(.)({)([ 221211331 hXZhHG LKKLKLKL               (A.8) 
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 From (A.6) we find that 
)]()()[/1()ˆ/ˆ( 21311331122 MMHMPX KLKLKL                            (A.9) 
 
Now the demand for the non-traded input is given by 
.3232 XaX
D  Differentiating this equation one gets 
.ˆˆ 32 XX
D  Using (A.7) one can find 
211211213122 {)()[/1()ˆ/ˆ( LKKLKL
D MMMMGPX    
                                                                                              (.))}]/(.)( 2 hXZh   (A.10)   
Using (A.1), (A.9) and (A.10) we find the following stability condition for equilibrium in 
the market for commodity 2. 
 ))ˆ/ˆ()ˆ/ˆ(( 2222 PXPX
D )/1(  )()([ 21312131 MMHMMG KLKL    
                                   0(.))}]/(.)()({ 23213211  hXZhM LLKKKL        
Inserting the values of 21 ,,, MMHG and 3M from (A.5) into the above expression and 
noting that )/()/1( 22233
*
3 XPXP  we get 
)[/1())ˆ/ˆ()ˆ/ˆ(( 2222  PXPX D )}({ 212313 LLLK   )({ 321 KKL    
                                                                                   (+) 
                                                                               (.))}/(.)()( 2321 hXZhLLK    
                                                                                                          (+)                             
              + }/(.)}(.){{ 22223 XPTXZT  )({ 2212212111 LKLKLKLK    
                                                       0)}]))(1/(( 3313312331  LKLKLKL   
                                                                                                      (+) 
                                             0)/()/(                                           (9.25) 
where: )()()}{()[{/1( 321321212313 KKLLLKLLLK    
                                                         (+)                                 ( )     
           (.))}/(.)( 21 hXZhK   221211122223 ((.)){(.))(/( KLKLKTXZTXP    
                        )}]))(1/(() 3313312331221 LKLKLKLLKL   ; and,       (9.24)   
                                                                                           (+) 
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)([{ 212313 LLLK   } )}]((.))/(.)({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh         
                          (+)                                                                                            ( )  
         )]/((.)}(.){[ 22223 XPTXZT  )([ 2212212111 LKLKLKLK    
                                               )]))(1/(( 3313312331 LKLKLKL              (9.26.1) 
                                                                                               (+) 
 
 
APPENDIX 9.3: Derivation of equation (9.28)  
 
The effective emission tax rate is given by             
F
3
2 ))((
X
ZXZT                                                                                                                         
Differentiating F and using (9.18), we get 
ZZTXTXXZTXFF ˆ(.)ˆ(.)ˆ(.)ˆ 2223   
                                (.)}(.){ˆ 22 TXZTX ZZT
ˆ(.)  
 
Now using (9.22) one gets 
3
ˆXFF   (.)}(.){ 2 TXZT  [ KL ˆ)/1( 1 )}({ 212313 LLLK    
                                                                    − ])}/()(.){(ˆ 2223 CXPZTZ     ZZT ˆ(.)  
where, C 33123312212212111 ))(1/(()([ KLKLLKLKLKLK    
                                                                                                          .0)]331  LKL                                       
Use of (9.24) and simplification yield 
3
ˆXFF   (.)}(.)[{ 2 TXZT  )/( 1  L KLLLK ˆ)}]({ 212313    
                                                                                             (+) 
                        ZXPCTXZTXPZT ˆ}]/){((.)}(.))}[{/()(.){( 232222223      
 
Further simplification gives 
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3
ˆXFF  (.)}(.){ 2 TXZT  )/[( 1  L KLLLK ˆ)}]({ 212313    
              )}[/()(.){(  ZT (.))/(.)()}{({ 2321212313 hXZhLLKLLLK    
                                                                                   ZKKL
ˆ)}]( 321              (9.28) 
 
 
APPENDIX 9.4:  Derivation of equation (9.29) 
 
Differentiation of equation (9.12) yields 
 
* *
2 3 3 3 3 3 3(.) (.) ( ) ( )L L L DdY h dW Wh Z dX W W a dX W W X da a X dW K dr              
                                                                                    ZdTdXZT (.)(.) 2  33dXmP                                         
or, *2 2 3 3 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(.) (.) ( ) LYY Wh W Wh Z X X W W a X X      
                                                   * 3 3 3 3 23 ˆ ˆ( ) ( / (1 ))L K DW W a X r rK r                                                                                                                                                               
                                                   WXWaL ˆ33 ZZTXXZT
ˆ(.)ˆ(.) 22  233 XˆXmP    
                               (note that ra KL ˆ))1/((ˆ 23333   ; ).1()( 2333   KL ).  
 
Now substitution of 2Xˆ in place of 3Xˆ into the above equation yields 
*
3 3 3 3 3 23
ˆ ˆ ˆ{ (.) (1 )} {( ) ( / (1 )) }L L K DYY h W W W W a X rK r          
                     2(.)}(.)[{ XZThW  * 3 3 3 2
ˆˆ( ) (.) ] (.)LW W h mP X X T ZZ      
                                                                                    
With the help of (9.15) and (9.16) the above expression becomes 
*
1 3 3 3 3 1 23 1 2
ˆ ˆ[ (.) (1 ) ( ) (.) ( / (1 )) ]( / )K L L K L D LYY Wh W W h rK P                
                             ZZT ˆ(.) 23332 ˆ](.))*((.)}(.)[{ XXmPhWWXZhWT L    
 
Using (9.22) and (9.23) we can write 
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YY ˆ )}/()(.)[{ˆ 2223 XPZTAZ   )}]((.))/(.)(({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh    
           1 23 2 2 2
ˆˆ [{ / }{ (.) (.)}] (.)LK A P X T Z X T T ZZ         
          )}](){/[(ˆ 2123131 LLLKLBK   ])}/()(.)[{(
ˆ
2223 CXPZTBZ    
 
where A * 3 3 1 3 23 1 3 1[{( ) (.) / (1 )} (.) (1 ) ],L K L K L D LW W h Wh rK             
*
3 2 3 3[( ) (.) { (.) (.) } ]LB W W h T h W Z X mP X        ; and, 
C 33123312212212111 ))(1/(()([ KLKLLKLKLKLK    
                                                                                                       .0)]331  LKL   
 
Further simplification gives 
2322 )}[/()(.){(
ˆˆ  AXPZTZYY  )}((.))/(.)(({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh    
                                                                                                               () 
                                                                                                CB 23 )]( 22 XP     
                                                                                                                    (+)                                                         
      (.)}(.)){/)[(/(ˆ 222231 TXZTXPAK L   )}]({ 212313 LLLKB      (9.29) 
                                                                                                                  (+) 
 
APPENDIX 9.5:  Two possible cases 
 
Depending on the different signs and values of   the following two cases are possible. 
Case I:  0 . From (26.2)  (26.4) it follows that .0 Then, from the stability 
condition in the market for commodity 2 (given by (9.25)) one obtains: 0 . We have 
stated in the text that 0 only if 0(.)}(.){ 2  TXZT i.e. )./1( ZZET   Using 
(9.10.1) it is then easy to check from (22) that 0ˆ 2 X when 0ˆ K and 0ˆ 2 X when 
.0ˆ Z  
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Again with the help of (9.10.1) from (9.29) we find that 0ˆ Y  when 0ˆ K if (i) 0A ; 
and, (ii) .0B  On the other hand, 0ˆ Y  when 0ˆ Z under the same two sufficient 
conditions. 
 
Case II:  Let us now concentrate on the case where the agricultural sector is more capital 
(less labour) intensive than the informal manufacturing sector. In this case, we 
have )./()/( 2211 LKLK aaaa    This implies that 0)( 2121  LKKL  and 0 . There 
can be two sub-cases depending on the sign of , given by (9.26.2).  
 
Sub-case 1: 0 and .0 From (9.25) and (9.26.1) we find that 
0 and 0 (as 0 ). A sufficient condition for 0 is that 
0(.)}(.){ 2  TXZT i.e. )./1( ZZET   
 
From (9.22) one finds that 0ˆ 2 X when 0ˆ K and 0ˆ 2 X when .0
ˆ Z  This from 
(9.27), in turn, implies that 0ˆ Z when 0ˆ K and 0ˆ Z when .0ˆ Z   
 
Then from (9.29) it follows that 
0ˆ Y when 0ˆ K if (i) 0B ; and, (ii) .0(.))(.)( 2  TXZTA  
On the contrary, 0ˆ Y when 0ˆ Z if  
23[ A )}((.))/(.)({ 3212321 KKLLLK hXZh   CB 23 0]  . 
or, if )}((.))/(.)({[ 321232123 KKLLLK hXZhA   )]( 22 XP  0)( ; and, 
.0)(B  
 
Sub-case 2:  0 ; and, .0 This implies that for stability of equilibrium in the 
market for commodity 2 we need: 0  a necessary condition for which is: 
0(.)}(.){ 2  TXZT i.e. )./1( ZZET    
From (9.22) it then follows that 0ˆ 2 X when 0ˆ K ; and, 0ˆ 2 X when 0
ˆ Z . 
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On the other hand, from (9.29) it follows that 
0ˆ Y when 0ˆ K if (i) 0A ;  (ii) ;0B and, (iii) either A or B is non-zero.   
Also 0ˆ Y when 0ˆ Z  if (i) 0A ; and, (ii) .0B  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 283 
Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion and Comments  
 
Informal sector is essentially an extensive discipline as an element of the production 
system and labour markets in developing countries. It is not only a segment in a 
dichotomous economic structure; rather it encompasses an array of multifarious 
activities, each with its distinct feature. ‘Informality’ has a multidimensional character. 
Basically, it is conceived as work characterized by the lack of minimum levels of returns 
to labour, where the job is performed without legal rights, without opportunities for 
labour quality enhancement, with no social protection and trade union representation. 
Apart from such precarious employment in informal units, the recent expansion of 
informality within the private corporate sector and the public sector with outsourcing, 
subcontracting, work at home and other typical forms of work that foster unstable and 
insecure employment relations can safely be construed as unrestrained growth of 
‘informality’.  
 
The informal sector not only exists but is ubiquitous and has stupendous influence on the 
workings of the economy, inter-relationships between the economic agents and efficacy 
of changes in policy parameters. However, most of the enterprises cannot be placed in 
any of the extreme points of the formal-informal continuum; rather they fall in some 
place in the intermediate zone. This complexity gets in the way of formulation of 
appropriate progressive strategies targeted to integrate the informal sector into 
development.  
 
In this book we endeavour to give an insight into the different dimensions of the informal 
sector and study its multi-faceted interaction with the other sectors of the economy. Most 
importantly, we give an outline of the earlier doctrines, elucidate on the newer ones and 
critically review the contradictions within them to trace the nature and direction of 
desirable policy parameters that may be relevant in the present scenario. We have stylized 
the informal sector within different established theoretical frameworks. We have 
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incorporated the informal sector in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model; and also 
considered the dualistic approach within the Harris-Todaro framework. We have 
embraced the theories of dependency and/or underdevelopment where the focus shifts 
from marginalization to the structural linkages that exist between the informal and formal 
sectors. The dependent structural linkages between the informal and formal sectors are 
shaped by capitalist modes of production that result from the wage and labour strategies 
of capitalist enterprises which seek to lower costs by resorting to subcontracting. We 
have considered situations, albeit in different models, where the informal sector produces 
internationally traded final commodity, non-traded final commodity, and traded and non-
traded intermediaries. 
 
10.1. An Overview  
 
We set off our discussion with the most popular dualistic approach proposed by Harris 
and Todaro (1970). We explain the Harris-Todaro (HT) migration mechanism and trace 
out the importance of informal wage in the determination of unionized wage in a 
segmented urban labour market. In the existing literature on informal sector it is usually 
assumed that the workers who are unable to find employment in the urban formal sector 
are automatically absorbed in the informal sector in which the wage rate is perfectly 
flexible, thereby leaving no room for open unemployment in the migration equilibrium.  
But empirical evidence strongly suggests that the menace of open unemployment does 
exist in the urban sector of developing economies despite the existence of an informal 
sector. An informal sector of a developing economy often is found to consist of small 
subcontract firms, where workers do not get more than their reservation wages. Besides, 
there are often strong barriers to entry even into the informal sector, which exclude some 
workers in finding employment in the informal sector of the economy. We have 
presented theoretical models that show the simultaneous existence of urban informal 
sector and open unemployment in a Harris-Todaro model.  
 
A common practice in developing countries is that the governments often implement 
traditional subsidy policies to ameliorate the problem of rising unemployment in the 
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urban sector. The standard Harris-Todaro result suggests that the key to the solution of 
the urban unemployment lies in the rural sector of the economy.  The HT model advocates 
that any urban development policy aimed at enhancing employment opportunities in the 
urban sector is likely to exaggerate unemployment in the urban sector; rather rural 
development program is forwarded as a possible solution to the problem.  
 
However, the introduction of dualism in urban sector, where the informal sector coexists 
with formal sector, may generate results contradicting the standard Harris-Todaro result. 
It is shown that cases may arise where a rural development policy cannot mitigate urban 
unemployment resulting from rural-urban migration. On the contrary a surge in the wage 
or price subsidy to the urban sector may be instrumental in lowering the urban 
unemployment level. It is assumed that the government procures food from the rural 
sector and distributes it among the urban consumers so that the government can 
effectively control the urban labour force by controlling the availability of food in that 
sector. Subsidy policies to the rural sector increase the availability of food in the urban 
sector resulting from an increase in total food production, causing the urban labour force 
to expand. On the other hand, a wage or a price policy in the urban sector raises the level 
of employment in the urban sector, while keeping the rural sector undisturbed. Thus the 
urban unemployment level falls. However, here the crucial role of the demand side in 
determining the level of production both in the manufacturing and rural sectors has been 
ignored. This lacuna has been dealt with in another model where the importance of 
demand side in determination of the level of production in all the three sectors is 
considered. A price or a wage subsidy policy to the rural sector raises the aggregate 
income of the workers in the economy, which in turn causes an increase in the level of 
demand in all the three sectors, directly or indirectly. The employment level in each of 
the three sectors increases, thereby causing reduction in urban unemployment. Also a 
demand management policy, for example an export promotional scheme in the 
manufacturing industry raises the level of employment in each of the three sectors of the 
economy, directly or indirectly, lowering urban unemployment.  
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The essence of our discussion is that it can never be assured that urban development 
programs will necessarily be effective in solving the urban unemployment problem. 
Therefore, it seems prudent to avoid these policies. On the other hand, rural development 
programs in the form of a wage or price subsidy policy and/or a demand management 
policy such as an export promotional scheme in the manufacturing sector unambiguously 
lowers the urban unemployment level. However, when the urban unemployment level is 
demand determined and the government can control it through a demand management 
policy, then there is little justification of using the indirect policy measures such as price 
or wage subsidy policy. Thus we provide a theoretical basis for the introduction of export 
promotional schemes, for example, the formation of duty free export processing zones 
(EPZs) to mitigate the unemployment problem in the urban area.  
 
The informal subcontracting is introduced and it is shown that the informal sector firm 
does not get more than its reservation income in the subcontracting system and that the 
subcontracting system is the optimal policy to the formal sector firm provided there is 
imperfection in the credit market. A credit subsidy policy to the informal sector leads to 
an overall contraction of the formal sector while it expands the informal sector. However, 
it does not raise the industrial productivity so long as it is engaged in subcontracting 
arrangement with the formal sector firm. 
 
The common contention now in the perspective of the ongoing process of globalisation is 
that the problems of all developing countries can be best understood with reference to the 
international environment, of which they are a part. The problems of underdevelopment 
must, therefore, first and foremost be perceived in a global context. We try to explore 
different aspects of the informal sector in the backdrop of globalisation.  
 
We analyse the effects of liberalised trade and investment policies on welfare and open 
unemployment in a developing economy. A conventional result in the literature on trade 
and development is that growth with foreign capital is immiserizing in a tariff-distorted 
economy. Having discussed this result that had been obtained in a number of studies in 
both HOS and Harris–Todaro (1970) frameworks, we show in a three sector Harris-
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Todaro (1970) type general equilibrium model, with the assumption of wage rigidity in 
the two urban sectors, leading to the simultaneous existence of open unemployment and 
an urban informal sector in the migration equilibrium, that an inflow of foreign capital in 
either of the two broad sectors of the economy may be welfare improving mainly through 
the fall in urban unemployment.  On the other hand, a reduction in import tariff may 
lower national welfare. This is in contradiction to the traditional result that envisages 
removal of distortions to facilitate more efficient allocation of resources. Besides, an 
inflow of foreign capital into the urban sector (a reduction in import tariff) leads to an 
expansion (a contraction) of the urban sector of the economy. This policy is likely to 
ameliorate (aggravate) the problem of urban unemployment. These results are completely 
opposite to those generated by the standard Harris-Todaro model. 
 
We also show that even in a 2  2 decomposable production structure there may be 
welfare gains from foreign capital. This happens if the labour reallocation effect of 
foreign capital inflow outweighs the output effect (of the import-competing sector). 
However, the existence of labour market distortion is a necessity to obtain the 
counterintuitive result and any attempt to lower the magnitude of labour market distortion 
lowers the possibility of welfare gain from foreign capital. A liberalizing developing 
economy, yearning for foreign capital, therefore, ought to be vigilant while undertaking 
labour market reform policy. This is because there is a trade off between the growth with 
foreign capital and labour market reform policy. However, it is also true that in obtaining 
welfare-improving result of foreign capital, the presence of labour market distortion is 
necessary only in the absence of technology transfer. In case foreign capital inflow is 
accompanied by technology transfer, welfare of the economy may increase even if there 
is no labour market distortion. Foreign capital leads to an increase in the efficiency of 
domestic labour, effectively raising the labour supply. As a consequence, the tariff-
protected sector does not necessarily expand. With additional labour supply it is quite 
likely that domestic income rises and foreign capital is welfare-improving if the labour 
endowment effect is sufficiently large. Thus, investment liberalisation policy and labour 
market reform may be undertaken concomitantly in the presence of technology transfer. 
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Empirical evidence points out that trade and investment liberalisation has so far failed to 
provide any substantial welfare gains to the liberalizing countries, which seems quite 
puzzling. One possible explanation may be that the liberalizing countries have tried to 
free their economy in every possible way and at a very brisk pace, without pre-
calculating their possible outcomes. Whether a country should follow every aspect of the 
WTO-prescribed policy-package is a vital question. We have shown that an inflow of 
foreign capital is desirable only if there exists certain degree of labour market distortion. 
So, again this calls for a very cautious tread towards labour market reform. If labour 
market distortion is removed beyond a certain limit, gainful effects of investment and 
trade liberalisation policies cannot be achieved and in the extreme cases these may even 
be counterproductive. On the other hand, a tariff reform measure has been found to be 
relatively safe in the existing setup. In the Harris-Todaro setting an inflow of foreign 
capital has been found to be immiserizing. The welfare consequences of tariff and labour 
market reforms have been found to depend crucially on the presence and magnitude of 
foreign capital in the economy. If the magnitude of foreign capital is relatively small, 
deregulation of the labour market is likely to produce a favourable effect on national 
welfare while a tariff reform will be counterproductive. But these results are likely to get 
reversed in the presence of substantial amount of foreign capital in the economy.  
 
With substantial evidences of ‘informalisation’ in the developing countries, generally 
attributed to liberalised policies, it becomes imperative to examine the effects of such 
policies on the welfare of informal sector workers, that can fairly be assessed by the 
informal wage rate. We have shown that trade liberalisation, except in a very special 
case, produces depressing effect on the informal wage while inflows of foreign capital 
and/or structural reforms like deregulating the labour market are likely to produce 
favourable effects on the wage earnings of the poor workers. The latter result is 
extremely crucial as it explains why labour market reform should form an integral 
constituent of the liberalised economic package in the liberalizing countries. Furthermore, 
these results do not hinge on the nature of the capital mobility between the formal and 
informal sectors and, therefore, are robust.  So, removal of the protectionist policy, which 
aims at reduction of commodity market distortion, must be undertaken very cautiously as 
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it is likely to hurt the interest of the poorer group of the workforce. On the other hand, 
investment and labour market reforms may be encouraged.  
 
In accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem it is predicted that liberalised policies 
are likely to lower the prevailing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. 
But empirical evidences in a number of developing countries are in sharp contradiction to 
this conjecture. We have shown that the wage inequality rises unambiguously due to 
policies like an increase in the relative price of the high-skill commodity and a reduction 
of import tariff from the low-skill manufacturing sector. On the other hand, an increase in 
capital endowment due to, for example, an inflow of foreign capital improves the wage 
inequality if the skill-intensive sector is not more capital-intensive (in a special sense) 
vis-à-vis the low-skill manufacturing sector. Interestingly, contrary to the common 
wisdom a decline in the trade union power of the unskilled labour that results from a 
policy of labour market reform does not necessarily lead to deterioration in the skilled-
unskilled wage inequality. In fact, such a policy may improve the wage inequality under 
reasonable condition. This result is important especially, when many of the developing 
countries are hesitant to undertake labour market reforms seriously in the fear that such a 
move would be vehemently resisted by the political parties and trade unions on the plea 
that it would lead to general wage reductions of the poorer groups of the working 
population engaged in different sectors of the economy and accentuate the wage 
inequality. But, we have shown that there is very little substance in such a common and 
populist belief. The vast section of the poor working population engaged in the different 
unorganized sectors of the economy will ultimately be benefited from such a policy and 
the wage inequality is also very much likely to get better.  
 
A vital point that emerges is that the reform policy/ies to be undertaken essentially 
depends on the nature of the target group, whose welfare the government envisages to 
safeguard. Liberalisation policies that improve overall national welfare may be 
detrimental for the poorer section of the society or may intensify inequality in terms of 
wages. This can be indicative of the fact that the benefits accruing to the relatively well-
off section greatly outweighs the harm inflicted on the poor. Thus it rests with the 
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respective governments to choose from the alternative reform strategies and implement 
them in accordance with their objectives of egalitarianism, uplifting the downtrodden or 
mitigating social inequality.  
 
The social menace of child labour is inextricably linked to the informal sector of 
developing countries. Almost the entire child labour force is employed in the informal 
sector in these countries. Poverty and lack of educational facilities are often referred to in 
the literature as the primary factors responsible for the incidence of child labour. 
Liberalised trade and investment policies and provision of better and free education are 
largely recommended as remedial measures. It is advocated that policies like tariff 
reforms and / or inflow of foreign capital in substantial amounts are likely to take the 
developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits of which would eventually 
percolate down to the bottom rungs of the society and reduce poverty. A reduction in 
poverty, in turn, would exert a downward pressure on the incidence of child labour and 
urban unemployment of adult labour. On the other hand, betterment of educational 
facilities coupled with allied incentive schemes would also be able to deliver the goods 
by keeping the children from poor families into schools and refraining them from 
entering the job market. However, empirical evidences from developing economies 
embarking on economic liberalisation are not quite encouraging. The incidence of child 
labour has plummeted over the last few decades but not at the expected rate. Even in 
some high growth-prone areas, the incidence has been on the rise. Why globalisation and 
betterment of educational opportunities have not so far been able to produce the desired 
results is quite puzzling.  
 
We have shown that if different trade and investment liberalisation programs and a free 
education policy are undertaken simultaneously in a transition economy, their overall 
effect on the supply of child labour may not be quite satisfactory as different policies 
produce mutually opposite effects on the incidence of child labour, thereby nullifying 
each other’s effects, at least partially.  
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Even in an H-T model inflow of foreign capital in the economy and / or a free education 
policy may raise the supply of child labour in the urban sector by forcing rural workers to 
migrate to the urban sector with their children and accentuate the problem of urban 
unemployment of adult labour. Besides, trade reforms like tariff reductions on the urban 
final manufacturing product or rise in the price of the export commodity resulting from 
worldwide liberalised trade policies in agriculture and the education subsidy policy 
lowers the welfare of the run of the meal people of the urban sector while foreign capital 
inflow unambiguously improves their welfare. The analysis made in this book can serve 
to question the effectiveness of these policies as a general proposition. The policymakers 
should decide which policies to be given priority and carried out in order to mitigate the 
incidence of poverty-induced child labour in the system only after taking into account all 
parameter values to get the desired results.  
 
Quite interestingly, the informal sector has its share of contribution in the environment 
too by way of perpetuating as well as mitigating environmental pollution. In developing 
countries reduction of the permissible level of pollution by pollution regulating 
authorities is a conventional policy to arrest further environmental degradation. Although 
both the formal and informal manufacturing units cause industrial pollution, the extent of 
pollution generated by the informal sector firms is significantly greater than that 
generated by their formal sector counterparts. With limited access to Environmentally 
Sound Technology (EST) the informal sector firms, largely using backward technology, 
are responsible for a major share of pollutants. The formal sector firms in developing 
countries often subcontract the informal sector units to undertake a number of tasks and 
processes that are “dirty” from the environmental point of view. The informal sector 
firms being unregistered are difficult to control and so they face fewer incentives to 
prevent pollution. In the circumstances, an indirect way to control environmental 
pollution is to impose pollution emission tax on the formal sector firms if the level of 
industrial pollution created exceeds a certain permissible level. This is expected to 
persuade them to minimize harmful discharges by cutting down the use of intermediaries 
produced by the informal sector and thus improve the environmental quality. A pertinent 
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question is whether this indirect way of controlling pollution can actually deliver the 
goods.  
 
We have analyzed the efficacy of such a policy in a three-sector general equilibrium 
model with a polluting informal sector, which produces a non-traded intermediate input 
for the formal sector. It is shown that even if the permissible pollution level is reduced, 
the polluting sector may expand and lead to a deterioration in the environmental standard. 
Quite unexpectedly, this policy may improve welfare of the economy. This has a very 
important policy implication due to the counterintuitive results of direct environmental 
policies. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital may be effective in lowering the 
level of pollution although it may affect welfare of the economy adversely. Therefore, 
there might exist a trade-off between the economy’s objectives of lowering the level of 
pollution and improving national welfare. This calls for designing appropriate policies 
since reduction of pollution level and improvement of national welfare, both feature as 
priorities for a developing economy. 
 
It is believed that pollution and solid waste generation are unavoidable accomplices of 
industrial production. To tackle the solid wastes, the well known ‘waste management 
hierarchy’ proposes waste minimization, reuse, recycle, recovery and disposal, and it is 
believed that waste minimization is the best approach. But in developing countries with 
less stringent pollution norms and environmental standards, waste minimization is often 
not prioritized; rather rampant industrial activities with heavily polluting and waste 
generating effects are indulged in. Waste dumping and open burnings can cause severe 
harmful effects; landfill has its own problems as well since it encroaches into the already 
scarce land in these countries with massive rates of urbanization. Hence, recycling, 
although not the best, may be the only viable solution for managing solid wastes in these 
countries.  
 
The informal sector plays a crucial role in recovery, processing and recycling of solid 
wastes in developing countries which are some of the largest importers of recyclable 
wastes that are mainly used in the informal recycling industries as intermediate goods. 
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International agreements like the Basel Convention prohibit trade in hazardous wastes, 
but there exists controversies regarding effects of free trade in non-hazardous recyclable 
wastes.  
 
We show that foreign capital inflow and tariff reforms in wastes may produce effects that 
tend to increase domestic waste recovery as well as recycling and lower the level of 
pollution in an economy where waste recovery and recycling are carried out in the 
informal sector.  
 
 
10.2. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although having dealt with a number of issues, we perhaps have been unable to do 
justice to an extensive topic like informal sector within our limitations. There still remain 
pertinent issues that demand theoretical exposition. A few of them have been discussed 
below with a view to provide an outline for further research.  
 
Self-employment has assumed remarkable significance, more in the recent years, 
accounting, in average, for more than 30% of the labour force. The importance of self-
employment had long been sketched by Hart (1971) who emphasized, “The distinction 
between formal and informal income opportunities is based essentially on that between 
wage earning and self-employment.” Although it was an overtly simplified 
categorization, it indicated self-employment as an important part of the informal sector. It 
offers a choice between underemployment as informal wage earners or to be self 
employed, and involves a micro level decision of individuals whether to work for 
themselves or commoditize their labour. Self-employment may again be dichotomous in 
nature. On one hand it consists of artisans, shoe shine boys, street vendors, repairmen, 
depicting lower income than formal sector wage earning activities, while on the other, it  
comprises of small business enterprises that operate on an informal basis to circumvent 
regulations that often earn higher then informal wage earners. The recent surge in 
informal self employment can be broadly ascribed to the effects of flexible deregulation 
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of labour markets in most of the developing world embracing economic reform, which 
encourage temporary contract modalities or the lack of it.  
 
The informal self-employed serve the community by providing cheaper goods, ready 
access to goods, employment for the unskilled, and an employment "cushion" for bad 
times. Despite globalisation and the resulting competition informal self employment has 
recently played a major role in poverty alleviation through employment and income 
generation. However, theoretical literature on informal self-employment is scarce. While 
substantial research has been focused towards the workings of informal wage 
employment and the implications that liberalisation has on informal workers, the 
repercussions on those self employed in the informal sector are rarely studied. 
 
Secondly, empirical evidences indicate an overwhelming representation of women in 
informal sector employment. In some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, virtually all of the 
female non-agricultural labour force is in the informal sector: for example, the informal 
sector accounts for over 95 % of women workers outside agriculture in Benin, Chad, and 
Mali. In India and Indonesia, the informal sector accounts for nine out of every ten 
women working outside agriculture. In ten Latin American and four East Asian countries, 
for which data are available, half or more the female non-agricultural workforce is in the 
informal sector. Thus, the informal sector is a larger source of employment for women 
than for men (Charmes, 1998; UN, 2000; Chen, 2001). 
 
Although it is very difficult to accurately count the women workers in the informal 
sector, street hawkers and vendors probably account for a large proportion of the women 
working in commerce as family or ‘own account’ workers. Other forms of women's 
informal employment include domestic service, contracting or subcontracting, and 
prostitution. Women's problems in informal sector employment include low earnings, 
lack of skills, lack of knowledge of commerce and local bureaucracies, no access to 
wholesale suppliers and credit, and illiteracy. 
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Globalisation and the resulting restructuring of production foster outsourcing of 
production to home-workers who remain outside the formal workforce. There is a 
predominance of women in the export processing zones, for example in the garment 
industry of Bangladesh. Notwithstanding the fact that women’s informal work 
contributes substantially to GDP and global trade, women informal workers are overtly 
synonymous with poverty and vulnerability. 
 
Although average incomes of both men and women are lower in the informal sector than 
in the formal sector the gender gap in income and wages appears higher in the informal 
sector than in the formal sector and exists even when women are not wage workers. This 
is largely due to the fact that women are under-represented in high-income activities (like 
informal entrepreneur, self employed) and over-represented in low-income activities (like 
casual worker and subcontract worker).  
 
They are constrained to work in the neighbourhood of their residence and can access jobs 
only through informal contacts, both of which reduce their bargaining power 
considerably. The tendency for specialized activities to be concentrated in different 
geographic locations of a city further restricts the possibility of women workers being 
engaged in diverse jobs and thus aggravates the situation of an excess supply of labour in 
a particular activity. Constrained choice, limited contacts of women and physical 
segmentation of the labour market perpetuate forces that entrap women workers in a low-
income situation with worse outcomes than those of their male counterparts (Mitra, 
2005).  
 
Regulations regarding minimum wage, literacy campaign with the onus on women 
education along with vocational and on the job training are some of the recommendations 
found in the literature to improve the conditions of women within the informal sector. 
Unfortunately, theoretical literature to capture the gender dimension in the informal 
sector is scarce. It is necessary to trace out the labour market conditions and intriguing 
discrepancies in the wages of women workers and evaluate different policies with respect 
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to trade and reforms in the light of women informal workers since they are likely to affect 
the latter in a different manner.  
 
Third, illegal immigration has been a source of predicament for not only many 
developed, but developing countries as well. For example, inspite of efforts by the 
respective governments to restrict immigrants, the number of illegal immigrants from 
Mexico to U.S. and Bangladesh and Nepal to India has been on the rise. The illegal 
immigrants in the developing countries are mostly the unskilled workers of the 
neighbouring countries that permeate through the borders, largely motivated by the 
economic benefits in terms of higher wages or employability in the host country and end 
up in the informal sector, with virtually no barriers to entry.  
 
The welfare effects of illegal immigration in the host country have been subject to 
substantial debate. However, the unfavourable effects seem to be quite overwhelming. 
The influx of unskilled labour tends to exert a downward pressure on the competitive 
informal wage. With unemployment already existing in these developing host countries, 
unskilled immigrants are likely to displace native workers, and also become a source of 
burden for the government since they tend not to pay taxes by the virtue of their 
illegality.  
 
There exist a number of instruments for the government to control illegal immigration. 
The stringency in border enforcement and penalties for immigrants that are nabbed 
alongwith internal enforcement whereby illegal immigrants are apprehended and expelled 
from the country may be palpable methods to resist them. Some countries provide foreign 
aid to the country of origin in order to reduce income differentials and thus the incentive 
to immigrate. 
 
There exists a considerable theoretical literature on illegal immigration (Ethier, 1986; 
Bond and Chen, 1987 and Bandyopadhyay, 2006 to name only a few). However, the 
interaction of illegal immigrants with the informal sector has not received adequate 
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attention, but needs in-depth study before formulating policies to deal with illegal 
immigration. 
 
Fourth, the recent financial and economic crisis that initiated in 2008 mainly in the 
advanced countries has started to permeate into the developing countries with crisis 
impending in their wage and employment levels.  The global slump has critically affected 
poverty and income distribution and triggered rising joblessness in the developing 
countries.  According to a study by the Labour Bureau of Ministry of Labour and 
Employment in India, about half a million people were rendered jobless between October 
and December 2008 due to the recession. According to official Chinese figures, by 
January, 2009, 15.3 per cent of China’s 130 million migrant workers had lost their jobs 
and returned home. This aggregate figure of migrant job loss does not include those who 
stayed back in cities in search of new jobs and fell back upon the informal sector, at least 
temporarily. 
 
These conditions of increasing unemployment are anticipated to have large repercussions 
on the informal sector. Over 55 % of non-agricultural employment in the developing 
world is informal and these already high figures of informality are likely to increase even 
further. According to the annual Global Employment Trends report (2009) by the ILO the 
number of people joining the ranks of the unemployed, working poor and those in 
vulnerable employment, are expected to increase dramatically. The Asian Development 
Bank predicts that the number of self-employed people and unpaid family workers will 
increase by 21 million, if current conditions hold or by 60 million if the situation 
worsens. Empirical evidences from Argentina and many Asian countries support the 
predicted shift towards more informal employment in times of economic downturn.   
 
There are mainly three mechanisms through which the global recession has affected the 
informal sector: first, the fall in the imports of developed countries from developing 
ones and the consequent decline in commodity prices has severely hit the export 
oriented informal sector that either produce final export goods or supply intermediaries 
for the export industries. Developing countries which depend on primary and processed 
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products have impinged the rural agricultural informal sector. Secondly, during 
economic crises, informal employment acts as a cushion when people are laid off in the 
formal sector and need to find new job opportunities. Furthermore, an economy going 
into recession might experience a shift from the tradable to the non-tradable sectors, 
which again would strengthen informality. Third, the advanced countries may be 
expected to outsource more production aspects to the developing ones to curtail their 
costs, with the potential of generating new jobs and business . 
 
Since informal employment can offer only temporary job prospects that are more 
vulnerable in times of recession, the increasing informality can be construed as jobs of 
inferior quality, high risks and insufficient social protection that are likely to increase 
poverty levels in the developing countries. To counter this situation and strive towards 
the Millennium Development Goals, governmental intervention to improve social 
protection and empowerment for those in the informal sector seems crucial. The ILO 
suggests that people will be more willing to work under flexible terms if they have a 
better social safety network to fall back on. This would also reduce pressure on 
employers to provide welfare measures. Also, better social security is likely to minimize 
possibilities of social unrest. 
 
Better social security may be ensured by extending existing formal mechanisms to the 
informal sector or scaling up support mechanisms for informal sector so that it could act 
as a shock absorber to prevent people from falling into the poverty trap. Examples 
include the strengthening of conditional cash transfer programmes, enhancing public 
works and giving a boost to (micro)-insurance schemes that protect against basic risks 
like health shocks. Steps must also be taken to increase the productivity of informal 
businesses by providing better infrastructure and access to resources.  
 
The above discussion constitutes the general and perceptible insights into the impact of 
economic recession on the growth of informal sector. With a only few studies delving 
into the nuances of the linkages between economic downturn and informal sector, like 
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Rogerson (1988) and Meagher (2008), the present global recession calls for extensive 
study on the issue.  
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